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For political scientists, the vulnerability, peripheral nature and presumed lack of bargaining 
power of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) raises intriguing questions around how these 
fac o  infl ence SIDS  poli ical and diploma ic beha io .  Gi en he globalised nature of 
issues such as climate change, management of the ocean commons and the structuring of 
in e na ional ade ag eemen , all i al o SIDS  na ional in e e , i  i  logical o infe  ha  
SIDS have a strong motivation, even more than most states, to adopt diplomatic approaches 
ha  a e open  and ha  p io i i e he fo ma ion and main enance of coope a i e ela ion hip  
and even formal alliances.  For some scholars, there is a view that the most effective way for 
SIDS to overcome their structural weaknesses and improve their bargaining power is through 
a gang p  app oach o coope a i e diplomac , he eb  he  eek o o k oge he  o add e  
common problems  including through a SIDS-focused regionalism. 
 
Recognising that much of the SIDS literature has aken i  a  a gi en ha  he e a e  poli ical 
and diplomatic behaviour is conditioned by their supposed vulnerability and that the political 
dynamics of cooperation and contestation that may influence inter-island cooperation are too 
often downplayed, this study sets out to explore the realities of political engagement, 
cooperation, regionalism and collective diplomacy in one particular island grouping and in a 
specific thematic area: the island states of the Western Indian Ocean in the context of fisheries.   
 
The study asks how existing political dynamics between the Western Indian Ocean island states 
incentivise (or fail to incentivise) deepening cooperation, integration and collective diplomacy 
among these states in the fisheries sector.  The study also asks to what extent these existing 
political dynamics allow for the Western Indian Ocean island grouping to be thought of as a 
distinct and socially-constructed region  particularly one characterised by commonly-held and 
actionable fisheries regimes. Finally, to the extent that signs of inter-island cooperation and 
collective diplomacy can be found within this island grouping, the study queries whether there 
is e idence o gge  ha  ganging p  ha  allo ed he e i land a e  o boost their collective 
bargaining power and achieve impactful diplomatic outcomes on fisheries issues. 
 
The study argues that the political dynamics that exist between the Western Indian Ocean island 
states do incentivise inter-island cooperation in fisheries, but only to a limited extent.  
Technical cooperation in the fisheries sector, whether at the state or non-state levels, is clearly 
evident among these islands.  However, the existence of this technical cooperation does not 
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appear to serve as a catalyst for cooperative spillovers or for sustained political buy-in among 
the islands for fisheries-based integration, collective diplomacy or regime-building.  Connected 
to this, it is difficult to identify among these islands a clear notion of true regionness.  
 
The absence of commonly-accepted fisheries regimes among these islands, in particular, points 
to a lack of common values and expectations converging around this sector.  This, in turn, 
precludes the possibility of these island states constructing a common political identity as a 
di inc  fi he ie  egion  ( ome hing ha  hi  d  demon a e  ha  aken place in he 
comparable island grouping of the Pacific).  The upshot of these realities is that the Western 
Indian Ocean island states have little apparen  mo i a ion o gang p  fo  common ca e and, 
in the rare cases they have done so, they lack the deep reserve of collective political capital 
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CHAPTER 1: The Political Dynamics of Cooperation among Small Island 
Developing States  An Introduction 
 
1. Background: The Vulnerability of Small Island Developing States & the 
Presumed Importance of Cooperative Diplomacy  
A considerable literature exists chronicling the economic, political and environmental 
challenge  facing Small I land De eloping S a e  (SIDS).  SIDS  compa a i el  mall 
populations mean that their domestic markets seldom provide a strong base for economic 
growth.  SIDS are resultingly obligated, in spite of their tendency to be geographically remote 
and distant from global markets, to adopt an outward orientation that subjects them to the 
vagaries of international trade.  These states lack abundant natural resources and yet struggle 
to diversify their economies away from the few resources they do have.  Most SIDS rely on 
exporting a limited number of primary commodities, often to a very small number of export 
markets.  These traits all lead to a high exposure among SIDS to external economic shocks 
(Campling, 2006; Feeny and McGillivray, 2010; Guillaumont, 2010; Heger, Julca and 
Paddison, 2009; McGillivray, Naudé and Santos-Paulino, 2010). 
Some SIDS, especially those with expansive territorial waters, are able to leverage the 
endowments available to them through their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)1, including 
leasing oil and gas or mineral exploration rights, as well as fishing rights, to raise revenues.    
Financially, the benefits of leasing these rights may be substantial.  However, such benefits are 
mirrored by the strong possibility of over-exploitation and resulting resource depletion by 
rights-holders, particularly in contexts where SIDS lack the governance capacity to develop 
and enforce sustainable resource extraction measures.  Some SIDS have succeeded in 
diversifying their economies, often by making astute investments in developing their human 
capital.  Even this diversification, however, has tended to centre on fickle service sectors such 
as finance and tourism, which rarely provide a stable or extensive economic foundation 
(Campling, 2006; Lee, Hampton and Jeyacheya, 2014; Scheyvens and Momsen, 2008).            
Politically, SIDS are sometimes lauded for their supposed high levels of social cohesion 
and tendency towards transparent and democratic governance (Anckar, 2002; Srebrnik, 2004).  
Ho e e , he e a e  p blic admini a ion  a e picall  la ge p opo ional o pop la ion i e 
and a e co l  o ope a e gi en SIDS  mall dome ic a  ba e  and limi ed e en e o ce . 
 
1 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are sea zones, prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), that 
e end 200 na ical mile  f om a a e  ho eline.  Wi hin i  EEZ, a a e ha  o e eign igh  o e  ma ine e o ce  be  e ea  
surface.  This is the case even if surface waters within the EEZ are classified as international waters.  EEZs are thus not the same as a a e  
territorial waters, which based on UNCLOS conventions, e end 12 na ical mile  f om a a e  ho eline.  See he follo ing link: 
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm> (accessed 24 December 2018). 
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Many SIDS are resultingly forced to rely on foreign aid to ensure the day-to-day delivery of 
government services (Chittoo, 2011; Feeny and McGillivray, 2010; Rodrik, 1998).   
High an po  and ene g  co , connec ed o SIDS  geog aphic emo ene , ac  a  
considerable drags on island economies, but also emerge as intractable political problems and 
sources of occasional unrest linked to high costs of living (Armstrong and Read, 2003; 
Briguglio, 1995; Read, 2004).  Extensive labour migration provides needed remittance income 
to many small island households, but also pulls at the social fabric of these states in addition to 
draining local workforces (Amuedo-Dorantes, Pozo and Vargas-Silva, 2010; Attzs, 2009).  
Finally, while European colonial rule did bequeath at least some islands with stable systems of 
government, it also left legacies of racial resentment stemming from unequal access to power 
and resources among different ethno-cultural groups in some SIDS.  This is especially true in 
those islands that were centres for European plantation agriculture based on slave  and later 
indentured  labour (Scarr, 2000).  The persistence of inequalities, combined with failures in 
basic government service delivery, have been credited with increasing rates of crime and 
political violence in many SIDS (McGillivray, Naudé and Santos-Paulino, 2010). 
Environmentally, SIDS are confronted with the ongoing degradation of their coastal 
and marine resources, particularly their coral reefs and fish stocks.  As has been well-
documented, many of these states are at the forefront of conversations about the medium and 
long-term impacts of climate change.  Rising seas, ocean acidification and increased exposure 
o in en ified ocean o m em  all po e h ea  o he e i land  ellbeing and e en 
survival.  At present, increased soil salinity caused by heightened incidences of flooding and 
d o gh  a e p e ing he e i land  ag ic l al li elihood  and food ec i  (Ba ne  and 
Campbell, 2010; Betzold, 2015; Kelman, 2010).     
There remains considerable scholarly debate around both the formulation of a precise 
conceptual definition of smallness , as well as about how smallness , in both a geographic 
and demographic sense, links to islandness  to mark the issues noted above (Campling, 2006; 
Maass, 2009; Sutton, 2011).  There is also an acknowledgment that many of the problems 
confronting SIDS, such as small domestic markets, lack of economic diversification and costly 
government administration, may also be characteristic of some non-SIDS small states and even 
some larger island states (Connell, 1993; Read, 2001; Selwyn, 1980).  However, the literature 
tends to broadly agree on two main points.  First, that when taken together, the scale and 
intensity of these economic, political and environmental challenges contribute to a unique 
vulnerability among SIDS.    Second, that this vulnerability makes it especially important that 
SIDS pursue cooperative diplomatic relationships with other states, including other SIDS, in 
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order to improve their visibility and to form political and diplomatic alliances that will help 
them increase their bargaining power and effectively represent their national interests. 
Turning first to the issue of vulnerability, this has been used to justify a categorisation 
of SIDS as a specific sub-set of states.  Indeed, it was on the basis of their perceived 
vulnerability that the United Nations (UN) first recognised SIDS as a special case  at the 1992 
Confe ence on En i onmen  and De elopmen  in Rio de Janei o. The UN  1994 Ba bado  
Programme of Action on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States 
(BPOA) operationalised this distinctiveness by working towards the design of SIDS-specific 
development strategies.2  The creation of a UN High Representative for the Least Developed 
Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-
OHRLLS) in 2001, the adoption of the Mauritius Strategy  as a follow-up to BPOA in 2005, 
a  ell a  he UN  eg la  ho ing of m l i-stakeholder international conferences on SIDS 
(the third and most recent being held in Samoa in 2014), all signify efforts to support SIDS to 
improve their resilience.   
  The foc  of hi  d  i  no  on SIDS  lne abili  per se.  This issue, while important 
to reiterate, has been dealt with extensively in the social science literature dealing with these 
types of states.  What is of interest to this study is delving further into the issue of SIDS 
diplomacy and critically interrogating the assumption that these vulnerable states are as 
cooperatively inclined as the SIDS literature seems to expect.  Campling (2006: 236), while 
suggesting that much of the SIDS literature is too pessimistic, nevertheless contends that there 
a e clea  limi a ion  on ha  ac ion SIDS can ake b  hem el e  o o e come he permanent 
nature of their geographical constraints and their associated extreme economic lne abili  
(au ho  i alic ).  The pursuit of close cooperative relationships and some degree of 
regionalism with their near neighbours  whether other SIDS or the larger states that often 
comp i e SIDS  main aid dono  and e po  ma ke   is seen as an essential political response 
to coping with these adverse conditions.  Barnett and Campbell (2010) as well as Betzold 
(2015), hile p ai ing SIDS  adap i e effo  in he face of ma ine deg ada ion and clima e 
change, arrive at a similar conclusion.  For these writers, these existential threats are rooted in 
issues of global governance over which SIDS can attain little influence unless they are able to 
forge robust diplomatic alliances with like-minded allies, including other SIDS. 
  Cohen (1983: 9-10), in a much earlier assessment of the economic development 
p o pec  of SIDS, a g ed ha  a gene al a ocia ion be een mallne  and eakne  i  clea  
 
2 For a comprehensive listing of documents connected to BPOA, see the following link:  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/conferences/bpoa1994> (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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and that SIDS would inevitably struggle to overcome dependency on larger states and create 
an imp o ed po i ion fo  hem el e  in he global econom  nle  he  co ld gang p  and 
form cooperative relationships amongst themselves.  Similar perspectives have been offered 
by a range of scholars with an interest in the diplomacy of small states  and SIDS in particular 
(Benwell, 2011; Graham, 2017; Schiff, 2010).  Critically interrogating the extent to which 
SIDS view cooperation  and particularly cooperation with other SIDS  as a political 
imperative, is deemed by this study to have analytical value.  While there tends to be an 
assumption, including in much of the literature cited above, that SIDS are a relatively uniform 
group of vulnerable states, the examples of countries like Mauritius and Singapore, both with 
highly-developed and prosperous service-based economies, would suggest that this is not 
necessarily true.  Even when faced with a number of common challenges, SIDS are more 
he e ogeneo  han i  of en ackno ledged.  Simila l , a mp ion  abo  he e a e  
diplomatic motivations tend to be driven by a generalised view of these countries as being 
relatively powerless and dependent.  Is this really the case or are these states actually 
characterised by more complex political and diplomatic dynamics?     
 For political scientists, the vulnerability, peripheral nature and presumed lack of 
bargaining power of SIDS ai e  in ig ing e ion  a o nd ho  he e fac o  infl ence SIDS  
political and diplomatic behaviour.  Given the globalised nature of issues such as climate 
change, management of the ocean commons and the structuring of international trade 
ag eemen , all i al o SIDS  na ional in e e , i  i  logical o infe  ha  SIDS do indeed ha e 
a strong motivation, even more than most states, to adopt diplomatic approaches that are open  
and that prioritise the formation and maintenance of cooperative relationships and even formal 
alliances.3 The ea on  fo  SIDS  p e med lack of bargaining power are deemed both 
structural and practical.  A n mbe  of chola  highligh  SIDS  bargaining power as being 
constrained by their marginal positioning within the global power structure.  This, in turn, 
limits the extent to which these states can devise and pursue their own diplomatic agendas, 
particularly if these agendas do not align with the interests of the larger and more powerful 
states with whom many SIDS have politically and/or economically dependent relationships 
(Breuning, 2007).  For other scholars, SIDS  bargaining power and diplomatic potential are 
restricted for more practical ea on .  The e incl de SIDS  compa a i el  eak diploma ic 
 
3 Schola  ha e defined he concep  of international cooperation  in diffe en  a .  The chola l  deba e a o nd hi  concep  ill be o ched 
on in Chapter 2.  However, as a useful starting point, this study will frequently reference A el od and Keohane  (1985:226) common 
defini ion of coope a ion a  occ ing hen actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.  
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networks, as well as the scarce human and financial resources these states have available to 
allocate to diplomacy (Bueger and Wivel, 2018; Hey, 2003; Schiff, 2010).    
How should SIDS respond to these challenges? Some thinkers point to a need for SIDS 
to simply accept their peripheral positioning in the global power structure and for them to seek 
benefits through patron-clien  ela ion hip .  B  o king o de elop po i i e e change  ith 
larger and more powerful states, SIDS can obtain external backing and material support (e.g. 
development aid or foreign direct investment) that may prove crucial in allowing them to meet 
hei  na ional in e e , e en if he e e change  come a  he expense of SIDS being able to 
develop truly independent foreign policies (Veenendaal, 2017).  By contrast, and as noted in 
the previous sub-section of this chapter, scholars like Benwell (2011), Graham (2017) and 
Schiff (2010), focused on the more practical diplomatic challenges confronting SIDS, all take 
a more positive view about the potential for these states to rise above their peripheral 
positioning and to at least modestly punch above their diplomatic weight.   
They make this argument by highlighting the view that small states such as SIDS are 
best served through a gang up  approach towards international diplomacy.  By dedicating 
political capital towards the strengthening of cooperative relationships with one another, and 
by then leveraging their combined efforts through the pooling of resources and expertise, SIDS 
should be able develop institutional capacities  and influence  that would be unavailable to 
hem indi id all .  Schiff (2010) gi e  fo m o he gang p  he i  b  a g ing ha  i  i  onl  
through the establishment of intra-SIDS regional cooperation agreements and by forming 
common cooperative blocs that SIDS can really increase their capabilities, gain leverage and 
address their shared challenges.   
These cooperative relationships between SIDS are not meant to push aside other 
diplomatic strategies, including those based around SIDS seeking productive engagement with 
more powerful (non-SIDS) states.  For the islands of the Pacific, Indian Ocean and Caribbean, 
these broader relationships will always be of vital importance.  However, cooperation and 
collective diplomacy among SIDS is seen as a complementary yet undervalued approach that 
allows SIDS to be pro-active in strengthening their mutual bargaining power and diplomatic 
presence.  Relationships between SIDS, contend both Benwell (2011) and Schiff (2010), are 
marked by common interests.  Not least is a shared sense of urgency over climate change and 
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a common de i e o eap benefi  h o gh he eme ging bl e econom .4  The motivations for 
SIDS o coope a e eem eadil  appa en  and indeed, he e e i  clea  e ample  of he gang 
p  app oach in ac ion.  The Alliance of Small I land S a e  (AOSIS) i  an in e -governmental 
organisation, acting at a global level, that leverages shared resources and common diplomatic 
efforts among SIDS to raise awareness of the threats they face from climate change (Benwell, 
2011; Chasek, 2005; Gillespie, 2003).   Within specific island groupings, inter-governmental 
organisations also exist to bring SIDS together to cooperatively undertake technical initiatives, 
mainly by pooling resources, sharing experience and undertaking joint management of 
common projects in sectors as varied as fisheries, renewable energy, transport, tourism and 
higher education.  In addition to providing mutual support and capacity development, these 
organisations offer (at least in theory) common diplomatic fronts for SIDS when they choose 
to engage the international community on important issues. Arguably the most prominent of 
these organisations are the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).   
 
2. Research Problem: The Political Dynamics of Cooperation, Collective 
Diplomacy and Regionalism among SIDS 
As one potential avenue for SIDS to improve their bargaining power and overcome at 
least some of the constraints that deprive them of visibility and influence, the dynamics 
underpinning a gang up  approach to cooperation and collective diplomacy are potentially 
exciting.  It is notable, however, that in spite of scholars such as Benwell (2011), Graham 
(2017) and Schiff (2010) providing strong conceptual arguments for this approach, and while 
evidence of both inter-island cooperation as well as gang up  diplomacy clearly exist, there 
has been relatively little political science dedicated to exploring these topics in-depth.  In 
part, this may be a consequence of SIDS not being given high priority in much of the 
international relations literature (though there are important recent exceptions  see, for 
example, Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Graham, 2017; Veenendaal, 2017).  There is a small 
literature oriented around the SIDS-focused inter-governmental organisations noted above, but 
this tends to focus more on the bureaucratic functioning of these bodies rather than on the 
cooperative dynamics that underpin them.          
 
4 An agreed definition of the term blue economy  does not yet exist.  This concept, including its differing interpretations, will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. However, this dissertation works on a prevailing understanding of the term as provided by the Center for the Blue 
Economy, Middlebury Ins i e of In e na ional S die  a  Mon e e .  The Cen e  defini ion iden ifie  he bl e econom  a  ha ing h ee 
distinct but connected meanings relating to: the overall contribution of the oceans to economies, the need to address the environmental and 
ecological sustainability of the oceans, and the ocean economy as a growth opportunity for both developed and developing countries. .  See 





These gaps mean that the literature provides little analytical insight on the degree to 
which he a mp ion  a o nd he gang p  app oach o SIDS coope ation and collective 
diplomacy reflected in reality. How effective does this approach truly appear to be in helping 
SIDS improve their bargaining power and diplomatic heft? Are the motivations for SIDS to 
cooperate really as evident (and important) as the p oponen  of he gang p  app oach 
assume? To what extent are SIDS, with their scarce diplomatic resources, incentivised to make 
mutual cooperation and collective action a priority? Does the pooling of resources and 
expertise by SIDS, where it occurs, truly help them enhance their shared institutional 
capacities? Nor is there much perspective on how inter-SIDS cooperation, where it exists, can 
best be structured and how it should evolve.  Can SIDS meaningfully improve their bargaining 
power and address their common array of challenges by cooperating on a purely technical or 
issue-by-i e ba i ? O  doe  he gang p  app oach o coope a ion and collec i e diplomac  
also demand, as Schiff (2010) seems to imply, a high degree of institutionalisation and even a 
move towards some type of SIDS-based regionalism based around the creation of shared 
regimes?  
Underlying this gap in exploring the possibilities of cooperation and collective 
diplomacy among SIDS is a seeming reluctance in the literature to delve into the politics 
around SIDS cooperation.  As alluded to in the previous sub-section, there is an assumption 
that SIDS are a relatively uniform group of states and that their political and diplomatic 
behaviour is largely conditioned by their vulnerability.  Issues of political contestation 
between SIDS or the diverse motivations of different SIDS to see (or not see) cooperation 
or even formal region-building as an avenue to pursue collective diplomacy, are seldom 
explored with any degree of robustness.  The research problem of interest to this study is 
focused on the political dynamics of cooperation between SIDS.  It may be the case that 
SIDS, with their unique vulnerability, are politically aligned more often than not.  However, 
without exploring in some depth the political dynamics that influence whether (and how) these 
countries choose to cooperate and pool their diplomatic efforts, including at the non-state level 
where inter-island exchanges between civil society and private sector actors may indicate the 
strength of cooperative processes, it is difficult to say for sure.     Consequently, it becomes 
problematic to gauge what potential the gang up  approach truly has as a strategic option for 
SIDS and whether SIDS-based regionalism is truly an achievable political aim. 
From an understanding of these dynamics, it will be possible to provide more thoughtful 
insights on whether cooperation between these states really has the potential to serve as strategy 
fo  boo ing SIDS  collec i e ba gaining po e .  Recogni ing he practical difficulties of 
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exploring this research problem at an international level and with a focus on multiple issue 
areas, this study instead takes a deep dive into exploring intra-island political dynamics in one 
particular island geography  the islands of the Western Indian Ocean (Comoros, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles and the French-controlled islands of Mayotte and Réunion) (Figure 1.1) 
and in the context of a specific issue-based theme focused around fisheries.  The study does 
provide some analysis that compares and contrasts certain aspects of the Western Indian Ocean 
SIDS context with the context of the Central and Western Pacific SIDS. However, the study 
does not aim to provide a fully-fledged comparison of the two island geographies.   As will be 
no ed in he o lining of he d  e ea ch me hodolog  la e  in hi  chap e , hi  foc ed 
approach limits the degree to which this study can offer broad generalisations on the issues 
noted above.  However, an in-depth analysis of particular geographic and thematic context still 
allows the study to address the identified research problem with rigour and with the aim of at 
least contributing modestly to the gaps in the literature identified earlier.   
 
Figure 1.1: Political Geography of the Western Indian Ocean Island States 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2020. 
 
3. Objective of the Study & Key Arguments 
 With this bounded geographic and thematic focus in mind, the study sets out to address 
the following main research question: How do existing political dynamics between the 
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Western Indian Ocean island states incentivise (or fail to incentivise) deepening 
cooperation, integration and collective diplomacy among these states in the fisheries 
sector?  The study also explores two secondary research questions.  First, to what extent do 
these existing political dynamics allow for the Western Indian Ocean island grouping to 
be thought of as a distinct and socially-constructed region  particularly one 
characterised by commonly-held and actionable fisheries regimes? Second, to the extent 
that signs of inter-island cooperation and collective diplomacy can be found within this island 
grouping, is there evidence to suggest that ganging up  has allowed these island states to 
boost their collective bargaining power and achieve impactful diplomatic outcomes on 
fisheries issues? 
 It will be argued that the political dynamics that exist between the Western Indian 
Ocean island states do incentivise inter-island cooperation in fisheries, but only to a limited 
extent.  Technical cooperation in the fisheries sector, whether at the state or non-state levels, is 
clearly evident among these islands.  However, the existence of this technical cooperation, or 
what Mitrany (1976) calls functional cooperation , does not appear to serve as a catalyst for 
cooperative spillovers or for sustained political buy-in among the islands for fisheries-based 
integration, collective diplomacy or regime-building.  Connected to this, it is difficult to 
identify among these islands a clear notion of what Hettne and Söderbaum (2000: 461) call 
regionness, whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active 
subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region .   
The absence of commonly-accepted fisheries regimes among these islands, in 
particular, points to a lack of common values and expectations converging around this sector.  
This, in turn, precludes the possibility of these island states constructing a common political 
identity as a distinct fisheries region  (something that this study will demonstrate has taken 
place in the comparable island grouping of the Pacific).  The upshot of these realities is that 
the Western Indian Ocean island states have little apparent motivation to gang up  for 
common cause and, in the rare cases they have done so, they lack the deep reserve of collective 
political capital required for such efforts to be impactful.   
This conclusion by no means invalidates the assumption that a gang p  app oach o 
inter-island cooperation among SIDS can be a valuable diplomatic strategy for these types of 
states to pursue.  Indeed, some of the comparative evidence provided from the Pacific island 
context will point to the merits of collective diplomacy among SIDS, particularly when this 
involves active efforts towards fisheries-based integration and the creation of actionable 
regimes.  However, these conclusions do indicate that simply assuming that SIDS, because of 
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their shared challenges and vulnerability, are conditioned by these factors to behave in a 
particular political and diplomatic manner, too easily disregards the often-messy political 
d namic  ha  hape SIDS  na ional in e e  and foreign relations  just as these dynamics do 
for other types of states. 
In making these overarching arguments, this study will identify three main factors that 
shape  in ways that impede the formation of regionness and which dissuade these islands from 
ganging p   inter-island political dynamics in the Western Indian Ocean.  The first factor, 
and the one that this study will stress as being most important, pertains to the disparities in 
levels of socio-economic development and political cohesiveness between the different islands.  
These disparities are primarily between Mauritius and Seychelles on one side and the poorer 
island states of Comoros and Madagascar on the other.  The Fragile States Index, maintained 
by The Fund for Peace, clearly illustrates these disparities in assigning Comoros and 
Madagascar positions as the 53rd and 57th most fragile countries in the world, whereas 
Seychelles and Mauritius sit at 126th and 153rd place, respectively.  Strikingly different socio-
economic conditions and political cultures create a mismatch in the dominant policy and 
political incentives between the islands.  These intra-island disparities serve to inhibit 
prospective platforms for cooperation between these states, whether at the state-to-state level, 
within the context of inter-governmental organisations and even at the non-state level.   
The second factor relates specifically to the inefficiencies present within the shared 
institutional architecture  namely, the inter-governmental organisations  within which the 
islands seek to cooperate and build collective action over fisheries.  The third factor relates to 
the di p ion of F ance, a  bo h a egional  pla e  i hin the island grouping (due its 
sovereignty over Mayotte and Reunion) and as an external power seeking to impose its own 
interests in the region.  This disruption serves to sow distrust between the four independent 
island states and this makes collective action over fisheries challenging to generate or sustain.  
Each of these factors will be touched on as repeated themes in the three core chapters (Chapter 
4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) that detail inter-island political dynamics over fisheries. 
 
4. New Regionalism  as an Underlying Theoretical Perspective 
The above arguments will be presented with reference to the theoretical insights of 
new regionalism , put forward by scholars such as Bachinger and Hough (2009), Goldstein 
(2002), Hettne (1997, 1999, 2005), Hettne and Söderbaum (1998, 2000), Hurrell (1995), 
Mittelman (1999), as well as Shaw (2000, 2004). New regionalism , articulated in more detail 
in Chapter 2, provides a useful conceptual lens for examining cooperation, integration and 
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regime-building among the Western Indian Ocean island states.  Finding inspiration in the 
social constructivist view of international relations, new regionalism  posits that both 
cooperation and its outcomes are politically contested and are driven mainly by the emerging 
ideas and values held by cooperative actors across a wide range of issue areas.  This stands in 
contrast to less ideational theories of international relations, such as those based in a realist, 
liberal institutionalist or even Marxist worldview (typically categorised by the above scholars 
under the banner of old regionalism ), which tend to emphasise material concerns (e.g. 
security or economic interests) as the main drivers of cooperation and collective action. 
New regionalism  argues that cooperative processes must be studied in recognition of 
the context in which they are taking place. It also holds that cooperative outcomes be assessed 
not against an idealised gold standard , but rather on whether they truly reflect the ideas and 
values that political actors profess to hold.  For a number of new regionalist  scholars, these 
idea  and al e  ake angible fo m h o gh K a ne  (1983: 1) notion of cooperative regimes, 
which he identifies as explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
p oced e  a o nd hich ac o  e pec a ion  con e ge in a gi en a ea of in e na ional 
relations.   Ruggie (1975: 570) provides an earlier  and even more concrete  definition of 
regimes, which he articulates as mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, 
organisational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of 
states.    
Much of the academic focus around regimes, illustrated through liberal interpretations 
of regime theory, pertains to the role they play in supporting the development of formal 
cooperative institutions.  Importantly, however, Hurrell (1995: 336), writing very much from 
a new regionalist  perspective, points out that regimes can also often be based on a much 
looser structure, involving patterns of regular meetings with some rules attached, together with 
mechanisms for preparation and follow-up.   Such a definition is useful in a study of 
cooperation and collective diplomacy in the global south, including among SIDS, where formal 
institution-building (unlike in a cooperative space like the European Union  EU) seldom 
emerges as a priority among political elites.  From this interpretation, it should be apparent that 
this study will take an approach to the study of regimes that builds on those aspects of regime 
theory that are based on a sociological rather than rationalist view of state (and indeed non-
state) decision-making.  The perceptions of state/non-state actors, as well as the environment 
in which they operate, matter just as much as interests and power when it comes to predicting 
how these actors will behave towards each other.   
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In presenting its key arguments, this study will critically interrogate the types of 
cooperative regimes that have been developed among the Western Indian Ocean island states 
in the fisheries sector.  As is detailed in the research methods section later in this introduction, 
evidence for both the existence and effectiveness of these regimes, including the degree to 
hich he  eng hen he e a e  capaci ie  fo  collec i e diplomac , ill be d a n f om 
primary interview data as well as from documentary sources. These sources include fisheries 
cooperation agreements, project budgets and reports, treaties, meeting minutes, investment 
agreements, import/export records, policy papers/briefs, as well as fisheries surveillance 
protocols (to name just a few).  To reflec  he idea ional na e of ne  egionali m , he e 
regimes will be examined with a view to whether they appear to reflect the stated aspirations 
and beliefs articulated by cooperating political actors. 
By introducing the concept of regionness, ne  egionali m  adop  a mutable view of 
cooperation, with both its form and objectives being open to ongoing change along a spectrum 
that reflects fluid levels of cohesion among cooperating states (Hettne, 2005).  Aligning with 
H ell  (1995) afo emen ioned view of regimes, regionness does not imply the necessity of 
cooperation evolving only through a formal process of regionalisation and institution building. 
Instead, it accepts the social constructivist view of cooperation as having meaning if it creates 
a sense of shared identity and common purpose among cooperating states  even if such 
cooperation remains largely informal in nature (Hettne and S derbaum, 1998, 2000; Hurrell, 
1995).  Fo  hi  d  in e iga ion of coope a ion and collec i e diplomac  among Western 
Indian Ocean i land a e , ne  egionali m  empha i  on idea  and al e , i  
acknowledgment that politics matter in informing if (and how) cooperative processes evolve, 
as well as its stress on adopting flexible (and contextually-aware) interpretations on the utility 
of cooperative outcomes, all offer considerable value. In particular, these tenets legitimise the 
importance of political dynamics as a primary research focus, they emphasise the importance 
of collecting rich qualitative data that provide ideational insights from political actors (detailed 
la e  in hi  chap e  e ea ch me hod  ec ion) and he  allo  he e ea che  ome lee a  in 
establishing how to critically analyse the outcomes of cooperative efforts among these islands. 
While fully acknowledging the central importance of state-to-state cooperation, 
he he  p ed bila e all  o  m l ila e all , ne  egionali m  al o ackno ledge  ha  
impo an  poli ical ac o  e i  a  diffe en  le el .  Ne  egionali m  ecogni e  a meaningful 
role for inter-governmental organisations as drivers of issue-based cooperation as well as in 
helping to formalise this cooperation by strengthening the shared regimes upon which 
collective diplomacy can be built (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998).  Ne  egionali m  al o 
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acknowledges the role played by non-state actors, in both civil society and the private sector, 
in building and sustaining cooperative endeavours, not least through epistemic communities 
sharing technical knowledge and expertise (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Hettne, 2005). 
In a study of cooperation, collective diplomacy and regime-building among island 
states, it is important to acknowledge that national governments are not always strong and that 
cooperative processes  and the political dynamics that influence them  are likely to also be 
affected by these additional political actors.  Bottom-up cooperation through non-state actors, 
in particular, may be a key source of political mobilisation, particularly over environmental, 
social and developmental issues.   In the Western Indian Ocean fisheries setting, these actors 
include private sector fisheries operators, scientific and surveillance bodies, educational 
institutions, media interests, as well as fisheries-focused non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to name just a few.   
Thi  d  anal ical f ame o k (Fig e 1.2) d a  on ne  egionali m  
recognition of political actor pluralism o j if  he e of h ee diffe en  len e  o anal e 
fisheries-focused cooperation and collective diplomacy among Western Indian Ocean island 
states.   
 
Figure 1.2: Analytical Framework & Cross-Cutting Themes 
 
 









The first of these lenses focuses on cooperation and collective diplomacy at the state 
level. This lens considers the types of cooperative agreements and collective diplomatic 
ini ia i e  nde aken b  poli ical ac o  i a ed i hin he e i land a e  national 
governments, particularly their fisheries ministries.  A second (and somewhat overlapping) lens 
foc e  on he e ame i e  in he con e  of he We e n Indian Ocean  in e -governmental 
organisations  the IOC, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Tuna 
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Commission (IOTC) and Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC).  A third 
lens focuses on the role that non-state actors, such as NGOs (and transnational NGO networks), 
scientific institutions, educational and vocational training institutes, as well as private sector 
fisheries operators, play in influencing cooperation and collective diplomacy within this SIDS 
g o ping.  The e h ee len e  ill be e plo ed epa a el  in hi  di e a ion  h ee co e 
chapters.  However, cross-cutting themes pertaining to the politics of cooperation, collective 
diplomacy and regionness will serve as inter-linking threads tying different aspects of the case 
d  oge he , hile einfo cing he d  ke  a g men .  
 
5. Providing Context: The Western Indian Ocean Islands as a Cooperative Space 
P io  o del ing in o he d  e ea ch me hodolog  and i  me hod  of da a 
collection and analysis, it is useful to provide a brief cultural, historical and political sketch of 
the Western Indian Ocean island grouping.  This sketch serves to identify some of the 
overarching traits that make these islands a distinct space in which to explore the political 
dynamics of cooperation, collective diplomacy, regime-building and even region-formation 
among SIDS.   
Contrary to their near neighbours in East Africa, who came under mainly British or 
Portuguese domination in the late 19th century, the Western Indian Ocean islands were long the 
preserve of French political and cultural influence.  Mauritius (Île de France) and Réunion (Île 
Bourbon), both previously uninhabited, emerged in the 18th century as settler-led plantation 
economies focused on the production of sugarcane using slave labour (Allen, 1999; Anata and 
Selvon, 2012).  Around this same time, Seychelles, also lacking an indigenous population, 
became prized by the French for its strategic location on the spice route  to India, as well as 
for its potential to serve as a centre of spice production for the French East India Company. 
However, Seychelles never received the same European settler influx as Mauritius or Réunion 
(Scarr, 2000). 
The e e i o ie  all came nde  B i i h con ol af e  F ance  defea  in he Napoleonic 
wars.  Réunion was returned to French sovereignty, where it remains to this day, by the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815.  Mauritius and Seychelles (administered as part of Mauritius until 
becoming a separate crown colony in 1903), while allowing French interests to retain economic 
primacy, remained under British control until independence. This arrived in 1968 for Mauritius 
and in 1976 for Seychelles.  In all three territories, multicultural societies were gradually 
established in the colonial period through the ongoing influx of labourers from Africa, India, 
China and elsewhere to work the sugarcane fields and in other commodity sectors after the 
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abolition of slavery.  This labour influx was particularly notable in Mauritius, where indentured 
labourers from India eventually came to form a majority of the population and would attain 
political power in the lead-up to independence (Allen, 1999).  
Madagascar, with a long-settled population ruled by an absolute monarch, came under 
French control progressively over the course of a decade after an initial invasion in 1883.  
Comoros, ruled by local Sultans enjoying close links with Zanzibar, came under French 
influence a few decades earlier in 1841.  Both island states experienced a colonialism more 
akin to the states of the African mainland, with violent repression an integral element of the 
colonial regime.  While not plantation economies in the same way as the other islands, the 
French utilised Comoros and Madagascar as centres for the production of assorted primary 
commodities, including vanilla, cocoa and ylang-ylang (Caminade, 2010; Deschamps, 1965).  
After considerable (and often violent) resistance, Madagascar achieved independence in 1960.  
Three of the four Comorian islands became independent in 1975, but with the fourth island  
Mayotte  choosing in a referendum to remain under French sovereignty.  This remains an 
ongoing point of tension between France (and by extension the European Union  EU) and the 
Comorian government, which continues to lay sovereign claim to Mayotte (Caminade, 2010).  
While not a central focus of this study, the colonial and post-colonial histories of the 
Western Indian Ocean islands will be touched on at various points in the following chapters.  
What is important to note at this stage is how this history has shaped these islands as a 
cooperative space  and as a prospective region  in the present.  The French language acts as 
a common source of linguistic unity among these islands. Meanwhile, the shared colonial 
experience and the socio-cultural commonalities this entails has created an element of mutual 
identity under the banner of l'Indianocéanie (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, 
Government of Seychelles), though the degree to which this identity really manifests itself at 
a political and popular level will be critically interrogated at different points in this study.     
The Western Indian Ocean islands possess commonalities in their economic histories, 
being centres for primary commodity production and export, mainly to France/the EU.  Even 
as island economies have diverged, common cause has often been developed among these 
islands as they seek to exploit trade benefits, first under the preferential market access provided 
by the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) regime and now  with far less 
certainty  under updated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU (Giesbert, 
Pfeiffer and Schotte, 2016).  Looking towards the future, these islands are all confronting a 
common economic and political future in which their waters are likely to be a centre for great 
power  competition between France/the EU, China and India.  Indeed, the fact that both Beijing 
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(in 2016) and New Delhi (in 2020) have recently obtained observer status within the IOC points 
o a g o ing ole fo  he e co n ie  in infl encing he na e of he e i land  collec i e efforts 
around economic development, preserving their natural environments and combatting the 
growing threat of climate change.          
Shared experiences of anti-colonial struggle and the exchange of material and moral 
ppo  be een poli ical eli e  d ing he diffe en  i land  d i e  fo  independence, ho gh 
not widely acknowledged today, at one time provided a foundation for political cooperation 
between these countries.  Indeed, the creation of the IOC in 1982 was, in part, a means for these 
countries to coordinate a shared anti-colonial hi d a  fo eign polic  (McDo gall, 1994).  
However, as will be discussed later in the study, the IOC certainly did not retain this focus, 
particularly once France (because of its sovereignty over Réunion) was admitted as a member 
later in the decade. 
To varying degrees, the Western Indian Ocean SIDS are all confronted with the litany 
of economic, political and environmental challenges that were noted earlier.  To make a 
seemingly obvious point, Madagascar, with its sizeable land mass and population, cannot be 
formally classified under the SIDS framework. In theory, this island possesses attributes, such 
as greater availability of human resources and more opportunity for economic diversification, 
that would merit hesitation for including it in a common analysis with its neighbouring SIDS.  
However, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, the realities confronting the Malagasy state, 
in terms of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities, actually make it similar to its near island 
neighbo .  Al o, d a ing on S on  (2011: 142) argument that larger  island states (in his 
work referring to Jamaica and Papua New Guinea) share many characteristics and also 
maintain integral links with all small states in their respective regions , there is some logic for 
including a larger  island country like Madagascar in this SIDS-focused analysis.  In the 
chap e  ha  follo , he d  ill a io l  e he e m  SIDS  and i land a e  hen 
discussing the various nations that are part of the Western Indian Ocean island grouping.  
Taking a very current focus, migration flows between the Western Indian Ocean 
islands, while not necessarily extensive (with the exception of flows into Réunion and Mayotte, 
which as members of the EU are attractive to would-be economic migrants), are nonetheless 
evident.  Private sector investments, such as those of Mauritian textile firms outsourcing some 
operations into lower-wage Madagascar (Maminirinarivo, 2006), as well as common branding 
efforts, such as the e i land  c en  join  o i m ma ke ing nde  he banne  of he Vanilla 
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Islands 5, all serve as examples of inter-island connectedness.  These contemporary 
connections as well as those borne out of common historical experience, all suggest that there 
is logic in looking at these islands as a contained cooperative space.  This is not to suggest that 
these countries do not also exist as part of much larger geographic and political regions , not 
least in their ties to the African continent.  However, there are enough elements that 
distinctively bind the Western Indian Ocean islands together that it is reasonable to see this 
g o ping a  an app op ia e ca e d  con e  fo  hi  d  line  of in i .        
At the same time, key differences between the islands in this grouping also allow for a 
consideration of whether the unique vulnerability associated with SIDS really provides, in 
itself, a strong rationale for these states to see ganging up  as a political priority.  
Alternatively, it can be queried whether this vulnerability is secondary to other political 
considerations, including those emerging from very distinct cultural influences and 
dramatically different levels of development.  The islands of the Western Indian Ocean, 
separated by considerable distance and by rough seas, are culturally diverse.  A unique Creole 
culture predominates in Seychelles and Réunion, while in Mauritius this Creole population is 
a minority in a country where the majority is of Indian descent.  Comoros and Mayotte, with 
their closer proximity to the African mainland and historical trading links with Zanzibar, enjoy 
a great deal of Afro-Arab cultural influence. Madagascar is perhaps the most distinctive, with 
much of its population being descended from long-ago migrants from the Indonesian 
archipelago, though with some African cultural influence along its coasts.   
There are also stark disparities in levels of socio-economic development between these 
islands.  These disparities, less marked even twenty years ago than they are today, have become 
more significant as countries such as Mauritius, and to a lesser degree Seychelles, have 
embarked on political and economic reforms to democratise, invest in their human capital, 
diversify their economies (at least to a degree) away from primary commodities and reduce 
poverty.  Mayotte and Réunion, while not particularly dynamic from an economic standpoint, 
reap the benefits of largesse from the French state and enjoy higher living standards than their 
near neighbours.  Madagascar and Comoros, due to long-lasting political instability and a 
number of failed economic reforms, remain poorly governed and impoverished.  The Western 
Indian Ocean is a cooperative space, but even compared to other island groupings such as the 
Caribbean or the Pacific, it is hardly uniform.     
 
5 See the Vanilla Islands tourism marketing website: <https://www.vanilla-islands.org/en/> (accessed 13 October 2018).  
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The fisheries milieu in the Western Indian Ocean will be mapped out in some detail in 
Chapter 3.  For the moment, it is important to note that within this issue-based setting, there is 
additional logic in seeing this island grouping as a cooperative space and as a prospective 
region he e a gang p  app oach o collec i e diplomac  o ld eemingl  ha e me i .  
Fisheries are an economic driver for all islands albeit to varying degrees.  The sector acts as an 
important source of livelihoods, income and food security for island populations, as well as a 
vital source of state revenues  whether in the form of fish and fish product exports, access 
fees, the licensing of foreign vessels or the allocation of fishing permits.  Large and overlapping 
maritime EEZs give added impetus for these states to coordinate with one another on issues of 
ocean governance.    In addition to their common membership in the IOC, which places a strong 
technical focus on fisheries, aquaculture, maritime shipping, marine protection and tourism 
(among other areas), the Western Indian Ocean SIDS are also all members of two other 
fisheries-focused inter-governmental organisations:  IOTC and SWIOFC.  Fisheries and linked 
blue economy  themes are also of importance to IORA, which brings the Western Indian 
Ocean islands together with the full gamut of countries with Indian Ocean coastlines.    
The Western Indian Ocean is central to the global tuna fishery, with both purse seine 
fishing (centred around Seychelles) and long line fishing (focused around Mauritius) taking 
place.6 Some cooperative regimes have been developed in the Western Indian Ocean to 
establish shared responsibility for managing the ocean commons and its resources, with the 
most well-known arguably being the bilateral agreement between Mauritius and Seychelles to 
jointly manage the continental shelf of the Mascarene Plateau.7  As this study will demonstrate 
at various points, however, such regimes are hardly commonplace, especially when compared 
to an island grouping like the Pacific.  While the study will focus on fisheries as a generalised 
sector, a particular emphasis is placed in many areas on the tuna fishery, which serves as the 
most commercially-lucrative fishery and the one where inter-island connections are most 
evident.  Finally, the Western Indian Ocean islands have all developed wider blue economy  
policy papers that outline mutual steps to secure the sustainability of ocean resources even 
while utilising these resources for economic gain (though implementation is a separate and 
more problematic issue) (Researcher Interview: Managing Director for the Department of the 
Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).  Just as broad historical and contemporary socio-
 
6 The distinction between purse seine and long line fishing pertains to the type of net used.  Purse seine fishing utilises a f ishing net that 
operates in a similar manner to a drawstring on a traditional purse and is a preferred technique for catching fish species that aggregate close 
to the ocean surface, including some types of tuna.  Longline fishing makes use of baited hooks along single lines of a large net and is used to 
catch fish species, including tuna and swordfish, at greater depths. 
7 See p e  elea e: Se chelle  and Ma i i  Sign Landma k T ea ie  fo  Join  Managemen  of Con inen al Shelf , Depa men  of  Foreign 
Affairs  The Republic of Seychelles.  <http://www.mfa.gov.sc/static.php?content_id=36&news_id=278> (accessed 03 July 2018).  
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economic trends suggest a degree of binding between Western Indian Ocean SIDS, the shared 
economic and environmental importance of fisheries for these countries further indicates the 
presence of common interests.  
 
6. Research Methodology: An Instrumental Case Study of Political Cooperation, 
Integration and Regime-Building in the Western Indian Ocean 
 Thi  d  e ea ch me hodolog  ake  he fo m of a ingle in men al ca e d .  
The research is instrumental  in the sense that it is seeking to shed light on a general 
phenomenon  how the political dynamics evident between the Western Indian Ocean island 
states incentivise (or fail to incentivise) deepening cooperation, integration and collective 
diplomacy between these countries  by focusing on a thematically-bounded case pertaining to 
this phenomenon: how political dynamics between these islands impact the above in the 
context of the fisheries sector.  Cooperation, collective action and regime-building, as 
processes, in one particular thematic sector, serve as a distinct case of cooperation, collective 
action and regime-building, as processes, among the Western Indian Ocean island states more 
broadly.  This stands in contrast to an intrinsic case study, where a case is being investigated 
because it is unusual or unique.  It is also distinct from a collective case study, in which a series 
of individual instrumental case studies are done to examine an issue and develop comparative 
analyses (Rule and John, 2011). 
 Yin (1981, 2009) provides what may be the most commonly cited conceptual overview 
of the case study approach, noting that these studies seek to explore, in-depth, a contemporary 
and distinct phenomenon within its real-life context  and with a case study methodology being 
an all-encompassing approach that informs decisions around the logic of research design, not 
least in approaches to data collection and analysis.  There continue to be contested views on 
the extent to which case study truly serves as a distinct research methodology (Yazan, 2015), 
the role of theory generation through case study research (Creswell, 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2009), as well as whether case studies should strive to achieve a high level of analytical 
generalisation  (Yin, 2009) or remain rooted in a more descriptive approach (Stake, 1995).   
However, there is scholarly consensus, including among political scientists (Crasnow, 
2012; Gerring, 2004) around the fact that case studies are fundamentally oriented around depth 
of focus, an appreciation of how phenomena are intimately linked to the context in which they 
exist, diversity in the types (and sources) of primary and secondary data collected, plus the 
importance of data thoroughness and triangulation to validate emerging themes.  Also vital is 
rigour in the application of qualitative data analysis techniques, as well as the need to aim for 
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some type of generalised reporting of findings, even if these generalisations are not aimed at 
providing evidence of causal relationships. 
In this study, the case being examined is that of a process  the process of cooperation, 
integration and regime-building between SIDS, the ways this process is influenced by the 
political dynamics evident between these states, as well as the modalities and outcomes of this 
process  in a particular thematic sector and geographic context.  The case study brings together 
a wide range of primary and secondary data (outlined in the next section), mainly qualitative 
but also secondary quantitative data where appropriate.  In doing so, the case study takes a deep 
dive into the fisheries sector within the Western Indian Ocean, aiming to gain as thorough an 
understanding as possible of the prevailing trends that define this sector  at the state and non-
state levels  and how these trends relate to their broader political context.  The case study 
approach is naturally descriptive.  However, analytical rigour is also brought to bear by 
connecting the analysis back to the underlying theoretical approach of new regionalism .  The 
approach to data analysis, also outlined in the next section, ensures that the patterns identified 
in the data are linked back in a focused way to answering the key research questions. 
There are implications to adopting an intensive rather than extensive research 
methodology.  Most prominently, can the case study, even with an in-depth focus, really 
p o ide an  emblance of Yin  (2009) analytical generalisations ?  Ideally, a study seeking 
to offer general conclusions on the political dynamics of cooperation, integration and regime-
building among the Western Indian Ocean island states would explore a wide array of issue 
areas.  Indeed, he e ea che  ini ial plan fo  hi  d  a  o adop  a collec i e ca e d  
approach and utilise comparisons across different thematic areas (fisheries, renewable energy, 
tourism and transport) and even different island geographies to offer a generaliseable set of 
conclusions.  The practicalities of doing a collective case study, however, were daunting given 
the time and financial resources available to the researcher.  This was especially true since this 
study was planned to collect and analyse large amounts of primary data.   
A single instrumental case study is burdened with certain hindrances when it comes to 
making generalisations.  For a number of reasons, the cooperative dynamics pertaining to one 
thematic sector may not be easily generalised to other thematic sectors, even within a common 
geographic context.  Prudence must be employed by the researcher in regards to making claims 
on what the results of the research are saying.  For this study, causal generalisation is not a 
realistic objective.  Instead, the study is focused on providing an in-depth analysis of its case, 
arguing its thesis within the bounded confines of its thematic and geographic contexts.  
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However, even without causal generalisation, the findings can still be used to highlight issues 
of broader importance that can guide future research. 
There remains the need to justify the selection of fisheries as the thematic focus for the 
study.  Even in the absence of casual generalisations, the findings generated by the bounded 
case study must demonstrate value in shedding light on broader phenomena.  The decision to 
focus on fisheries was made b  he e ea che , in pa , fo  p ac ical ea on .  The e ea che  
previous experience, contextual familiarity (Sherbut, 2008) and existing contacts in the 
Western Indian Ocean SIDS, particularly at government level, made the sector a logical focus.  
Indeed, the researcher has carried out both academic and professional fieldwork connected to 
the Western Indian Ocean fisheries sector, meaning that technical expertise had been generated 
and could be drawn upon to facilitate interviews with Key Informants (KIs).  This expertise 
and past experience also made it easier for the researcher to identify which factors relevant to 
the overarching research questions were most essential to explore.   
A case study focused around fisheries has a number of other advantages.  First, fisheries 
act a key economic driver for the Western Indian Ocean island states. As will be detailed in 
Chapter 3, there exist dedicated inter-governmental organisations, government ministries, 
private sector firms, scientific institutions and NGOs focused on the sector  usually taking an 
economic and/or conservation focus.  These actors, in turn, are associated with a number of 
existing bilateral and multilateral political and technical agreements on issues such as 
combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, the management of shared 
continental shelves, port facility management and the establishment of protected marine areas 
(among other topics).  These agreements provide a solid platform for assessing the existence 
(or non-existence) and effectiveness of cooperative regimes between the Western Indian Ocean 
islands.  Comparable institutions and agreements, while evident in other sectors, such as 
transport and tourism, were not seen to provide the same thickness  in terms of the body of 
resources that would be available to the researcher for analysis.   
Second, fisheries are at the heart of the blue economy , a concept that focuses on a 
range of economic initiatives connected with the sea as well as with sets of activities and 
policies geared towards the sustainable development of ocean resources.  Besides serving as 
arguably the core of the blue economy , being a highly visible example of the exploitation of 
 and fight to conserve  marine resources, fisheries are also intimately linked with 
complementary sectors that also fall under a blue economy  framework  e.g. port 
management, ocean surveillance and tourism.  A focus on fisheries thus offers an opportunity, 
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even in a limited way, to bring into the analysis some of the cooperative dynamics evident (or 
not) within these other issue areas, thus providing a broader scope for the study.  
 
7. Research Methods: Data Collection and Data Analysis 
   
Data Collection Methods 
The data used to inform this case study analysis have been obtained from both primary 
and secondary sources.  Primary data have been collected by the researcher through in-depth 
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with stakeholders engaged in the respective fisheries sectors 
of the different Western Indian Ocean island states.  A total of twenty-five KIIs were carried-
out by the researcher over two separate field visits.  A first field visit to Madagascar, Mauritius 
and Seychelles took place over five weeks in September and October 2017. A second field visit 
took place at different points over four months from August to November 2018, allowing for 
interviews to be carried out in Réunion, as well as in Comoros and Mayotte.  Brief return visits 
to Madagascar and Mauritius also occurred in late 2018. 
KIs were identified purposively by the researcher, based on their organisational 
affiliations and professional roles.  The researcher had the luxury of being able to utilise eight 
pre-existing contacts, established through previous fieldwork in the region, as KIs.  A further 
twelve KIs were identified by the researcher through the use of government, NGO and chamber 
of commerce directories, mostly accessed online.  Finally, the remaining five KIs were 
identified by the researcher with the assistance of other informants, allowing for a snowball 
sampling approach to be utilised.  This was especially useful in contexts such as Comoros, 
where the researcher lacked pre-existing contacts and where stakeholder directories  either 
online or hard copies  were difficult to access or were non-e i en .  To align i h he d  
three investigative lenses focused around state-to-state ministerial interactions, engagement 
through inter-governmental organisations, as well as engagement among non-state actors, 
efforts were made to identify prospective KIs from fisheries-focused national government 
bodies (usually fisheries ministries), inter-governmental organisations, NGOs/civil society and 
he p i a e ec o .  A f ll li  of he d  KIs, by affiliation, country and sector, is provided 





8 Consent was obtained from each KI for their listing in this dissertation.  To protect the confidentiality of KIs, all names have been omitted.  




Table 1.1: List of Interviewed Key Informants by Affiliation, Country & Sector 
KII # Key Informant (Affiliation) Country Sector 
1 Administrator (National Quality Office for Certification of Fisheries Products) Comoros Government 
2 Fisheries Officer (General Directorate of Fishery Resources of Comoros) Comoros Government 
3 Representative (Grande Comore Union of Boat Owners) Comoros Non-State (Civil Society) 
4 Fisheries Officer (Chamber of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture of Mayotte) France (Mayotte) Government 
5 Associate Director (Réunimer) France (Réunion) Non-State (Private Sector) 
6 Research Officer (Institute for Research for Development) France (Réunion) Non-State (Civil Society) 
7 Senior Fisheries Administrator (TAAF Governance Authority) France (Reunion) Government 
8 Associate Editor (Madagascar Tribune) Madagascar Non-State (Civil Society) 
9 Research Officer (Fisheries and Marine Science Institute of Madagascar) Madagascar Non-State (Civil Society) 
10 
Vice-President (National Association for Fish Collectors and 
Exporters of Madagascar) Madagascar Non-State (Private Sector) 
11 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Regional Integration (Government of Mauritius) Mauritius Government 
12 Executive Director (Mauritius Oceanographic Institute) Mauritius Non-State (Civil Society) 
13 Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission (Government of Mauritius) Mauritius Government 
14 Former Chief Fisheries Officer (Government of Mauritius) Mauritius Government 
15 Managing Director (Princes Tuna) Mauritius Non-State (Private Sector) 
16 Chief Diplomatic Adviser (Government of Seychelles), ex-Secretary-General of the Indian Ocean Commission Seychelles 
Government; Inter-
Governmental Organisation 
17 Director of the James Michel Blue Economy Research Institute (University of Seychelles) Seychelles Non-State (Civil Society) 
18 Director (Seychelles Maritime Academy) Seychelles Non-State (Civil Society) 
19 Executive Director (Nature Seychelles) Seychelles Non-State (Civil Society) 
20 External Adviser (Indian Ocean Tuna, Ltd.) Seychelles Non-State (Private Sector) 
21 Former Director (Seychelles Fishing Authority) Seychelles Government 
22 General Consul of Mauritius in Seychelles (Government of Mauritius) Seychelles Government 
23 Managing Director for the Department of Blue Economy (Government of Seychelles) Seychelles Government 
24 Ocean Governance Advisor for the Department of Blue Economy (Government of Seychelles) Seychelles Government 
25 Secretary-General (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) Seychelles Inter-Governmental Organisation 
 
The researcher had considerable success enlisting the participation of individuals from 
national government departments and agencies, as well as in engaging with high-level contacts 
from inter-governmental organisations.  Gaining the participation of non-state KIs, particularly 
from the private sector, was typically more challenging.  This may have been the result of the 
researcher having comparatively more experience, and a higher comfort level, engaging with 
p blic ec o  official  ( he e ea che  p e-existing contacts in the Western Indian Ocean 
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island states were all government officials) and communicating to them the value of their 
participation in the study.  The researcher also found that prospective KIs from the private 
sector were less interested in the d  foc  and le  likel  o deem he d  e ea ch 
questions as being worthy of their engagement.  A study limitation connected to this is that 
insights from the private sector are not documented nearly as comprehensively as those of even 
other non-state actors, such as NGOs and research institutes.  
The role of gatekeepers  in facilitating/hindering access to KIs is also important to 
note.  The researcher was able to engage with pre-existing contacts directly.  In cases where 
the researcher benefitted from prospective interviewees being identified through snowball 
sampling, it was usually the case that the researcher was provided with the information required 
to contact these individuals without going through an intermediary.  Particularly for 
prospective private sector informants, however, the researcher could not draw on these same 
advantages and usually had to filter an interview request through an intermediary.  In such 
cases, pinning down the availability of potential interviewees was more difficult and interview 
requests were not always successful, particularly given the relatively limited time the 
researcher had available on each country field visit.  On some occasions, the researcher did 
attempt to obtain interviews with private sector firms and local NGOs by making unscheduled 
visits to their offices, though to mixed results. 
Not all of the KIIs proved equally informative.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the researcher 
had more detailed discussions with pre-existing contacts and with those individuals referred by 
other KIs.  In terms of the research analysis, the result is that the primary data which inform 
m ch of hi  d  e idence ba e a e ome ha  ke ed o a d  a ep e en a ion of na ional 
government and inter-governmental organisation informant perspectives.  This is not to say, 
however, that the primary data that were collected from non-state informants were not useful 
(they undeniably were).  Furthermore, a number of the KIs that the researcher interviewed from 
the government and inter-governmental sectors had previous private sector (though less 
commonly NGO) experience, even if this experience was not current.  Particular efforts were 
also made throughout the research to ensure the collection and analysis of quality secondary 
data pertaining to NGO/civil society and private sector activities in the Western Indian Ocean 
fisheries sector.  Taken together, the researcher is of the view that these initiatives have yielded 
quality data. 
The other imbalance within the primary data pertains to the fact that considerably more 
interviews were carried-out in Mauritius and Seychelles than in the other Western Indian Ocean 
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i land .  Thi  a  fo  h ee main ea on .  Fi , a majo i  of he e ea che  p e-existing 
contacts were in these two countries.  As noted earlier, these pre-existing contacts greatly 
facilitated further field research.  Second, the relatively transparent nature of the Mauritian and 
Seychellois political systems and society, when contrasted with the lack of transparency in 
Comoros and Madagascar, as well as the heavy bureaucratisation of the French territories, 
meant that it was far simpler to obtain interviews in these countries, with informants feeling 
more open to sharing their perspectives.  Third, the inter-governmental organisations most 
relevant to the Western Indian Ocean are located in either Mauritius (the IOC and IORA) or 
Seychelles (the IOTC), further accounting for the higher respondent numbers in these states.   
KIIs9 e e ched led in a loca ion of he info man  choo ing, all  hei  office o  
home.  All interviews were carried out in a location that ensured privacy.  Most interviews 
were one-on-one, though the researcher was able to engage in a useful group interview exercise 
in Seychelles among three informants, with different profiles and expertise, affiliated with the 
national Department of the Blue Economy.  The majority of interviews were carried-out in 
English (particularly in Mauritius and Seychelles), though some were also carried-out in 
French, a language for which the researcher has a strong working knowledge.  Informed 
consent was obtained from all KIs after the researcher had explained the objectives of the 
e ea ch, he ea on fo  he info man  incl sion in the study, as well as how the data would 
be used and how the researcher would ensure the confidentiality of the interview data.  Twenty-
two KIs permitted an audio recording of their interviews, all of which lasted between sixty and 
ninety minutes in duration.  For recorded interviews, the researcher carried out a transcription 
of the recorded data immediately following the interview, supplementing these with additional 
notes taken during the interview.  For interviews where the KI did not consent to being 
recorded, the researcher wrote up detailed notes.  These digital interview data files, both audio 
recordings and transcripts, while not containing information that could be deemed especially 
sensitive, were maintained (and backed-up) in encrypted files. 
To complement these primary data and to reinforce data reliability, a large amount of 
secondary documentation was utilised to triangulate the research analysis.  The majority of this 
documentation was available in the public sphere, usually through government or inter-
governmental organisation online portals.  These documents included archival records, 
fi he ie  and bl e econom -centred project and programme reports, technical reports, 
 
9 E hical app o al fo  he field o k a  ob ained f om S ellenbo ch Uni e i  Re ea ch E hic  Commi ee: H mani ie , in A g st 2017.  
This approval was granted based on a review of all data collection tools (in English and French), a written informed consent form, as well as 
prospective interview request letters/emails.  This ethical approval was valid throughout the duration of the study (being valid until August 
2020).   
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scientific papers, policy papers, meeting minutes (especially from inter-governmental summits 
and chamber of commerce meetings), conference papers, diplomatic memos, media resources 
(e.g. interviews, press releases), as well as a small amount of quantitative trade and investment 
data, extracted from publicly-accessible online databases.   
Some trade and investment data, as well as sectoral fisheries data (e.g. on employment 
and shipping movements) were not available online, but could be accessed through national 
statistics agencies.  Similarly, a select amount of secondary qualitative data, particularly 
diplomatic memos, annual reports and policy documents, were accessed physically through 
national archives in the different countries.  When the researcher was obligated to obtain 
information through an in-country institution, a written letter was presented to a responsible 
staff member to outline the rationale for the information request and to detail how the 
information would be used by the researcher.  The full list of secondary documentation 
analysed for this study can be found in the references list at the end of the dissertation.   
 
Data Analysis Methods   
Adopting one of the approaches to qualitative data analysis advocated by Stake (1995) 
and Creswell (2007), the researcher undertook a process of categorical aggregation of the 
transcribed interview data and field notes.  With the help of qualitative data analysis software 
(NVivo), transcribed interview and field note data were coded thematically according to 
common ideas and patterns.  A code table was developed by the researcher to ensure coding 
consistency.  Some codes were pre-cho en b  he e ea che  o eflec  concep  in he d  
theoretical framework, allowing the researcher to explore the resonance of these concepts in 
relation to the primary data.  However, additional codes were developed as the researcher 
undertook multiple iterations of data review, thus allowing the data to speak  (Rule and John, 
2011) i ho  being limi ed b  he e ea che  o n p e-established expectations.  From these 
coded categories, the researcher undertook a content and thematic analysis to identify what 
Stake (1995) refers to as multiple instances  within the data.  These instances , in turn, were 
used to derive issue relevant  meanings, which provided a basis for a further grouping of the 
coded da a, incl ding di ec  o a ion  f om KI , in o ca ego ie  aligned i h he d  
primary and secondary research questions.   
Collected secondary sources were grouped thematically and the researcher undertook 
multiple iterations of content analysis on relevant documentation.  The same process of data 
coding, grouping and theme identification applied to the primary data was also followed 
simultaneously for the secondary data.  However, the researcher was cautious to ensure that 
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the secondary data were allowed to speak  without being pigeonholed into the codes, groups 
and themes identified in the primary data.  Separate codes were developed from the secondary 
data analysis (with some of he e ea che  p e-chosen codes again being applied to ensure a 
link to theoretical concepts).  It was only after these secondary data analysis codes had been 
transformed into issue relevant  meaning  and o ed in o heme  linked o he d  
primary and secondary research questions that the researcher brought these analyses together 
and undertook a further stage of collective review, with a set of final data categories being 
validated with reference to the full array of analysed data.  It is from the analysis of these final 
categories that the study write-up is derived.  
 
8. Structure of the Dissertation 
  The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a critical 
review of the scholarly literature that informs the focus of this study.  A particular emphasis is 
placed on analysing the literature on the diplomacy of small states and on the different 
perspectives of cooperation provided by the main theoretical schools within international 
relations.  This chapter situates the focus of this study within this literature even while 
acknowledging that it seldom touches directly on SIDS (and almost never on fisheries) as core 
areas of interest.  The main componen  of hi  chap e  foc e  on elabo a ing ne  
egionali m  and i  ocial con c i i  fo nda ion .  The i abili  of ne  egionali m  a  
a theoretical perspective for this study is defended, though the shortcomings of this theory are 
also highlighted where relevant. 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the dynamics that characterise the fisheries sector 
(and particularly the tuna fishery) in the Western Indian Ocean.  There exist a wide array of 
actors, agreements, policies and trends that characterise this sector.  A mapping of these, both 
at a region-wide  level and in the context of each of the individual islands, ensures that basic 
technical terminology, key ideas, concepts and important stakeholders are all introduced and 
their roles understood before they are discussed further in he di e a ion  co e analytical 
chapters.  This chapter also establishes, through practical examples, the existence of technical 
or functional  cooperation between the Western Indian Ocean island states over fisheries.   
 In Chapter 4, the dissertation begins its analytical exploration with a focus on the first 
of he d  h ee in e iga i e len e : he poli ical d namic  a  pla  be een he We e n 
Indian Ocean islands at the state-to-state ministerial level.  The chapter explores these 
dynamics through a particular focu  on he la gel  n cce f l effo  of he i land  
respective fisheries ministries to enact common Minimum Terms and Conditions (MT&Cs) to 
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govern foreign vessel access to their EEZs.  Two particular issues  disparities in socio-
economic development between the islands and the economic competition between them over 
fisheries related foreign investment  are highlighted to detail this case.  
Chap e  5 deal  i h he econd of he d  in e iga i e len e : he poli ical 
dynamics at play between the Western Indian Ocean SIDS within the key inter-governmental 
organisations responsible for facilitating inter-island cooperation over fisheries. The chapter 
details how these political dynamics are influenced by the lack of coordination existing 
between these bodies and the resulting duplication of many of their core fisheries initiatives.  
The chapter also discusses how the heterogeneity that exists between the different islands as to 
their overriding foreign policy priorities, influences their differing approaches to each inter-
governmental organisation.  The chapter concludes with a discussion on the role of France in 
shaping inter-island political dynamics, particularly within the IOC, and how this affects 
prospects for deepening cooperation, integration and fisheries regime-building among the 
Western Indian Ocean SIDS.  
In Chapter 6, the dissertation changes focus to its third investigative lens, exploring 
inter-island political dynamics and regionness from the standpoint of fisheries-focused non-
state actors.  The chapter considers issues around the weakness of civil society within the island 
grouping, but particularly in Comoros and Madagascar, as well as how the lack of autonomy 
ha  he i land  e pec i e ci il ocie  ac o  ha e f om hei  na ional go ernments affects 
prospects for the creation of inter-island epistemic communities focused on fisheries.   
Finall , Chap e  7 b ing  he di e a ion  anal i  f ll ci cle, relating how inter-island 
political dynamics between island state fisheries ministries, within fisheries-focused inter-
governmental organisations and at the non-state level combine o affec  he i land  p o pec  
for deepening cooperation, enacting integrative regimes and engaging in collective diplomacy.  
The chapter also relates the concl ion  of he d  back o ne  egionali m  and ocial 
constructivism, commenting on what the findings say about the extent to which the Western 
Indian Ocean island states can truly be thought of as a socially-constructed region.  The chapter 
concludes with some specific commentary on what the findings of this study, even with its very 
bounded geographic and thematic focus, says about the diplomacy of small states (and 
pa ic la l  SIDS) and he p o pec i e ili  of he gang p  app oach o collec ive action as 
a means for these types of states to improve their bargaining power and represent their national 
interests.  Specific reflections are also provided on how political scientists should consider 




CHAPTER 2: Small State Diplomac , Cooperation & New Regionalism  - 
A Literature Review 
 
1. Introduction and Chapter Overview  
This chapter sets out to critically review the scholarly literature that informs the focus 
of this study.  In doing so, the chapter o k  o e abli h he ele ance of he d  p ima  
and secondary research questions, including how these questions address gaps in the academic 
nde anding of SIDS  coope a i e diplomac .  The chap e  al o e abli he  he uitability 
of he d  heo e ical app oach and he anal ical len e  in od ced in Chap e  1.  The 
chapter starts by analysing the literature pertaining to the diplomacy of small states and the 
distinctive place that SIDS occupy within this literature.  This analysis establishes the relevance 
of low bargaining power and corresponding diplomatic weakness as structural constraints to 
SIDS  poli ical ac ion.  D a ing on pe pec i e  f om o ke  chool  of ho gh , one foc ing 
on the barriers facing SIDS due to their weak positioning in the global power structure, and the 
other concentrating on the practical limitations that SIDS must overcome in order to project 
diplomatic influence, a focus is placed on unpacking the thinking underlying the gang up  
approach to cooperation and collective diplomacy among SIDS.  The chapter then proceeds to 
provide a brief summary of how different intellectual traditions within international relations 
define and seek to operationalise the concept of cooperation  be een states.  Touching on 
the realist, liberal institutionalist, Marxist and social constructivist schools of thought, 
a g men  a e p e en ed a  o h  he la e  p o ide  he mo  ef l fo nda ion fo  hi  d  
research focus.  Following this, the chapter moves to an examination of the new regionalism  
literature, first presenting the competing conceptual perspectives around what new 
regionalism  represents, before delving into the practical applications of this approach in the 
global south  and particularly in relation to SIDS.             
Importantly, this literature review will work to establish the credibility of new 
regionalism  a  an app op ia e heo e ical len  b  hich o engage i h hi  d  line  of 
inquiry.  At the same time, the review will also note areas where this theoretical perspective 
appears to be lacking, as well as how the research presented in this dissertation will address 
some of these shortcomings.  The chapter will conclude with a review of existing literature, 
albeit limited, on how political dynamics between SIDS influence cooperation between these 
states in the fisheries sector.  In doing so, the chapter will reinforce the value in taking this 
sector as a case study focus in exploring issues of cooperation and collective diplomacy among 
the Western Indian Ocean SIDS. 
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2. The Diplomacy of Small States 
Within much of the international relations and political science literature, SIDS are 
often lumped into the broad category of small states  rather than being analysed as a case 
apart (Archer, Bailes and Wivel, 2014; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Graham, 2017; Hey, 2003; 
Jesse and Dreyer, 2016; Sutton, 2011).  This stands in contrast to much of the economic, social 
development and environmental literature, which is more likely to treat SIDS, much as the UN 
does, as a distinct classification of states.  This inclusion of SIDS in the broader political 
analysis of small states can be useful in identifying broad trends and, as is done in most of the 
works cited above, when the interests of SIDS and small state non-SIDS are examined in a 
comparative manner.  However, the inclusion of SIDS in the broader small state literature does 
have drawbacks.    In particular, this literature tends to get bogged down in trying to produce 
authoritative definitions of smallness, whether based on population size (Read, 2001; Streeten, 
1993), land area (Crowards, 2002) or assorted economic measures, such as Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) or trade openness (Davenport, 2001; Mattoo and Subramanian, 2004).  This 
definitional discussion is often of limited value; something that was recognised even in some 
of the foundational work on small state diplomacy (Keohane, 1969; Rothstein, 1968; Vital, 
1967).  As Campling (2006: 249) argues, views on smallness are laden with subjectivity , 
while Wood (1967: 29) notes that smallness is a comparative and not an absolute idea  and 
any metric used to assess smallness will be arbitrary .  This is a view furthered by Bjøl (1971), 
Handel (1990), Jazbec (2001) and  somewhat more recently  Cooper and Shaw (2009). 
 Even in a discussion of SIDS, contestation exists over defining what is small .  While 
most scholars do not hesitate to classify SIDS as small  or even micro  states, Perinchief 
(2016) cites the often-con ide able a ea of man  SIDS  EEZ  o a g e ha  he e a e  a e no  
small  at all, particularly in terms of their (actual or potential) resource endowments.  
However, an overt fixation on smallness is also problematic in any discussion of SIDS because 
SIDS  ni ene  doe  no  come f om hei  i e alone. I  al o come  f om he collec i e cale 
and intensity of the economic, political and environmental challenges these states face, as well 
as the distinct vulnerability these challenges create.  It is true that these challenges are all, to a 
deg ee, linked o mallne .  Ho e e , he  a e al o connec ed o SIDS  geog aphical 
positionings, resource endowments, colonial and post-colonial histories, types of political and 
economic in i ion , a  ell a  o SIDS  dependence on (and e po e o) he ocean, among 
other factors.  When SIDS are discussed politically in the broader small state context, the 
impo ance of he e a io  fac o  in infl encing SIDS  poli ical beha io  ends to get 
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subsumed under an assumption that smallness, as a discrete and yet somewhat undefinable 
concept, matters above everything else.      
 Nevertheless, for scholars concerned about the wellbeing of SIDS, the broad literature 
on small states is extremely useful in providing a justification for highlighting low levels of 
bargaining power, as well as limited diplomatic capabilities, as important structural constraints 
o SIDS  poli ical ac ion.  The li e a e end  o come a  he e i e  f om o pe spectives.  
First, in terms of the weak positioning of small states in the context of global power relations.  
Second, focusing more on the practical constraints, such as human and financial resource 
limitations, that prevent small states from attaining diplomatic heft.  These perspectives 
occasionally overlap, but as will be argued later in this section, the literature focusing on the 
practical hindrances to small state power projection provide a more useful foundation upon 
which to situate this study.  
 
3. Diplomatic Weakness among Small States: The Global Power Relations  
Literature 
A useful example of the early work done on small state diplomacy, rooted very much 
in the global power relations  literature, is that of Keohane (1969).  Keohane takes a systemic 
view and divides the global political order into four tiers of states: system-determining , 
system-influencing , system-affecting  and system-ineffectual .  While states in the first 
two categories are capable of projecting influence unilaterally, system-affecting  states can 
attain influence only through collective action.  System-ineffectual  states, meanwhile, have 
almost no leverage, with their foreign policymaking reflecting adjustment to reality, not 
rearrangement of it  (p. 296).  Keohane  anal i  make  no efe ence o SIDS. Ho e e , ince 
he perceives the majority of Lilliputian  developing countries to be in the system-
ineffectual  category, there is little doubt that this is where he would envision SIDS to be 
situated as well.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Holbraad (1971), who refers to small 
states as the pawns  of international relations. Holbraad notes that small states, including 
SIDS, struggle to come to grips with a process [international diplomacy] that takes place, so 
to speak above their heads  (p. 78).      
Handel (1990), unable to come to a satisfactory definition of small , instead talks of a 
general class of weak states , inclusive of countries lacking in some combination of their 
human, natural, economic and/or military resources.  Included at the bottom-rung in his list of 
weak states , Handel speaks of mini-states , in which he includes the majority of SIDS.  
These mini-states  ha e ome o e lap i h Keohane  system-ineffectual  states.  
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Concurring with Keohane, Handel describes these states as being almost entirely reactive in 
the face of tumultuous global forces.  Lacking the economic or military resources to be real 
diplomatic players, mini-states  are overwhelmed by external events and have their foreign 
policy10 op ion  dic a ed o hem.  Handel  ie  echo ho e of Je i  (1976), ho po i  ha  
mall a e  compa a i e lack of e o ce  and e l ing inability to buffer themselves against 
external shocks, makes them little more than passive reactors in a global system within which 
they have minimal power.  
The above scholars wrote at the height (Keohane, Holbraad, Jervis) and tail end 
(Handel) of the Cold War.  In this period of great power  politics, defined by security concerns 
and hard realist thinking among international relations scholars, it is not surprising that small 
states would be ascribed a marginal role in global diplomacy.  However, with the end of the 
Cold War and a gradual shift away from hard realism towards a more liberal internationalist 
perspective (Ikenberry, 2018), combined with the emergence of themes such as human rights 
(Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Sikkink, 1998) and the natural environment (Dalby, 1992; 
Smith, 1993) as diplomatic focus areas, some scholars did expect a modest opening in the 
diplomatic space available to small states.  Elman (1995), for example, hypothesised that the 
emergence of this broader array of issue areas could presage an opportunity for small states to 
generate foreign policy pro-actively and on the basis of their domestic political preferences 
rather than as reactions to prevailing geo-political forces. 
For the most part, however, the contemporary global power relations  literature has 
continued to paint a broadly negative picture of small states when it comes to their prospects 
for engaging in pro-active diplomacy.  Breuning (2007), despite writing in a more current geo-
political environment, echoes Keohane and Handel by citing the constrained political space 
that small states, defined as having limited land, human or resulting economic resources, have 
at their disposal.  Breuning contends that small states are likely to be highly interdependent 
with other (larger) states.  This interdependence may exist in relation to security or economic 
concerns (or both), but has the effect of constraining the foreign policy options that dependent 
small states are willing to consider.  To preserve the advantages they obtain through these 
interdependent relationships, Breuning argues that most small states will adopt either 
consensus-oriented foreign policie , in which they passively align their diplomatic priorities 
with those of a larger state, or compliant foreign policies , in which small states continue to 
 
10 This study adopts Nanji a  (2010: 330) definition of foreign policy  as the process by which states identify goals in the international 
em ac ing on he in e na ional age in p i  of hei na ional in e e . 
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align their diplomatic agendas with more powerful counterparts, but do so resentfully and with 
awareness that they lack the capabilities to pursue other options.   
Bailes, Thayer and Thorhallsson (2016) mi o  B e ning  ie  in po la ing shelter 
theory , in hich mall a e  eek alliance hel e  ela ion hip  i h mo e po e f l (la ge ) 
states.  These relationships can be extremely beneficial to the interests of small states, but they 
necessitate diplomatic alignment  consensus or compliance  with those states providing them 
with shelter .  Veenendaal  (2017) di c ion of mall a e  a  beneficia ie  of pa on-client 
relationships, introduced in Chapter 1, appears to also fit this mould.  To Veenendaal, small 
states (which he defines as those with populations below 250,000 people) benefit from 
exchanges  with larger patron states, including in the provision of security and economic 
support.  However, Veenendaal acknowledges that these benefits come with an acceptance of 
passive diplomatic alignment on the part of small state clients.   
In none of the above analyses are small states presented as independent actors with 
meaningful levels of bargaining power or an ability to project their own diplomatic influence.  
These states may be able to take basic steps to strengthen the rules and procedures of 
international organisations, in the hope that doing so binds  larger powers to global norms 
that serve small state interests (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Vital, 1967).  More likely, 
however, is that small states will simply be reactive players in a global system that forces them 
to seek alliances with larger and more powerful counterparts in order to guarantee their security 
and wellbeing.  Wivel and Oest (2010: 434), writing specifically of microstates , describe 
them as permanently stuck as the weak party in asymmetric relationships internationally and 
therefore forced to adopt strategies that cope with the permanency of their weakness.   No clear 
pathway is established within this literature for these types of states to change their peripheral 
ci c m ance , i h mo  eemingl  de ined o emain in Keohane  bo om ng of system-
ineffectual  states.   
SIDS seldom feature as a core focus of this literature on small state positioning within 
the global power structure.  For the most part, SIDS are simply assumed to follow patterns of 
diplomatic behaviour akin to other small states, though possibly  given their micro  status 
from an even more marginal global positioning.  Veenendaal (2017) is something of an 
exception since he takes a number of SIDS as case study examples in his analysis of patron-
client relationships between small and large states.  However, Veenendaal makes little effort 
to distinguish the effects of patron-client exchanges  between SIDS vs. non-SIDS small states.  
For the purposes of this study, the above literature should mainly serve to lend credence to the 
d  o e a ching claim that small states like SIDS are, by and large, presumed to be 
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operating with little bargaining power and from corresponding positions of diplomatic 
weakness. 
 
4. Diplomatic Weakness among Small States: The Practical Limitations  
Literature 
There is a second strand of small state literature that focuses less on strategic power 
imbalances and more on the practical challenges associated with effective diplomatic 
engagement.  While by no means denying the comparatively weak position that small states 
occupy within the global power structure, this literature is more open to the possibility that 
small states can exploit opportunities for diplomatic influence on particular issues.  What may 
prevent small states from individually realising these opportunities, however, are limitations in 
he h man and financial e o ce  he e a e  can alloca e o diplomac .  He  (2003) 
reference to limited foreign policy bureaucracies  encapsulates this view.  Both Hey, as well 
as Bueger and Wivel (2018), note that small states, including SIDS, typically possess weaker 
diplomatic networks than their larger counterparts.   
Small states, and especially micro-states  (a category within which Bueger and Wivel 
categorise SIDS), have comparatively limited funds to spend on diplomatic efforts and have 
smaller pools of potential human resources to draw upon when staffing their diplomatic corps.  
These factors make it difficult for many small/micro states to maintain a consistent or sizeable 
presence at international fora or other (formal or informal) meetings. This has two major 
impacts.  First, it makes it less likely these states will gain the opportunity to chair diplomatic 
committees and/or to take the lead in crafting policy proposals.  Second, it leaves these states 
with less information than they would like on the diplomatic positions of other states; 
ome hing ha  p e en  he eng hening of mall/mic o a e  ba gaining po e .  Schiff 
(2010) summarises the result of these resource constraints with his contention that small states, 
and particularly SIDS, lack the resources needed to overcome the high negotiation costs  that 
are incurred by states engaging in modern-day diplomacy. 
For this study, a useful foundation emerges from the literature focused on the practical 
limitations that inhibit small states from projecting influence.  The small state literature focused 
on global power relations is less suitable.  This is not because the latter literature is not valid, 
but rather because this literature tends to start from a realist standpoint that: a) is somewhat 
deterministic in assigning small states a set position in the global power structure; and b) 
seldom recognises cooperation as a viable means for small states to adjust (however modestly) 
their global positioning.  As already noted, this literature provides few identifiable avenues for 
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real change.  The more practically-focused literature, on the other hand, allows small states 
some agency to realise diplomatic objectives provided they can overcome their aforementioned 
resource constraints.  This literature is more cognisant of SIDS as distinct actors and it presents 
problems that while significant, are not intractable.  This literature draws on liberal thought 
and raises the possibility that through mutual cooperation and by exploiting the malleability of 
diplomatic systems, small states can tilt the diplomatic playing field slightly in their favour. 
 
5. Opportunities for Enhancing Small State Influence 
A number of practical limitations  scholars argue that diplomatic institutions and 
processes (referred to as institutional systems  by Cooper and Shaw, 2009) provide more 
openings to small states than is commonly recognised.  These openings, however, can only by 
realised through deft political action on the part of small state decision-makers.  Bueger and 
Wivel (2018), in their excellent analysis of Seychellois diplomacy in the field of ocean 
governance (to be referenced at various points in this dissertation), note that in spite of 
undeniable material limitations, small states  and particularly SIDS  can take three measures 
to attain diplomatic influence.  First, these states must work to establish the importance of their 
geographical positioning, reinforcing to larger powers the vital strategic role they can play on 
impo an  i e  in hei  icini  (e.g. fo  Se chelle , he co n  ideal po i ioning a  a 
logistical centre for efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia).  This, the authors claim, 
has the effect of drawing in both financial and material investments from larger powers, 
including in capacity-b ilding, ha  ma  eng hen he e mall a e  diploma ic capabili ie  
over time.   
Second, small states need to develop issue-specific capacity and strive to achieve niche 
influence .  Small states cannot hope to be major diplomatic players.  However, by channeling 
their limited resources into developing expertise in particular sectors (as Seychelles has done 
with the blue economy ), small states can insert themselves into issue-based diplomacy that 
reflects their national interests.  Third, small states need to develop political cultures and 
institutions that are conducive to activist  foreign policies.  This means establishing 
democratic norms that minimise (as much as possible) domestic political cleavages, while 
mobilising decision-makers to universally support the niche  policy aims that the small state 
intends to pursue.  Institutionally, small states must minimise levels of bureaucracy and ensure 
that political decision-making, inclusive of civil society, happens quickly and can respond to 
changing circumstances.  
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The measures put forward by Bueger and Wivel for enhancing small state diplomatic 
power are not new.  Graham (2017) also writes of the importance of context specific 
determinants  in allowing some small states to exploit their geographical positioning to 
overcome practical limitations in projecting power.  Both Blanton and Kegley (2016) and 
Morgan and Webber (2002) point to the importance of regional context and political culture as 
determinants of diplomatic action among small states.  These ideas can also be found within 
much of the literature focusing on small states in the European Union (Arter, 2000; Bailes and 
Thorhallsson, 2013; Bunse, 2009; Panke, 2010).  However, Bueger and Wivel (2018) provide 
one of the few in-depth analyses that considers these power-enhancing  measures in a global 
south/SIDS context (though both Smed and Wivel, 2017 and Thorhallsson, 2012 provide 
commen a  ha  complemen  B ege  and Wi el  anal i ).  C io l , B ege  and Wi el  
study of Seychelles does not mention the notion of the country ganging up  with its SIDS 
neighbours.  If these three measures can be implemented by a single small island nation, could 
they not also be implemented  at greater effort but also to greater effect  by an island 
grouping? This is a question that will be explored in the chapters that follow. 
Bueger and Wivel (2018) establish that global diplomatic processes are not wholly rigid 
and that small states can take steps to overcome their considerable limitations.  Thorhallsson 
and Steinsson (2017) also seize on the issue of small states developing niche expertise and 
comparative diplomatic advantages.  They argue that in international environments that are 
peaceful, stable and institutionalised  (p. 22), this expertise can provide small states with some 
leeway for maneuver , particularly when working through regional or international 
organisations.  Cooper and Shaw (2009), drawing on the analysis of Bjøl (1971), discuss the 
importance of international institutions, and especially the types of institutional systems  in 
which small states find themselves.  In institutional systems that are relatively less 
confrontational , mall a e  ma  be in a po i ion o follo  B ege  and Wi el  ad ice o 
play-up their geographical value and to pursue activist  foreign policies.  Masters (2012) takes 
the discussion of small state diplomacy away from a state-centric view altogether.  She offers 
a reminder that even if small state governments are comparatively lacking in resources, an 
array of non-governmental actors in academia, the private sector and the media (to name a few) 
ma  al o be b o gh  o he able o eng hen mall a e  ba gaining po e   provided small 
state governments are willing to make available the political space for these actors to operate 
(alluding to Bueger and Wi el  political culture ). 
In addition to exploiting opportunities presented by prevailing institutional systems , 
some scholars within the practical limitations  li e a e al o ecogni e ha  mall a e  
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ability to project influence can be boosted through mutual cooperation.  While the term gang 
up  is not used by all of these scholars (Benwell 2011 and Graham 2017 appear to be the main 
ecen  p e o  of hi  e m), hi  li e a e b oadl  empha i e  ho  indi id al mall a e  
resource constraints can be overcome through a pooling of available resources and expertise, 
as well as through the development of collective institutions that facilitate shared decision-
making.  Thi  li e a e ejec  Holb aad  (1971) no ion ha  in e na ional diplomacy takes 
place above the heads  of small states.  It also goes against the arguments made by the global 
power relations  thinkers, like Handel (1990) and Jervis (1976), who contend that small states 
are mere reactors  to global events.  This literature, like that focusing on institutional 
systems  does not overstate the benefits of mutual cooperation, recognising that small states 
may only be able to punch above their weight to a modest extent.  However, it at least 
acknowledges another strategy within the diplomatic toolkit that small states can leverage to 
try and increase their bargaining power.   
Interestingly, much of this literature makes use of SIDS case studies  focusing on 
mutual cooperation between these states in regards to international trade negotiations (Byron, 
1994; Hornbeck, 2008; Girvan, 2010; Sheahan et al., 2010) or in advocating for measures to 
mitigate the consequences of climate change (Benwell, 2011; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; 
Jaschik, 2014).  Schiff (2010), as already noted, takes the example of Caribbean SIDS to make 
the argument that for these states to overcome their resource limitations and high negotiation 
costs , they are best served by establishing regional cooperation agreements and negotiating as 
a bloc.  Schiff contends that SIDS are well-placed to establish such mechanisms because they 
exhibit greater similarity of interests than more distant countries  (p. 1).   
Ganging up  also brings benefits, Schiff posits, because SIDS will be seen as more 
attractive negotiating partners by larger states or larger regional groupings if they can be dealt 
with as a collective rather than on an individual basis.  This is because the negotiation costs  
that arise when dealing with individual small states may not be seen as worth the effort, even 
b  a bod  like he EU.  In Schiff  ie , SIDS e abli h and main ain ba gaining po e  b  
banding oge he .  B on (1994) and Ho nbeck (2008) p o ide an nde pinning o Schiff  
claim  b  a g ing ha  Ca ibbean SIDS  abili  o main ain p eferential trade access to the EU 
market has come about largely because the EU has seen CARICOM as an institutional partner 
worth negotiating with, and because Caribbean SIDS have pooled their resources and political 
capital into CARICOM to establish its credibility and competence.  
A few scholars point to the role that mutual cooperation among small states, and 
especially SIDS, has played in allowing these states to influence global norms, especially in 
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relation to climate change and human rights (Wallbott, 2014; He, 2016; Pettenger, 2016).  
Benwell (2011) argues that cooperation between SIDS, both through island-focused 
organisations like AOSIS and through more informal platforms, has allowed SIDS to emerge 
as regime leaders  in shaping how global institutions perceive and seek to confront climate 
change.  Benwell contends that given the existential threat that climate change poses to many 
SIDS, these states do not have the option of simply being reactive .  By banding together and 
allocating their individually scarce financial and human resources to the development of a 
collectively-agreed strategy for climate advocacy, Benwell suggests that SIDS have been able 
to leverage a far higher (and more effective) profile than would have been possible if they had 
sought to pursue this advocacy individually.  By collaboratively working together to establish 
a mutual identity as front-line states  that stand to be the first victims of climate change, 
Benwell also credi  SIDS  collabo a ion i h injec ing genc  in o he clima e deba e. 
Graham (2017), in her thorough analysis of the foreign policies of Southern African 
small states, plainly notes that small states may be individually weaker than others but 
collectively they can prove very influential in international relations  (p. 134).  Graham 
conc  i h Ben ell  he i  ha  SIDS  referring in her case to Mauritius and Seychelles  
have achieved a great deal through collaborative efforts, both in advocacy around climate 
change as well as in working to shape global efforts to promote sustainable approaches to the 
blue economy .  Like Bueger and Wivel (2018), Graham singles out Seychelles as a small 
island state that punches above its weight and which has worked to establish niche expertise  
in different facets of ocean governance.  Unlike Bueger and Wivel, however, Graham argues 
that Seychelles has been effective in leveraging this expertise in part by seeking common cause 
with Mauritius, its larger and relatively more powerful neighbour.  Ganging up  with 
Mauritius to develop common policy positions has allowed Seychelles to piggyback on 
Ma i i  la ge  diploma ic a e i hin a io  egional o gani a ion  hen p e ing i  
objectives.  This stature arise  f om Ma i i  be e  e o ced diploma ic co p .               
As has been noted, the benefits of mutual cooperation (or other strategies outlined for 
small states/SIDS to overcome practical limitations to projecting influence) are rarely 
overstated within the literature.  However, some scholars have still taken issue with what they 
perceive to be a tendency among some small state optimists  o celeb a e he e a e  
occasional success in influencing diplomatic processes, even if doing so does not appear to 
lead to tangible diplomatic outcomes (Drahos, 2003; Lee, 2009).  Benwell (2011) tackles these 
criticisms head-on in arguing (not entirely convincingly) that changes in process may actually 
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be more important over the long-term in generating lasting transformations in norms and 
attitudes (e.g. towards the urgency of climate change).   
These criticisms do raise the question of how effective small state diplomacy really is.  
While the practical limitations  literature presents a number of measures for small states to 
punch above their weight, the literature tends to lack evidence suggesting that these measures 
deliver sustained diplomatic success.  The work of Benwell (2011) and Jaschik (2014), for 
example, clearly outline how SIDS have collectively and forcefully inserted themselves into 
the climate change debate, but they provide little clarity on how (or even weather) small states 
have fundamentally been able to change the terms of this debate to their advantage.  Similarly, 
while Schiff (2010) provides a strong conceptual rationale for the notion of small states banding 
together to form common negotiating blocs, he actually provides little thought on what 
modalities these states should take to institutionalise this cooperation  e.g. what level of 
cooperation and collective action is required for such blocs to be successful? Also, he provides 
little real evidence to suggest that these blocs generate positive returns for small states over the 
long-term.  Other writers, focusing on SIDS organisations like CARICOM and AOSIS, while 
highlighting singular instances of diplomatic success, tend not to demonstrate whether or not 
these successes are sustained.   
Also focusing on mutual cooperation among small states, Graham (2017) warns against 
the assumption that these states will inevitably be aligned on all matters.  Instead, she reiterates 
the importance of contextual factors, types of institutions and prevailing political cultures, as 
well as political and economic incentives, as the true drivers of cooperation or non-cooperation 
among small states.  Stated differently, small states are not all that different from their larger 
counterparts in having diverse interests.  Political considerations, and not merely the fact of 
being small  (o  being SIDS), will influence how small states choose to engage cooperatively 
and in the wider diplomatic sphere.  This is undoubtedly as true for SIDS as it is for small states 
in general.  Graham notes that while small states do, as Schiff argues, have common interests 
and share many underlying traits, they all will still place paramount importance on protecting 
their sovereignty and retaining flexibility in their diplomatic endeavours.  Those concerned 
with small states, she concludes, should not lose sight of this fact.   
 
6. Situating a Study on Western Indian Ocean SIDS in the Context of Small State 
Diplomacy 
This section has provided a general overview of the literature focused on small state 
diplomacy.  It has been argued that this literature falls roughly into two camps: 1) a global 
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power relations  literature that draws on realist thinking and which ascribes almost no 
diplomatic capabilities to small states; and 2) a practical limitations  literature that is more 
liberal in its outlook and which, while not disputing the comparatively weak diplomatic 
position in which small states find themselves, nevertheless argues that these weaknesses are 
largely based around resource constraints rather than global power imbalances.  This practical 
limitations  literature is much more likely to consider the diplomacy of SIDS and it presents a 
number of practical measures that small states/SIDS can take to enhance their bargaining power 
and diplomatic heft.   
For SIDS, leveraging the strategic value of their geographic positioning, channelling 
scarce resources into the development of niche expertise  and developing political systems 
and institutions that facilitate diplomatic drive towards priority objectives, are approaches that 
can be taken to exploit flexibilities within the institutional systems  of global diplomacy.  An 
additional approach is for small states to pursue intensive cooperation with one another.  The 
fo ma ion of common nego ia ing bloc  among SIDS can boo  he e a e  collec i e 
bargaining power, both by enhancing their own visibility and by reducing the negotiation 
costs  that might discourage diplomatic engagement if larger powers had to interact with SIDS 
individually.  Even the informal pooling of resources and expertise among small states like 
SIDS may allow them increased opportunity to push key objectives than would be the case if 
they sought to do so alone. 
This study is clearly situated within the practical limitations  literature.  It concurs 
with Benwell (2011), Bueger and Wivel (2018), Graham (2017) and Schiff (2010), that small 
states  and specifically SIDS  are capable of doing more than simply reacting to their realities 
and can be pro-active diplomatic players, at least in niche areas.  While not dismissing the 
views of global power relations  scholars, this study takes a view that existing evidence, such 
as the work of AOSIS in coordinating SIDS advocacy efforts around climate change, indicates 
a degree of influence projection among these states that rises above what these scholars are 
willing to concede.  However, the study also keys in on some of the overarching criticisms 
aimed at (and contained within) this literature.  Namely, even if small states like SIDS can find 
avenues to enhance their diplomatic influence, it is not clear what this actually means in terms 
of generating tangible outcomes.   
Turning specifically to the possibilities of mutual cooperation between SIDS, it is not 
clear from the literature how this cooperation can best be structured or sustained to ensure 
collec i e diploma ic infl ence.  Finall , G aham  (2017) ca ion ha  mall ates are 
heterogeneous in their interests and will, in spite of their common smallness , act on different 
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incentives when choosing whether (and how) to pursue cooperation with other small states, 
gi e  impe  o hi  d  p ima  e ea ch question looking at how (and whether) existing 
political dynamics among SIDS in the Western Indian Ocean are conducive to fostering 
sustained cooperation, integration and collective action.     
 
7. Defining Cooperation 
The following chapters of this dissertation will focus on unpacking three concepts 
introduced in Chapter 1, and which form the core focus of this study: cooperation, collective 
diplomacy and regionness.  The latter term will be fleshed out in the next section of this chapter 
focusing on new regionalism .  Few issues are as central to international relations as 
cooperation .  Yet arriving at a settled definition of this term, or understanding how it is 
operationalised into something that is tangible and easy to identify, remains a challenge for 
scholars.  In what follows, a general overview will be presented of how different theoretical 
traditions in international relations perceive cooperation between states.  The ways in which 
this cooperation is seen to lead (or not lead) to the emergence of collective diplomacy will be 
di c ed.  Finall , hi  ec ion ill e n o K a ne  (1983) no ion of regimes, also 
introduced in Chapter 1, to outline one way that those analysing the process of cooperation 
(such as this study) can be sure that they are examining something that is substantive.  
 Turning briefly to how cooperation  is situated within the dominant theoretical 
frameworks of international relations, a simplified categorisation can be done on the basis of 
three overarching approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism.  A fourth 
approach, a Marxist or Gramscian perspective, tends to focus on issues of hegemonic power, 
which in a modern 21st-century form, considers international relations as being about the power 
of a transnational capitalist class (Destradi, 2010; Robinson, 2005).  It is difficult to see where 
small states like SIDS fit into this type of framework or, stated differently, it seems unlikely 
that small states would be ascribed even the hint of any real agency in this type of outlook.  As 
such, this approach has not been adopted as a major focus for this study.  
For scholars concerned with SIDS, it is readily apparent that a realist view of 
cooperation will offer little succour in dealing with issues of low bargaining power or minimal 
diplomatic capabilities among these states.  Indeed, realist perspectives tend to take the view, 
outlined by the global power relations  thinkers in the previous section, that these constraints 
are natural and immutable consequences of relative state weakness in a global system that 
emphasises hard power.  Realist perspectives downplay the value of cooperation, at least 
outside the context of security alliances.  Also, because realism focuses on the balance of power 
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between states and assumes the existence of anarchy outside the state system, it provides no 
intellectual space for non-state actors or international (inter-governmental) organisations to 
play a role in supporting diplomatic processes.  With its focus on hard security, realism also 
gives little credence to the importance of socio-economic issue areas as foundations for 
international relations between states (Bull, 1977; Fromkin, 1981; Freyburg-Inan, Harrison and 
James, 2009; Hoffman, 1965; Keohane, 1984; Waltz, 1979).  
 For the reasons above, it should be apparent that both the central research question 
po ed b  hi  d , a  ell a  he d  anal ical f ame o k, o ld be of li le in e e  o 
committed realists.  Cooperation between presumably system-ineffectual  states, focused 
around a socio-economic set of issues pertaining to fisheries, would find no intellectual space 
in the realist framework.  Perceptions of self-interest among states would likely preclude the 
realist from expecting this type of non-security-focused cooperation to evolve into regular 
in i ionali ed collec i e diplomac .  Re ning o hi  d  anal ical f ame o k, 
introduced in Chapter 1, a realist would  at best  only see one of the three lenses  examined 
in this study, that of state-state cooperation, as being relevant.  The additional lenses focusing 
on cooperation through inter-governmental organisations and through non-state actors, would 
be deemed of little importance.    
These views stand in contrast to the liberal institutionalist approach outlined by Bulmer 
(1993), Keohane (1984, 1988), Keohane and Martin (1995), Keohane and Nye (1977), as well 
as Milner (1997).  Contrary to realism, liberal institutionalism contends that diverse forms of 
cooperation are not only possible, but are inevitable (and essential) in a world marked by 
multiple forms of complex interdependence.  While not denying that states are the predominant 
actors in international relations, liberal institutionalists acknowledge a need for states to cede 
some sovereignty to enable the creation and functioning of international organisations.  These 
organisations are managed through the creation of cooperative regimes  K a ne  (1983) 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures  that govern relations between 
member states and which may also allow for the incorporation of non-state actors into 
cooperative processes.  Within the liberal institutionalist framework, it is also possible to find 
the ideas underlying functional and neo-functional cooperation (Haas, 1961, 1970; Mitrany, 
1976).  Influential in explaining early patterns of political integration in post-war Europe. 
functionalism emphasises a link between issue-based technical cooperation among states and 
the effect of cooperative spillovers  in incentivising deepening political integration over time.  
This integration may lead to the development of supranational bodies through which complex 
forms of cooperation are managed and intensified. 
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Liberal institutionalism would seem to offer far more promise for scholars focusing on 
cooperation and collective diplomacy among SIDS.  It acknowledges that cooperation is a 
viable (and desirable) objective for states, while also positing that meaningful cooperation can 
exist beyond the issue of security.  The notion of functional  cooperation lends credibility to 
the possibility of technical issue areas, such as fisheries, serving as a catalyst for deepening 
cooperation and collective diplomacy.  Liberal institutionalism, unlike realism, also provides 
non-state actors with some room for maneuver and by drawing on the existence of cooperative 
regimes, it provides a basis for establishing the existence of institutionalised cooperation within 
an organisational structure.  It is seemingly possible to situate the gang up  approach to SIDS 
coope a ion nde  a libe al in i ionali  f ame o k.   Indeed, Schiff  (2010) call fo  mall 
states like SIDS to form common negotiating blocs and other formal structures through which 
to foster cooperation, would find favour with liberal institutionalists.   
However, whereas liberal institutionalism (and particularly functionalism) has been 
effectively applied to explaining the evolution of the European Coal and Steel Community into 
the European Economic Community and then into the EU, it has been examined from a slightly 
different perspective in the global south.  As Axline (1994) notes, the emphasis that liberal 
institutionalism places on cooperation as a pathway towards political integration, is less 
relevant among developing countries. This is because: a) political integration is seldom an 
objective of political elites in developing states, who even more than their counterparts 
elsewhere (e.g. in Europe) are likely to be protective of state sovereignty; and b) international 
organisations developed to foster cooperation in the global south are usually constrained in 
their ambitions by the lack of resources member states are able (or choose) to contribute.  This, 
in turn, may limit the extent (and types) of cooperative regimes produced.   
Liberal institutionalism possesses a number of traits that make it a viable framework 
fo  hi  d .  Unlike eali m, hich lend  c edibili  o onl  one of he d  anal ical 
lenses  (the state-state level), a liberal institutionalist approach would justify a focus on both 
state-state cooperation and cooperation through inter-governmental organisations.  It even, to 
an extent, provides space for considering the role of non-state actors in cooperative endeavours.  
However, the overarching focus of liberal institutionalism is on the functioning of inter-
governmental bodies, which for this study would refer mainly to the IOC and to a lesser degree, 
IORA, IOTC and SWIOFC.  It is certainly possible to consider the extent to which political 
dynamics among Western Indian Ocean SIDS foster cooperation and collective diplomacy 
through these bodies (Chapter 4 of this dissertation does so).  However, it is also necessary to 
ackno ledge A line  c i i e  and o ecogni e ha  in a global o h/SIDS con e , more than 
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if the study were looking at a cooperative space like the EU, a liberal institutionalist analysis 
that puts inter-governmental organisations (and their cooperative regimes) front and centre, 
may not capture the full story.   
Constructivism offers a third key theoretical perspective on international cooperation 
and it is through a constructivist lens that this study finds its most appropriate foundation.   
Constructivism, as its name suggests, assumes that cooperation is constructed  through 
consistent social practice and interaction.  Whereas realists see the material design of the 
international system as an unchangeable given, constructivists give credence to the notion that 
this system is actively developed  and consistently changed  based on the prevailing interests, 
values and identities held by participating political actors (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999).  
These factors determine not only the degree to which states choose to cooperate, but also how 
they do so, as well as the ways in which they may decide to develop and structure this 
cooperation over time (Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1992, 1999).   
Like liberal institutionalists, constructivists ascribe importance to inter-governmental 
organisations.  However, whereas the former tends to assume that these organisations must be 
assessed on the basis of whether or not they facilitate political integration, constructivists 
contend that these organisations function  and should be assessed  on the degree to which 
they reflect the ideas and values that underpin them.  Finally, with its emphasis on identity and 
values as shapers of cooperation, it is unsurprising that more political space is available under 
constructivism for non-state actors  norm entrepreneurs  in the words of Keck and Sikkink 
(1998)  to play a role in shaping cooperative processes. 
There is a degree of interpretative flexibility with constructivism that does not exist for 
either realism or liberal institutionalism.  This flexibility is extremely useful in a study of 
cooperation in a global south/SIDS context.  Because constructivism does not hold to the realist 
view of a pre-determined institutional structure based around hard power, there is nothing 
precluding small states like SIDS from seeking cooperative relationships on their own terms.  
Rather than being mere adopters of consensus  or compliance  foreign policies, SIDS can 
actively construct cooperative/collective initiatives, and even regimes, through their own 
volition and to reflect their interests.   
While the effectiveness of these constructs  may be variable depending on how they 
are assessed (and as practical limitations  scholars would argue, based on the resources these 
states have available to support them), a constructivist at least acknowledges that these states 
have some agency and can actively mould the political space in which they exist.  This is a 
foundational assumption for this study as well.  It underlies the primary research question, 
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which essentially asks how existing political dynamics shape the ways in which Western Indian 
Ocean SIDS choose to construct their common diplomatic environment in relation to fisheries.   
Constructivism also adopts a more flexible interpretation of what cooperation should 
lead to.  Whereas liberal institutionalists would argue that the end goal of cooperation should 
be some type of political integration, the constructivist contends that the process of cooperation 
is mutable and that the objectives of cooperation will change as the ideas and values that 
underpin this cooperation change as well.  This notion will be further discussed in relation to 
the idea of regionness in the next section of this chapter.  This flexible interpretation allows 
this study to engage with the cooperative process among the Western Indian Ocean SIDS 
without having to assess it against a pre-determined gold standard .  Re ning o he d  
primary research question, constructivism allows for a much deeper dive into how politics 
appears to influence the underlying social interactions between the island  diploma ic ac o  
rather than merely querying whether political dynamics influence a prevailing balance of power 
(realism) or affect progress towards political integration (liberal institutionalism).   
Finally, non-state actors, whether in civil society or the private sector, are front and 
centre as meaningful political actors under constructivism, whereas they remain either 
completely marginal (realism) or at best complementary (liberal institutionalism) under other 
f ame o k .  Wi h he con c i i  pe pec i e, all h ee of he d  anal ical lenses  are 
valid: state-state cooperation, cooperation through inter-governmental organisations and 
cooperation through non-state actors.  The next section expands this theoretical focus and 
discusses constructivism in the context of new regionalism .  This discussion will outline 
mo e clea l  ho  con c i i m ill info m hi  d  anal i .      
Having reviewed the ways that different international relations theories perceive 
cooperation, it is still useful to briefly consider how the literature has attempted to precisely 
define this concept.  In Chapter 1, it was noted that this study looks favourably on the definition 
provided by Axelrod and Keohane (1985: 226), in which they describe cooperation as 
occurring when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of 
others .  In separate work, Keohane (1984: 51) further details cooperation as revolving around 
the actions of separate states (or organisations), not previously in harmony, being brought into 
conformity with one another through a process of negotiation .  
Each of these definitions is valid in their own way and they each seize on the idea that 
cooperation is only real if it includes identifiable action on the part of cooperating agents.  
Ruggie (1975: 570) offers a constructivist reflection on cooperation that focuses on the 
existence or non-existence of regimes.  Providing a definition upon which Krasner (1982) 
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undoubtedly elaborated, Ruggie defines regimes, in material terms, as mutual expectations, 
rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial commitments, which have 
been accepted by a group of states.   K a ne  e plici  incl ion of p inciple  and no m  
further sharpens the ideational component of regimes.  Regimes are ultimately about ideas and 
about material evidence demonstrating that these ideas are being put into action.   
This study, when assessing evidence of cooperation among Western Indian Ocean 
SIDS, holds to this perspective.  Both the primary data collected through KIIs, as well as the 
reviewed secondary documentation, focus on interrogating the existence and meaning given to 
particular regimes established within this island grouping.  Materially, the study bases its 
analysis on a review of different evidential sources that are used to establish the existence and 
nature of cooperative regimes: budgets, investment agreements, treaties, joint 
cooperation/management agreements, meeting minutes, project reports, treaties and fisheries 
protocols (to name just a few).  At the level of ideas, the study utilises some of the same sources, 
but also draws heavily on the qualitative interview data in order to delve into the beliefs and 
values that inform the actions of key actors in each of the SIDS (at state and non-state levels) 
when formulating or engaging in collective diplomatic action.  The link between regimes and 
new regionalism  is discussed in the following section. 
 
8. New Regionalism  as a Theoretical Framework 
 The concept of new regionalism  was introduced in Chapter 1 as an overarching 
theoretical framework for this study.  Acharya (2012) legitimately questions whether it is really 
possible to view new regionalism  as a coherent theory akin to functionalism or liberalism.  
He argues that new regionalism  is more an intellectual movement to broaden the scope of 
regionalism studies, taking into consideration the impact of globalisation  (p. 8).  A cursory 
e ie  of he li e a e end  o ppo  Acha a  ie .  The chola l  di ide be een old  
and new  regionalism is generally marked by the end of the Cold War and the shift away from 
a global system defined by state-centricity and a bi-polar order focused on security, to a system 
that if not truly multi-polar, was marked by the emergence of diverse political actors capable 
of projecting influence on an array of issues.  These diverse actors included revitalised 
multilateral organisations, multinational firms and transnational civil society networks, enabled 
by the post-Cold War spread of democracy and capitalism (Hettne, 1999; Hettne and 
Söderbaum, 1998; Hurrell, 1995; Shaw, 2000).  An additional way of considering the shift 
from old  to new  egionali m i  h o gh Eikenbe  (2018) p e io l  ci ed hif  f om 
realism towards a greater acceptance of liberalism within post-Cold War international relations. 
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  Acharya is also correct that new regionalism  does not serve as a traditional predictive 
theory of international relations.  It does not offer a simple model of state behaviour and it 
contains a diversity of perspectives.  However, as will be detailed in this section, new 
regionalism  contains within it a number of assumptions that give defined structure to a 
constructivist view of international relations.  The array of perspectives that exist within the 
new regionalism  literature are considerable and this study does not attempt to draw on them 
all.  Instead, it focuses on a core selection of arguably the most well-known literature, 
particularly the conceptual work of Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel (1999) plus Hettne and 
Söderbaum (1998, 2000).  Also discussed will be the literature focused on the role of 
cooperative regimes within new regionalism  (such as Hurrell, 1995 and Fawcett, 2004), as 
well as the literature that focuses on new regionalism  in the global south and among SIDS 
(particularly Shaw 2000, 2004). 
   What does new regionalism  represent in practice? Much as this chapter earlier noted 
that academic debates around smallness  tend to get bogged down in definitional 
disagreements, Hettne (2005) argues that so too do attempts to define what constitutes a 
region  (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970; Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel, 1999; Hurrell, 1995; Nye, 
1968; Powers and Goertz, 2011).  N e  (1968: xii) terming of a region as a limited number 
of states linked together by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual 
interdependence  remains a gold standard definition.  Most subsequent definitions have built 
on Nye, framing the idea of a region based on what Powers and Goertz (2011: 2389) call 
geography plus something.   Geographical proximity combined with substantial economic 
ties, a common historical or cultural identity, or shared security concerns (to name a few 
possibilities) provide a logical way to determine whether a group of states constitute a region.   
New regionalism  does not dismiss these definitions, but it contends that since regions 
are socially constructed, what matters is not arriving at an objective understanding, but instead 
recognising the ways that political actors perceive and choose to interpret and act on the idea 
of a region.  Regions are politically contested, with their structure, purpose and definition 
fluctuating according to prevailing levels of regionness (Hurrell, 1995).  Regionness is also a 
contested term, though its essential traits are captured by Hettne and Söderbaum (2000: 461), 
who refer to it as a process by which a geographical area is transformed from a passive object 
to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region.   
According to Hettne (2005), levels of regionness consistently vary within a grouping of states, 
bringing higher or lower levels of cohesion depending on the prevailing political dynamics at 
play within the grouping.   
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Hettne identifies five levels of regionness on a spectrum from low to high-level 
cohesion: 1) a regional space; 2) a regional social system; 3) a regional international society; 
4) a regional community; and 5) a regional institutionalised polity.  Across this spectrum, state 
groupings evolve from basic trans-local relationships  to increasing interdependence.  By the 
time the level of regionness reaches that of an international society, norms and rules have been 
established between states to create predictability in their relations.  At the level of an 
international society, a grouping of states has chosen to construct an enduring organisational 
framework  that encourages a convergence of values and behaviours.  Finally, at the level of 
an institutional polity, a grouping has developed fixed decision-making structures and with 
inter-governmental organisations taking on supranational powers, including at least a modest 
degree of coercive power. 
Hettne and Söderbaum (2000), as well as Hettne (2005) and Hurrell (1995), all contend 
that evolution along this spectrum is halting and that reversals in levels of regionness may be 
just as common as progression.  Importantly, however, new regionalist  scholars do not view 
reversals in levels of regionness as signifying a failure of inter-state cooperation.  Hettne (2005) 
contends that regions (however defined) may be comparatively strong or weak, but as long as 
they display some regionness, cohesion and actorness (capacity to act on commonly-defined 
priorities), they are distinct political formations worthy of study.  This stands in contrast to a 
liberal institutionalist, and particularly a functionalist, who expect cooperation to consistently 
evolve and deepen, and who see backsliding in progress as representing a failure of the regional 
project (Hamad, 2016; Wolf, 1973).  Bøas, Marchand and Shaw (1999: 1068) make the point 
that there is not one universal approach to understanding cooperation or regional organisation 
and that scholars must start to accept that regional organisation and regionalisms are not 
developed within the framework of just one rationality, but in several localised rationalities.   
What do the above perspectives mean? First, in attempting to understand the trajectory 
of cooperation among states, it is not useful to make assessments on the basis of an idealised 
objective.  Not all groupings of states will cooperate or form regional  structures in the same 
way or with the same goals in mind.  SIDS in the Western Indian Ocean will have very different 
cooperative intentions than the developed states of the EU, for example.  Because cooperation 
and its evolution are products of social construction, new regionalism  demands that 
cooperative processes be studied in recognition of the local context in which they are taking 
place and that cooperative efforts be assessed based on whether they appear to be reflecting the 
ideas and values of cooperating actors.  Second, because cooperation and its evolution are 
politically contested, they are inherently fluid and can be expected to demonstrate more or less 
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cohesion (regionness) at a given time depending on the prevailing political dynamics that 
underpin them.  New regionalism  tends to adopt the view that higher levels of regionness are 
more desirable, largely because greater cooperative cohesion tends to open more political space 
for engagement by non-state actors (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000).  However, a relative lack 
of regionness does not make the study of cooperation in a given geographical space 
unimportant.  Rather, it points to the need to understand the ways in which prevailing political 
dynamics are influencing how cooperative actors behave and how these dynamics may be 
affecting actor incentives for working towards higher levels of regionness over time.       
From the above description, it should be apparent how new regionalism  and the 
concept of regionness fits within this study.  New regionalism  draws on the social 
constructivist perspective that cooperation, and particularly its modalities, are the product of 
social interaction and the evolution (or not) of ideas and values.  It also posits that judgments 
on the utility of cooperation be made on the basis of whether these ideas and values are reflected 
in the types of cooperative regimes produced.  In recognising the diversity in types of 
cooperation, the new regionalism  perspective is also in line with the social constructivist 
view that agency to undertake cooperation is not merely the preserve of more powerful (larger) 
states, but can also exist in very localised contexts (e.g. within an island grouping).   
Importantly, however, new regionalism  also provides some analytical grounding to a 
social constructivist perspective.  The flexibility of social constructivism, identified so far as a 
virtue, can also lead to vagueness when it is accepted that cooperative regimes can be whatever 
cooperative actors construct them to be. With such subjectivity, how can scholars attempt to 
draw conclusions about what they are studying? The concept of regionness, and especially 
He ne  (2005) fi e-level spectrum of regionness, provides something of a typology within 
which scholars can try to situate their own analysis. It also provides terminology that can be 
used to discuss the nature of cooperative efforts and their evolution (or regression).  At various 
poin  in he follo ing chap e , efe ence ill be made o He ne  pec m of egionne , 
including further detail on its different levels, as well as how cooperation among the Western 
Indian Ocean SIDS fits into (and moves along) this spectrum.    
   By emphasising the politically contested nature of cooperation and region-building, 
new regionalism  also informs this study by laying out the centrality of politics as a driving 
(or hindering) force in affecting cooperative approaches and outcomes.  Social constructivist 
views of cooperation, with their emphasis on ideas and values, do implicitly acknowledge a 
role for politics.  Indeed, constructivism does this to a much greater extent than either realism 
or liberal institutionalism, which consider politics very narrowly  mainly in relation to 
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strategic interests (realism) or economic interdependence (liberal institutionalism).  However, 
new regionalism , by articulating how regionness is made fluid by the shifting nature of 
poli ical d namic  i hin a coope a i e pace, p  poli ic  f on  and cen e.  Thi  d  
primary research question, looking at how political dynamics incentivise cooperation, 
collective diplomacy and regionness among Western Indian Ocean SIDS, is very much rooted 
in the new regionalist  assumption that politics matter and that cooperation needs to be 
understood as an overtly political  and not merely technocratic  process. 
In addition to introducing the idea of regionness and giving voice to the importance of 
politics in defining the structure of international cooperation, new regionalism  also gives 
structure to the constructivist perspectives around: a) the potential of non-state actors as key 
players in cooperative endeavours; and b) the relevance of a wide range of issue areas as 
foundations for cooperation  particularly emerging environmental issues in which norms, 
values and cooperative processes are still very much being developed.  Söderbaum and Shaw 
(2003: 222) define new regionalism  as being neither state-led nor non-state led, but rather as 
involving state, market, civil society and external actors coming together in a variety of 
mixed-actor collectivities, networks and modes of regional governance.   Contrary to an old 
regionalism  in which only the state mattered as a driver of cooperation, new regionalism  
deems that cooperative action can be initiated by a multiplicity of actors (Shaw, 2000).   
Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) note that evidence of non-state actor engagement in 
cooperative efforts may only be truly evident at higher levels of regionness.  However, where 
non-state actors are active, they may be as influential as their government counterparts, 
particularly when cooperative epistemic communities are created along a range of technical 
issue areas (Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  Epistemic communities are a central 
component of many liberal theories of international cooperation.  Under a social constructivist-
inspired new regionalism , however, these communities are  like state actors  ascribed 
important ideational roles and are seen to be capable of influencing the values and norms 
( norm entrepreneurs ) that may shape cooperation, either outside the context of state-state 
relations or as a complement to them.   
New regionalism  al o ei e  on Elman  (1995) a mp ion ha  he in od c ion of 
new issue areas in international diplomacy can open a wider space for different types of 
diplomatic actors to attain influence.  Rather than being materially-focused like the realist-
inspired old regionalism , constructivist new regionalism  emphasises the importance of 
normative issue areas as drivers of cooperation and regionness.  These issues include human 
rights, environmental sustainability, climate change and cultural protection (to name just a few) 
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(Benwell, 2011; Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel, 1999; Shaw, 2004).  While these issues have not 
necessarily displaced security as the core focus of international cooperation, new regionalism  
contends that cooperative regimes, reflecting both material and value-based concerns, are 
becoming increasingly evident in these expanded issue areas (Fry, 1994; Shaw, 2004).  Some 
of the aforementioned literature looking at the role of SIDS in leading the development of 
norm-based climate change regimes (Benwell, 2011; Jaschik, 2014) takes a constructivist 
viewpoint that acknowledges, with something of a new regionalist  perspective, the role of 
non-state actors in dedicating political capital towards the establishment of these regimes. 
This chapter has reviewed the literature around the diplomacy of small states, including 
SIDS.  Two overriding perspectives have been offered as to why these types of states are 
gene all  cha ac e i ed b  lo  le el  of diploma ic ba gaining po e .  The global po e  
ela ion  li e a e foc e  on he c al impedimen  mall a es confront when seeking 
to project influence in a global system that is seen to be designed to serve the interests of 
la ge  po e .  The p ac ical limi a ion  li e a e, mean hile, al o ackno ledge  lo  
levels of diplomatic bargaining power as an important challenge for small states like SIDS.  
Ho e e , hi  li e a e, con a  o he global po e  ela ion  anal i , poin  o he 
possibility of small states overcoming these limitations through practical diplomatic and policy 
app oache , incl ding h o gh he pe of gang p  app oach ad oca ed b  chola  like 
Schiff (2010) and Graham (2017).  The chapter elaborated on some specific examples of how 
SIDS (including the Western Indian Ocean SIDS) have worked to overcome (or at least 
mitigate) practical limitations, such as human resource and financial constraints to projecting 
diplomatic influence even if only in the context of very specific issue areas. 
The chapter opera ionali ed he no ion of coope a ion  be een a e , con ide ing 
how this concept is understood by the foundational approaches to international relations: 
realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism.  Finally, the chapter provided a 
justification for he d  heo e ical app oach ba ed on ne  egionali m  and i  
constructivist ethos.  Through this analysis, the chapter has identified the analytical gaps that 
hi  d  e ea ch e ion  eek o add e  and i  ha  iden ified he heo e ical foundation 
on hich he d  i  ba ed and h o gh hich he finding  f om he d  p ima  e ea ch 
will be interpreted.  With hi  d  li e a e e ie  complete, Chapter 3 will now turn 
directly o he d  e plo a ion of he We e n Indian Ocean island context, starting with a 





CHAPTER 3: Contextualising the Fisheries Sector in the Western Indian 
Ocean  
 
1. Introduction and Chapter Overview  
A considerable array of actors, agreements, policies, programmes and trends 
characterise the Western Indian Ocean fisheries sector, and particularly the internationally 
important tuna fishery that serves as the main focus for this study.  While this dissertation does 
not aim to get caught up in too much technical detail, there is merit to carrying out an 
overarching mapping of the fisheries sector so that terminology, key ideas and concepts, as 
well as important stakeholders, are recognised when they are discussed in he d  deepe  
analysis.  This chapter draws on both primary data - the interviews done by the researcher with 
KIs in each of the Western Indian Ocean SIDS  as well as document review in order to provide 
this sectoral overview.   
The chapter begins by providing a broad perspective on fisheries in the Western Indian 
Ocean, touching on both the socio-economic and environmental aspects of the sector.  The 
thinking underlying the wider blue economy  is also briefly discussed.  Following this, the 
chapter moves to a country-by-country overview, outlining general trends as well as 
introducing key national fisheries institutions and their roles.  The chapter then details the four 
main inter-governmental organisations engaged in the Western Indian Ocean fisheries sector 
before finally highlighting the main policies and programmes that underpin regional fisheries 
development. 
While mostly descriptive in nature and separate from the analytical insights provided 
in the chapters that follow, the overview provided in this chapter serves to demonstrate, through 
practical examples, the existence of technical cooperation between the Western Indian Ocean 
island states in fisheries.  It will then fall to the remainder of the dissertation to build on this 
o e ie  and o de elop he di e a ion  ke  a g men : ha  e i ing poli ical d namic  
between these islands act to prevent this technical cooperation from evolving into something 
more, whether a sustained culture of cooperative engagement or a sector-based preference for 
collective action and regime-building. 
 
2. The Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Sector: Providing Context 
As was briefly noted in Chapter 1, the Western Indian Ocean is a core component of 
the global tuna fishery.  The seas surrounding the Western Indian Ocean islands lie within the 
migration path of assorted tuna species, the most commercially prominent of which are of the 
yellowfin, skipjack, albacore, bigeye and southern bluefin varieties.  Taken as a whole, the 
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Indian Ocean e e  a  he o ld  econd la ge  na fi hing a ea af e  he We e n Pacific, 
acco n ing fo  nea l  20% of he o ld  ann al comme cial na ca ch and 16% of he na 
ind  annual global revenues (Lecomte et al., 2017).  The Western Indian Ocean accounts 
for between 70-80% of he Indian Ocean  o e all na ca ch  around 850,000 tons per annum 
valued at a little over USD 1.3 billion (Obura, 2017).  Marlin, swordfish and (particularly 
around Madagascar) prawns, are the other species harvested at large volumes for commercial 
purposes.  A wider range of species (e.g. anchovies, octopus, sardines, sea cucumber and 
snapper) are harvested closer to shore by smaller-scale fishers from these islands, mainly for 
sale and consumption in their home markets (Le Manach and Pauly, 2015).    
A study by Obura (2017) estimates the total Gross Marine Product 11 of the Western 
Indian Ocean to be in the annual range of USD 20.8 billion.  Fisheries (tuna plus other species) 
account for an estimated 9% of this total (a value of USD 1.9 billion).  For each of the Western 
Indian Ocean island states, fisheries serve as a key economic driver, albeit to varying degrees.  
In addition to the role that fisheries play in sustaining local livelihoods and in domestic trade, 
the sector also generates revenues through the annual access and license fees that Distant Water 
Fishing Nations (DWFNs)12 pa  o ope a e in he e i land  EEZ , a  ell a  h o gh landing 
fee , e el egi a ion fee  and f om he e i land  o n fi h and fi h p od c  e po .  To 
provide a sense of the central role that fisheries play in some island economies, it is useful to 
look at the example of Seychelles.  The country hosts the Indian Ocean  la ge  na canning 
fac o , hich p o ide  nea l  13% of Se chelle  fo mal emplo men  and i  ing la l  
e pon ible fo  o e  90% of he co n  good  e po  b  ol me (Ob a, 2017).    
Within Western Indian Ocean waters, fishing takes place on three levels: industrial, 
artisanal and traditional.13  The industrial sector, focused mainly on tuna, accounts for an 
estimated 87% of the total commercial value of fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean and is 
dominated by DWFN fleets, typically originating in Western Europe or East Asia.  The 
remaining 13% of the commercial value of regional fisheries is accounted for by artisanal 
fishing (traditional fishing is almost entirely subsistence-based), though it is in the artisanal 
sub-sector that many of the Western Indian Ocean islands  o n indigeno  fi he ie  ope a o  
 
11 Gross Marine Product is defined by Obura (2017) as being the estimated GDP-equivalent value accruing to the Western Indian Ocean 
island states solely from ocean-foc ed (o  bl e econom ) economic ec o : coa al and ma ine o i m, ene able ene g  and fi he ie .  
12 Distant-water fishing fleets are those foreign-registered fleets that fish within the 200 nautical mile EEZ of other countries and/or on the 
high seas.  These fleets (or their nations) negotiate access agreements with the countries within whose EEZs they wish to operate.   
13 There are a n mbe  of mean  b  hich o di ing i h ind ial , a i anal  and adi ional  fi hing, ho gh clea -cut differentiation can 
be difficult to establish.  Industrial fishing is capital-intensive, using large multi-million-dollar boats and a high-level of technology to 
efficiently allow for very large catches, typically far offshore.  Industrial fishing boats, including purse seiners, trawlers, mid-water trawlers 
and factory boats, may stay at sea for months to years at a time.  Artisanal fishing tends to be more coastal in focus, is far less capital-intensive 
and uses small to mid-size boats and less technology.  Whereas industrial fishing tends to be the preserve of large corporations, artisanal 
fishing may be pursued by small firms or fishing cooperatives, using boats such as trawlers, seiners or long-liners.  Traditional fishing is 
usually subsistence-based and involves the use of very small boats (e.g. canoes) with no technology, as well as shore-based fishing.  
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are categorised and where most of the i land  fi he ie -focused livelihoods are generated.  
Indeed, across the island grouping an estimated 250,000 people (minimum) are engaged in 
artisanal fishing (Teh and Sumaila, 2013; Lecomte et al., 2017).  Le Manach and Pauly (2015) 
credibly argue that the Western Indian Ocean SIDS undervalue their artisanal fisheries while 
allocating far more political capital to issues pertaining to the industrial tuna fishery.  Given 
that most fisheries-based cooperation that is apparent in the region, particularly at the 
ministerial level or through inter-governmental organisations, is predominantly focused on 
industrial-level tuna fishing, this sector is the main focus of this study.      
The Western Indian Ocean is somewhat less affected by human activity than other 
ocean regions (Stojanovic and Farmer, 2013).  Nevertheless, there is ongoing deterioration in 
he i land g o ping  co al eef  and coa al mang o e , hich ha  a di ec  impac  on he 
wellbeing of fish stocks.  Nearly two-thirds of Western Indian Ocean fish stocks are 
overexploited or fully exploited (Lecomte et al., 2017).  This situation is especially apparent 
among species such as the bluefin and yellowfin tuna, which are in high demand in foreign 
markets for consumption as sushi/sashimi.  Speaking in regards to the yellowfin tuna, the IOTC 
noted in 2017 a high risk of stock collapse over the coming 5-10 years absent the introduction 
of stronger harvest control measures (Obura, 2017).   
A considerable volume of bycatch  in the form of whales, dolphins, sharks and rays  
is captured as part of fishing operations in the Western Indian Ocean, particularly among 
fishers employing gillnets (over 23,000 MTs of bycatch per year) and industrial longlines 
(around 18,000 MTs of bycatch per year) (Lecomte et al., 2017).  The Western Indian Ocean 
i land a e  collective fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems have 
improved over the past 10-15 years, in large part due to the fisheries governance structures put 
in place by the projects and programmes facilitated by inter-governmental organisations like 
the IOC, IOTC and SWIOFC.  Technological developments (e.g. satellite tracking and 
imp o ed digi al comm nica ion  facili a ed b  Ea  Af ica  enhanced digital infrastructure 
following the installation of the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System) have also modestly 
contributed to improvements in regional MCS capabilities (IOC, 2017). However, there remain 
considerable MCS gaps, particularly in regards to traditional and artisanal fisheries, which are 
lightly regulated across the island grouping (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).   
In the traditional and artisanal sub-sectors, fishery resources are typically viewed as 
public goods and open access to fishing grounds is expected among local operators and fishing 
a ocia ion .  A emp  o con ol acce , ch a  Madaga ca  effo  o in od ce Ma ine 
Protected Areas along its coas , o  Ma i i  endea o  o nde ake pa ial planning i hin 
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its EEZ and to allocate only particular ocean blocks  to artisanal fisheries operators, have 
proven to be politically contentious (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean 
Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  National governments are gradually 
adopting improved fisheries management policies, nominally aligned with Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) standards for ecosystem-based management (Obura, 2017; 
Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  However, these policies are often: a) not 
backed up with enabling legislation that would secure a means of ensuring their enforcement; 
and b) are at odds with the sector growth objectives put forward by some national governments, 
which tend to emphasise ever greater catch targets without accounting for the actual health of 
existing stocks (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC). 
 
3. The Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Sector: Country-Level Dynamics 
Individual country fisheries profiles are provided below, in which some of the above 
details are unpacked further.  These profiles will demonstrate that while the broad issues 
outlined above are pertinent for all of the Western Indian Ocean SIDS, there are also clear 
differences in regards to: a) the extent to which fisheries are prioritised in the setting of public 




The Comorian EEZ sits at the mouth of the Mozambique Channel, which is one of the 
We e n Indian Ocean  p ima  fi hing g o nd .  A n mbe  of pecie  a e ha e ed f om 
Comorian waters by fishers engaged in traditional, artisanal and industrial fishing (Table 3.1).  
Domestic fisheries operations are all traditional or artisanal and are coastal in focus.  Industrial 
fishing is undertaken entirely by DWFN vessels, mainly purse seiners from France and Spain, 
in the wider EEZ (UNCTAD, 2017).  Total fisheries production, across levels and species, has 
fluctuated considerably over time, but with a notable aggregate decline in recent years.  The 
most immediate cause of this decline relates to the ongoing threat of piracy off the East African 
coast, which has contributed to a reduction in the overall vessel presence in Comorian waters 
(with many industrial operators choosing to fish in waters further south and east that are seen 
to be at lower risk from piracy) (UNCTAD, 2017).   
This reduced vessel presence, especially noticeable since 2010, has contributed to a 
recovery of tuna stocks, which are seen to be healthier in the Comorian EEZ than elsewhere in 
the Western Indian Ocean (UNCTAD, 2017).  Overexploitation is apparent, however, in the 
coastal stocks harvested by traditional and artisanal fishers.  Rapid population growth and a 
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lack of livelihood opportunities in Comoros has led to an increase in the number of fishers 
exploiting coastal fish stocks.  Increased boat traffic and the use of dynamite fishing14 are 
leading to the degradation of Comorian reefs and a reported decrease in coastal catch volumes 
(Ranaivoson and Ranaivoarison, 2013; Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH). 
 
Table 3.1: Key Fisheries Statistics - Comoros 
Size of EEZ 160,000 sq. km 
Total fisheries production (annual)* 12,003 MTs (2000); 10,738 MTs (2005); 63,447 MTs (2010); 12,674 MTs (2015); 16,407 MTs (2016) 
Main species harvested anchovies, breams, cuttlefish, marlins, sailfish, sardinellas, sharks, snappers, tunas (albacore, bigeye, mackerel, skipjack, yellowfin) 
Fisheries contribution to GDP 10%  
Traditional fishing Yes - carried out by (non-motorised) outrigger dugout canoes; also includes shore-based fishing 
Artisanal fishing Yes - carried out by planked or fibreglass boats, usually motorised (but with engines of less than 50 hp) 
Industrial fishing Yes - carried out by large DWFN fleets, particularly purse seiners 
Mariculture Not significant 
Revenues from granting DWFN access 
rights (annual) 
EUR 615,000 (access fees) + EUR 160,000 (other fees) = EUR 775,000 
(2017)  
* Total fisheries production figures should be seen as a likely underestimate given weaknesses in data collection, analysis and reporting, 
especially for the traditional and artisanal sub-sectors. 
MTs = metric tons; EUR = Euros. 
Sources: All data obtained from SmartFish Programme Country Review - Comoros (2014), except for production data, which are drawn from 
the World Bank/FAO dataset: Total Fisheries Production (2016) and revenue data, which are taken from UNCTAD (2017). 
 
Industrial fishing by EU DWFN fleets was governed (until 2018) by a bilateral 
Comoros-EU Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA).  However, in March 2018, 
the EU parliament voted to end its SFPA with Comoros due to perceptions that Comorian 
authorities had failed to enact legislation complying with international regulations on 
preventing IUU fishing in its waters.15  Until this agreement is re-established, industrial fishing 
and the over half a million Euros per annum that accrued to the Comorian state from 
acce /licen e fee  (a po ion of hich e e alloca ed o mode ni ing he co n  fisheries 
infrastructure and supporting the artisanal sub-sector), will face a steep decline.  Some DWFN 
revenues are still forthcoming through private access agreements with Asian DWFN operators, 
albeit at far lower values (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).   
Unlike the other Western Indian Ocean island states, Comoros lacks an indigenous 
export-oriented commercial fisheries industry.  The Comoros National Fishing Company was 
established in 2015 with Qatari investment and Sri Lankan technical assistance.  However, by 
 
14 Dynamite fishing involves using explosives to stun or kill large schools of fish, which allows for easier collection.  While illegal in most 
fisheries jurisdictions, lax enforcement makes this type of fishing a common problem, particularly among traditional and artisanal fishers.  
Dynamite fishing commonly harms reef systems and other fish habitats, leading to significant losses in biodiversity.  
15 See the following link on details surrounding the termination of the Comoros-EU FPA: <https://medium.com/@ALDEgroup/ending-the-
eu-comoros-fisheries-deal-the-eu-must-step-up-against-illegal-fishing-fa19cb61bca6> (accessed 03 April 2019). 
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2018, he compan  ope a ion  e e mo ib nd, d e o financial ho fall  and beca e 
Comoros lacks a local laboratory in which to undertake the tests required for quality control of 
any potential fish and fish product exports (Researcher Interview: Administrator, National 
Quality Office for Certification of Fisheries Products of Comoros).  However, in a notable 
example of inter-island cooperation, the ministerial agency responsible for fisheries, the 
Direction G n rale des Ressources Halieutiques (DGRH) is working with its counterpart in 
Madagascar to allow the Company (if/when it re- a ) o make e of Madaga ca  Institut 
Pasteur laboratories (in the cities of Antananarivo and Toamasina) for sample processing.  
Access to quality laboratory facilities could enable the Company to eventually become an 
ac i e e po e , ho gh he poo  ph ical ali  of Como o  ma i ime and fi he ie  
infrastructure (particularly landing sites, ports and cold-chain facilities  as well as the 
electricity and roads that support them) makes the success of the Company a questionable 
proposition in the short-term (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).    
Industrial tuna fishing in Comoros, contrary to the other Western Indian Ocean islands, 
does not create any employment.  This is because none of the tuna caught by DWFN fleets is 
landed in he co n .  A o nd 80% of he ca ch of DWFN e el  ope a ing in Como o  EEZ 
has traditionally been processed in Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius or Seychelles (Researcher 
Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  A foreign-owned semi-industrial fishing fleet is 
registered in Comoros, but lands its catch elsewhere (UNCTAD, 2017).  Comorian waters are 
also not a location for the transshipment16 of fish and fish products.  
Como o  ke  fi he ie  in i ion  (Table 3.2) are characterised by financial 
constraints and a lack of human resource capacity.  The DGRH serves as the main government 
body tasked with managing the fisheries sector.  The functions of the DGRH are replicated at 
the sub-national level, with separate DGRH offices operating on each of the three Comorian 
islands: Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli.  Tensions within the Comorian political system, 
between those advocating a unitary system of government versus those pushing for a federal 
arrangement and considerable autonomy for the individual islands, are replicated within the 
DGRH.  Thi  einfo ce  Como o  pa ic la l  high anking in he F agile S a e Inde  hen i  
comes to the fragmentation of state institutions.17  Central directives are often ignored or 
overridden by the Governors of the individual islands, who have responsibility for appointing 
the DGRH administrators in their respective jurisdictions.  This has served to hinder the 
 
16 Transshipment occ  hen a fi hing e el offload  i  ca ch o a ef ige a ed ca go e el (a eefe ) a  ea.  
17 See the following link for the ranking of countries in the Fragile States Index: < https://fragilestatesindex.org/data/> (accessed 20 December 
2020).   
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creation of a legal fisheries framework across the country (the sector instead operates on the 
basis of a vaguer Fisheries Code adopted in 2007) (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
DGRH).  The DGRH has received considerable financial and capacity-building support from 
the World Bank through both the SmartFish and SWIOFish projects, which are discussed 
further at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 5.  However, the DGRH remains extremely 
weak, particularly in regards to its internal research and policy formulation capabilities. 
 
Table 2.2: Key Fisheries Institutions & Legislation – Comoros* 
Competent Authority 
Office National de Contr le des Qualit  et de Certification des Produits 
Halieutiques (ONCQPH) (National Quality Office for Certification of Fisheries 
Products) 
Government Ministries 
Direction G n rale des Ressources Halieutiques (DGRH) (General Directorate 
of Fishery Resources); regional offices of the DGRH operate on each of the 
three Comorian islands 
 
Department of Planning - focuses on planning, regulations, fishing agreements 
and monitoring 
 
Department for Fisheries Promotion - deals with licensing, statistics, value 
addition and professional organisations 
Agence Nationale des Affaires Maritimes (ANAM) (National Agency for 
Maritime Affairs) 
Key Legislation Loi n° 07- 011/AU portant Code des p c e  e  de a ac e (Fisheries and Aquaculture Act), 2007 
Monitoring, Control & Surveillance 
(MCS) 
Centre National de Contr le et de Surveillance des P ches (CNCSP) (National 
Centre for Fisheries Control and Surveillance) 
Professional Associations Syndicat National pour le D veloppement des P ches aux Comores (SNDPC) (National Syndicate for Fisheries Development in the Comoros) 
Key Private Sector Operators Comoros National Fishing Company (moribund) 
Key Scientific Research Institutes 
I  Na a  de Rec e c e  A c e, a P c e e  E e e  
(INRAPE) (National Institute for Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment 
Research) 
Centre National de Documentation et de Recherche Scientifique (CNDRS) 
(Centre for Scientific Research and Documentation) 
Technical Training Centres Ecole de Pêche, Anjouan (Fisheries School, Anjouan) 
 
DGRH leaders continue to report that the agency has little ability to properly budget 
for research initiatives or to staff key research positions.  This means that the DGRH often 
operates and makes decisions on the basis of minimal (or no) data, especially in its governance 
of the coastal traditional and artisanal sub-sectors (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
DGRH).  The DGRH, d e o i  o n capaci  limi a ion , al o ha  eak link  i h Como o  
main national scientific research body, the Institut Na a  de Rec e c e  A c e, 
a P c e e  E e e  (INRAPE), with the country lacking an overall fisheries research 
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plan18 (Researcher Interview: Administrator, National Quality Office for Certification of 
Fisheries Products of Comoros).  Re pon ibili  fo  MCS e  i h he DGRH  Depa men  
of Planning, under which sits the Centre National de Contr le et de Surveillance des P ches 
(CNCSP).  The CNCSP has responsibility for implementing all MCS measures, particularly 
those pertaining to operationalising Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS).19 The CNCSP is 
widely seen to have dramatically improved its monitoring and data management capabilities in 
recent years, aided especially by technical assistance from the IOTC.  However, the agency 
continues to lack essential equipment, such as its own patrol vessel, and unlike equivalent 
bodies in the other Western Indian Ocean islands, the CNCSP is still in the formative stages of 
developing a holistic fisheries Management Information System (MIS) capable of synthesising 
diverse types of monitoring data, as well as consolidating data from different sources.   
Notably, technical assistance has been forthcoming from the main public fisheries 
agency in Seychelles, the Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA), both bilaterally and under the 
auspices of the IOC, to help the CNCSP develop an improved MIS (Researcher Interview: 
Former Director, SFA).  Still, the CNCSP is as constrained as other Comorian fisheries 
institutions in regards to staff skills shortages.  Only recently has the CNCSP started to make 
available its own observers to work aboard DWFN vessels.  However, a shortage of adequately 
trained observers still means that many vessels operate in the Comorian EEZ without a 
Comorian MCS presence (observers from other Western Indian Ocean islands are often 
substituted instead) (UNCTAD, 2017).   
Inter-island cooperative efforts, though few in number, provide hope for changing this 
situation over the medium and long-term.  As part of a bilateral Comoros-Seychelles 
Cooperation Framework signed in 2015, the Seychelles Maritime Academy (SMA) has started 
to regularly host Comorian students (as well as shorter-term learners on exchange visits) who 
are being trained in a range of MCS issues.  Over time, it is hoped that this will help build-up 
a trained coterie of Comorian technical staff capable of leading he co n  MCS effo , 
including through the provision of a consistent observer presence aboard DWFN vessels 
(Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH; Researcher Interview: Deputy Director, 
Seychelles Maritime Academy). 
 
 
18 Scientific studies are routinely carried out by the Scientific Committees of both the IOTC and SWIOFC, though the level of di rect 
involvement by Comorian researchers (DGRH or INRAPE) appears to be very low. 
19 VMS describes all systems used in commercial fishing to allow for the tracking and monitoring of fishing vessel activities, whether 




 A  1.2 million a e kilome e , Madaga ca  EEZ i  among he la ge  in he 
Western Indian Ocean.  Both traditional and artisanal fishing take place along the co n  
long coastline (Table 3.3).  Unlike Comoros, Madagascar also has its own domestic industrial 
fishery consisting of trawlers and long liners that mainly harvest prawns and tuna, respectively. 
Industrial tuna fishing is also carried out by European (French and Spanish) purse seiners and 
long liners, including a sizeable number registered in Mayotte and Réunion.  Overall catch 
levels have modestly increased after experiencing a decline from 2008 to 2014  a period 
marked by political crisis in Madagascar following a c  d a  in 2009. This crisis 
contributed to the imposition of sanctions and the suspension of trade deals with the EU 
(Madaga ca  main aid dono ), a  ell a  a eakening of a e in i ion , incl ding he 
administrative capacity of those bodies responsible for issuing fishing licenses to artisanal, as 
well as to domestic and DWFN industrial fleets; something recognised in the poor quality of 
p blic e ice  highligh ed in Madaga ca  anking in he F agile S a e  Inde .  Taken 
together, these factors all contributed to a reduction in reported fishing activity 
(Ramariandrasoa, 2017). 
 
Table 3.3: Key Fisheries Statistics - Madagascar 
Size of EEZ 1,200,000 sq. km 
Total fisheries production (annual)* 128,947 MTs (2000); 143,944 MTs (2005); 140,524 MTs (2010);  137,447 MTs (2015); 168,331 MTs (2016) 
Main species harvested 
bivalves, breams, crabs, cuttlefish, goatfish, lobsters, mackerels, marlins, 
octopus, prawns, sailfish, sea cucumbers, sharks, snappers, squids, tunas 
(albacore, bigeye, skipjack, yellowfin) 
Fisheries contribution to GDP 2%  
Traditional fishing Yes - carried out by non-motorised (or motorised) outrigger dugout canoes; also includes shore-based fishing 
Artisanal fishing Yes - carried out by planked or fibreglass boats, usually motorised (but with engines of less than 50 hp) 
Industrial fishing 
Yes  tuna fishing carried out by large DWF fleets, mainly purse seiners and 
long liners; shrimp trawlers used for domestic industrial fishing, while a 
small number of domestic long liners harvest tuna in coastal areas 
Mariculture Reasonably well-developed, with production of 25,998 MT per year (mostly prawns) (2016) 
Revenues from granting DWF access 
rights (annual) ~EUR 1,500,000 (access and other fees)** 
* Total fisheries production figures should be seen as a likely underestimate given weaknesses in data collection, analysis and reporting, 
especially for the traditional and artisanal sub-sectors.  Production figures refer exclusively to marine fisheries.  Inland (fresh water) fisheries 
contribute around 30,000 MT of production per year (2016).  
** Revenue data taken from the text of the bilateral Madagascar-EU SFPA.  Based on the SFPA, EUR 1.6 million in financial contributions 
was to be provided to Madagascar in 2015/2016, while EUR 1.5 million was to be provided in 2017/2018.  Out of these amounts, EUR 700,000 
was to be allocated to supporting the development of the wider Malagasy fisheries sector. 
MTs = metric tons, EUR = Euros. 
Sources:  All data obtained from SmartFish Programme Country Review  Madagascar (2014), except for production data, which are drawn 
from the World Bank/FAO dataset: Total Fisheries Production (2016) and revenue data, which are taken from the Madagascar-EU SFPA 
(2014). 
 
 Like Como o , Madaga ca  coa al a e  a e bjec  o of en e e e o e -
exploitation in spite of the country introducing  at least on paper  tighter MCS regulations as 
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well as access restrictions in some coastal waters (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, 
IOTC).  Tuna within the Malagasy EEZ are seen to be almost fully exploited, while prawn 
catch volumes are reported to have declined by 40% over the past fifteen years (Researcher 
Interview: Research Officer, Fisheries and Marine Science Institute of Madagascar).   Industrial 
fishing by European DWFN fleets was previously governed by a bilateral SFPA between the 
EU and Madagascar.  This SFPA remained in force until the end of 2018.  As this dissertation 
was being written, negotiations were underway to explore the possibility of arranging a new 
SFPA.  Ho e e , in ligh  of he EU  a ed in en  o p io i i e ainabili  in i  fi hing 
ag eemen  i h hi d co n ie , conce n  abo  he Malaga  a e  commi men  o 
combatting IUU fishing, as well a  b oade  o ie  abo  he in eg i  of he co n  p blic 
institutions, has left the future of the SFPA in doubt.  For this reason, Madagascar has taken 
steps to expand its fisheries agreements with East Asian states, such as by signing a ten-year 
(USD 2.7 billion) access agreement with a Chinese fisheries consortium in September 2018.20  
Unlike the EU SFPA, which was developed through state-to-state diplomacy, fishing 
agreements with East Asian DWFN fleets (mainly Chinese, Japanese, South Korean and 
Taiwanese) are typically made directly by the Malagasy government with East Asian fishing 
companies through private access agreements.21 There is little transparency and few 
sustainability measures incorporated into these types of agreements, including only minimal 
demand for accurate reporting on catch levels (UNCTAD, 2017).  IOTC efforts are ongoing to 
improve buy-in by DWFN private operators for adherence to MCS requirements in the tuna 
fi he .  Ho e e , Madaga ca  eeming hif  a a  f om he EU, ith its generally reliable 
adherence to sustainability objectives, towards other actors without this same focus, bodes ill 
for efforts to ensure the future health of tuna stocks in the Malagasy EEZ (Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).   
The majority of DWFN vessels fishing for tuna within the Malagasy EEZ land their 
catches in Seychelles (for purse seiners) or Mauritius (for longliners).  However, a smaller 
number do land their catches in Madagascar itself, thus creating employment and opportunities 
fo  p od c  p oce ing ha  do no  e i  in a co n  like Como o .  Madaga ca  o n e po -
oriented commercial fisheries sector incorporates a mix of artisanal and small-scale industrial 
operators, as well as a growing mariculture industry.  In 2018, he al e of Madaga ca  
 
20 See the following link for information about the Malagasy-Chinese fisheries agreement <https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-
links/madagascar-agrees-to-a-10-year-fisheries-agreement-with-chinese-consortium/> (accessed 10 June 2019). 
21 The Madagascar-China fisheries agreement was made on the initiative of the Agence Malagasy de Développement économique et de 
P  d e e e  (AMDP) a he  han he co n  fi he ie  mini .  Thi  ha  led o con ide able poli ical con o e  i hin 
Madagascar over the deal and its seeming lack of transparency.  See the following link: https://news.mongabay.com/2018/11/local-fishers-
oppose-2-7-billion-deal-opening-madagascar-to-chinese-fishing/> (accessed 13 June 2019). 
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exported fish and fish products was a little over USD 114 million.22  Over two-thirds of these 
exports  of which prawns and canned tuna were the largest by volume  went to the French 
market, with a small portion (~5%) finding their way to Mayotte and Réunion (Researcher 
Interview: Vice-President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of 
Madaga ca ).  Looking a  Madaga ca  comme cial fi he ie  ec o , i  i  po ible o iden if  
evident linkages with the other Western Indian Ocean islands.  These linkages reinforce the 
notion of viewing this island grouping as a connected fisheries space.  For example, the 
Réunionnais company Réunimer serves as a customer and main shareholder of a large crab and 
prawn aquaculture a ocia ion on Madaga ca  o h e  coa , in e ing a li le o e  USD 
100,000 since 2016, as well as providing technical assistance and in-kind equipment donations 
to help the association manage and ensure the quality of its operations (Researcher Interview: 
Vice-President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).   
An additional example demonstrates inter-island connectedness in the context of the 
fisheries value chain.  Madagascar imports a little over USD 4 million (2018) worth of fish and 
fish products from Seychelles.  Most of this fish is frozen tuna, harvested across the Western 
Indian Ocean i land  e pec i e EEZ  befo e being landed b  p e eine  in Se chelle .  
From Seychelles, this product is sent on to Madaga ca  o be p oce ed a  one of Madaga ca  
tuna canning factories, such as the one belonging to the Pêche et Froid Océan Indien (PFOI), 
a majo  ope a o  on he co n  no h coa .  Thi  p oce ed p od c  i  hen old dome icall  
or is exported to the French/EU market, thus serving as a needed source of export earnings 
(Lecomte et al., 2017). 
In another case of inter-i land coope a ion, membe  of PFOI  enio  managemen  
participated in a series of regular experience exchanges, over the period 2013-2015, with 
co n e pa  a  Se chelle  Indian Ocean T na (IOT) canne , he We e n Indian Ocean  
largest and most efficient fisheries enterprise (Researcher Interview: External Adviser, Indian 
Ocean Tuna, Ltd.).  Such exchanges were reported to have contributed to improved knowledge 
among PFOI staff on such issues as operational management, technological innovation and 
staff training (Researcher Interview: Vice-President, National Association for Fish Collectors 
and Exporters of Madagascar).  While it was not possible to interview PFOI representatives, 
hi  claim i  a  lea  pa l  einfo ced b  an e amina ion of PFOI  o gani a ional a egic 
plan, developed in 2015.  This plan cites organisational learning obtained from these exchanges 
as a driver of its corporate priorities, particularly in relation to setting technical objectives for 
 
22 All 2018 trade data were accessed through the Interna ional T ade Cen e  (ITC ) Trade Map Database, accessible at the following link: 
<www.trademap.org> (accessed 10-15 March 2019). 
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aff kill  de elopmen , a  ell a  in info ming PFOI  app oach o o gani a ional e-
structuring (PFOI, 2015).   
Madaga ca  ke  fisheries institutions (Table 3.4) are generally well-regarded from a 
technical standpoint.  Chronic underfunding, however, continues to serve as a major constraint 
in preventing some of these institutions from adequately fulfilling their mandates.  
Responsibility for the overall public management of the fisheries sector lies with the Ministère 
des Ressources Halieutiques et de la Pêche (MRHP) and its two constituent departments.  
MRHP sub-office  ope a e in each of Madaga ca  en -two regions and have responsibility 
for operationalising Ministry objectives.   
 
Table 3.4: Key Fisheries Institutions & Legislation – Madagascar 
Competent Authority Autorit  Sanitaire Halieutique (ASH) (Halieutic Sanitary Authority) 
Government Ministries 
Ministère des Ressources Halieutiques et de la Pêche (MRHP) (Ministry of 
Halieutic and Fisheries Resources) 
  
Department of Fisheries and Fisheries Resources - focuses on planning, 
regulations and monitoring 
 
Department of the Management of Fisheries Resources - deals with licensing, 
statistics, value addition and professional organisations  
Agence Malgache pour la P che et de Aquaculture (AMPA) (Malagasy 
Agency for Fishing and Aquaculture)  serves as a conduit for channeling 
development finance to fisheries-focused projects, firms and associations 
Key Legislation 
Ordonnance 93-022 du 04 mai 1993 portant r glementation de la p che et de 
a ac e (Ordinance for the Regulation of Fisheries and Aquaculture) 
L  N 2011 a  e e de O d a ce 93-022 du 04 mai 1993 sur la 
r glementation de la p c e e  de a ac e (Law on Amending the 
Ordinance for the Regulation of Fisheries and Aquaculture) (2012) 
Monitoring, Control & Surveillance 
(MCS) 
Centre de Surveillance des P ches (CSP) (Centre for Fisheries Surveillance) 
Agence Portuaire Maritime et Fluviale (APMF) (Maritime and Riverine Port 
Agency) 
Professional Associations Groupement des Aquaculteurs et des P cheurs de Crevettes de Madagascar (GAPCM) (Group of Aquaculturalists and Shrimp Fishermen of Madagascar) 
Key Private Sector Operators 
Groupement des Collecteurs et Exportateurs des Produits de Mer 
(GEXPROMER) (Association of Small and Medium Fish Product Exporting 
Enterprises) 
 
Copefrito; Madagascar Seafood; Murex International; Pêche et Froid Océan 
Indien (PFOI); S&G Madagascar; Tandrefana Pêcheries 
Scientific Research Institutes 
Institut Halieutique et des Sciences Marines (IHSM) (Fisheries and Marine 
Science Institute) 
Centre National de Recherches Oc anographiques (CNRO) (National Centre 
for Oceanographic Research) 
Centre National de Donn es Oc anographiques (CNDO) (National Centre on 
Oceanographic Data) 
Centre National de Documentation et de Recherche Scientifique (CNDRS) 
(Centre for Scientific Research and Documentation) 
Technical Training Centres Ecole d A ca  de  Sc e ce  e  Tec e  A c e (EASTA) 
* The above listing of institutions is not exhaustive, but includes most of the headline institutions responsible for fisheries governance in 
Madagascar.  The above institutions are also those that will be referenced in the following chapters. 
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However, an evaluation by Ramariandrasoa (2017) found that over a three-year period 
acked f om he 2014 fi cal ea , none of he MRHP  b-offices received the full funding 
that was officially allocated to them in the state budget.  Moreover, functional linkages between 
the Ministry and its sub-national offices are seen to be weak, with little oversight taking place 
to ensure that central directives are implemented in a uniform manner across the country.  This 
has particularly notable implications when it comes to the implementation of MCS in coastal 
waters, as well in the failure to implement a systematic process for the collection, analysis and 
reporting of both scientific and socio-economic fisheries data (Ramariandrasoa, 2017).  There 
are also concerns around a lack of transparency within the MRHP.  At the central level, these 
concerns pertain mainly to how the Ministry allocates fishing licenses (particularly for Asian 
DWFN fleets).  At the sub-regional level, these worries are largely around perceptions that fees 
paid by traditional and small-scale artisanal fishers, collected by the MRHP for intended re-
investment in fisheries infrastructure (e.g. landing sites and associated electricity generation 
and roads) are expropriated for other purposes (Ramariandrasoa, 2017; Researcher Interview: 
Vice-President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).  
Madaga ca  fi he ie  e ea ch in i e  a e deemed o be echnicall  ong, ho gh 
also underfunded and far less capable than they were in the past. Contrary to the situation in 
Como o , ea onabl  ong f nc ional linkage  e i  be een he MRHP and he co n  
main scientific research institute, the Institut Halieutique et des Sciences Marines (IHSM). 
IHSM serves as both an academic and applied scientific research centre, as well as a training 
centre for private and public sector fisheries personnel in need of refresher courses on marine 
biology and commercial fisheries management.  While it is difficult to gauge the extent to 
which IHSM research guides ministry-le el polic making, he in i e  o k i  eg la l  
cited in MRHP policy documents (MRHP, 2018, 2019).   
Madaga ca  ke  in i ional eakne  lie  i h MCS.  The main na ional agenc  
with responsibility for MCS, the Centre de Surveillance des P ches (CSP), works officially 
under the MRHP, but is operationally independent.  The CSP is equipped with VSM facilities, 
patrol boats, aerial means of surveillance, onboard observers, as well as personnel to carry out 
port inspections (UNCTAD, 2017).  The agenc  aff ha e al o been ac i e pa icipan  in 
the collective training of observers and in joint patrol initiatives undertaken by each of the 
Western Indian Ocean islands as part of the SmartFish project (IOC, 2014).23  However, the 
CSP has been gradually undermined as a result of underfunding, with its budget declining each 
 
23 A key element of the Sma Fi h p ojec  support for strengthening the collective MCS capabilities of Western Indian Ocean states is in 
enco aging ob e e  f om diffe en  a e  o pa icipa e in pa ol  in each o he  EEZ ,    
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year since 2009 (with the exception of slight increases in 2015/2016 that were not maintained) 
(Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  As such, trained observers have not been 
retained, while existing surveillance infrastructure (e.g. patrol vessels) is not always adequately 
maintained.   
Much of this budget reduction has resulted from the suspension of EU aid and 
investment after the 2009 coup and the fact that the EU (and other prospective donors) are 
reluctant, even after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2014, to provide financial support 
to Malagasy institutions that are seen to lack transparency (Researcher Interview: Vice-
President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).  For the 
CSP, the result is inconsistency in its ability to fulfill its mandate.  Basic MCS capabilities exist 
and are implemented, but funding is not always available to ensure the presence of Malagasy 
observers aboard DWFN vessels.  Pervasive corruption within Malagasy state institutions is 
also seen as affecting fisheries MCS, with authorities being accused of turning a blind eye to 
IUU fishing and of making little effort to improve surveillance activities geared towards 
traditional and artisanal fishers in coastal waters (Ramariandrasoa, 2017). 
 
Seychelles 
Seychelles sits prominently at the centre of the Western Indian Ocean tuna fishery.  The 
country has a very large EEZ that covers 1.3 million square kilometres (Table 3.5).  The Port 
of Vic o ia on Se chelle  main i land of Mah , e e  a  he We e n Indian Ocean  p ima  
landing and transshipment point for DWFN tuna fleets (particularly purse seiners), with much 
of the tuna landed in the country being processed and exported by the IOT cannery24 or 
exported for processing in neighbouring islands, particularly Madagascar and Mauritius.  
Fisheries constitute a larger proportion of national GDP in Seychelles, at around 20%, than in 
neighbouring countries (SFA, 2017).  As in Comoros, the threat of piracy has adversely 
affected fishing activity in the Seychellois EEZ. Indeed, a marked decline in fisheries 
production from 2005 to 2010 was largely the result of vessel operators abandoning much of 
the EEZ for more secure fishing grounds in the Southern Ocean.  Through international efforts 
o comba  pi ac , ec i  ha  been e o ed o mo  of Se chelle  EEZ and fi he ie  
production has steadily increased over the past five years (Researcher Interview: Chief 
Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  
 
24 An estimated 60% of all tuna caught by industrial operators in the Western Indian Ocean is transshipped at the Port of Victoria.  Of this 
volume, 30% is subsequently processed by IOT (SFA, 2017). 
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Efforts to ensure fisheries sustainability in Seychelles have provided mixed results.  
Like its island neighbours, Seychelles has struggled to implement adequate MCS measures in 
the coa al a e  he e mo  of i  a i anal fi he  ope a e.  The Se chelloi  go e nmen  
traditional policy of preserving open access to fishing grounds within its territorial waters has 
created a legacy of limited management control and resulting problems of stock over-
exploitation (Catanzano and Jo l, 2013; Lecomte et al., 2017).  The go e nmen  foc  ha  
shifted as more controlled access to fishing grounds, as well as the introduction of broader 
regulatory reforms, are deemed necessary to support sector sustainability under the national 
bl e econom  a eg .  Indeed, a con ide able amo n  of poli ical capi al ha  ecen l  been 
invested in establishing area-focused Fisheries Management Plans (FMPs), which seek to 
tighten access rights in some offshore waters, as well as more strictly regulate the methods and 
gear that can be employed by fishers.  While nominally the product of consultation between 
he a e, fi he  and bodie  ep e en ing fi he  in e e , e peciall  he Se chelle  Fi he men 
and Boa  O ne  A ocia ion, FMP  a e of en deemed o be op-down impositions by the state 
and adherence to FMP stipulations on the part of artisanal and semi-industrial operators is 
typically weak (though so too is enforcement) (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance 
Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles; SFA, 2018).  
 
Table 3.5: Key Fisheries Statistics - Seychelles 
Size of EEZ 1,288,643 sq. km 
Total fisheries production (annual) 33,203 MTs (2000); 109,452 MTs (2005); 87,110 MTs (2010);  104,986 MTs (2015); 127,128 MTs (2016) 
Main species harvested bonitos, groupers, lobsters, marlins, octopus, sailfish, sea cucumber, sharks, snappers, swordfish, trevally, tunas (albacore, bigeye, skipjack, yellowfin) 
Fisheries contribution to GDP 20%  
Traditional fishing Yes, but small in scale - carried out by non-motorised (or motorised) canoes as well as speedboats; also includes shore-based fishing 
Artisanal fishing Yes - carried out by planked or fibreglass boats, usually motorised with outboard engines; also involves some schooners with inboard engines 
Industrial fishing Yes  tuna fishing carried out by large DWF fleets (and a smaller domestic fleet), mainly purse seiners and smaller numbers of long liners;  
Mariculture 
Emerging, but still fairly marginal, with <2,000 MT produced per year 
(mostly pearl oysters and prawns); aquaculture production has actually 
declined in Seychelles due to the failure of a key prawn aquaculture 
enterprise in 2008 
Revenues from granting DWF access 
rights (annual) EUR 5,000,000* 
MTs = metric tons, EUR = Euros. 
* Revenue data taken from the text of the bilateral Seychelles-EU SFPA.  Based on the FPA, EUR 5.5 million in financial contributions was 
to be provided to Seychelles in 2014/2015, while EUR 5.0 million was to be provided from 2016 to 2019.  Out of these amounts, 50% was to 
be allocated to supporting the development of the wider Seychelles fisheries sector. 
Sources:  All data obtained from SmartFish Programme Country Review  Seychelles (2014), except for production data, which are drawn 




The central importance of the industrial tuna fishery to the national economy has led 
the Seychellois government to institutionalise fairly stringent (if still not fully consistent) MCS 
measures in this sub-sector, including the regular review and auditing of vessel declarations 
and log books, as well as limiting entry to its EEZ through the withholding or cancellation of 
licenses to DWFN vessels that fail to provide accurate information on their activities and catch 
levels (IOC, 2014).  The presence of the IOTC Secretariat in Victoria has led to the 
development of close linkages between Seychellois fisheries authorities and IOTC technical 
aff, i h official  in Se chelle  Mini  of Fi he ie  and Ag ic l e (MFA) and SFA 
typically playing a leading role in championing IOTC conservation management objectives in 
multilateral fora with other member states (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).   
Unlike Comoros and Madagascar, the bilateral SFPA that governs EU industrial fishing 
in the Seychellois EEZ remains in force.  The existence of an actionable legislative framework 
in Seychelles for combatting IUU fishing, combined with perceptions of transparency and 
compe ence i hin he co n  p blic in i ion , mean  ha  he EU ha  een li le ea on 
to question the SFPA, though additional access and sustainability measures are likely to be 
discussed between the Seychelles government and the EU when the current SFPA expires in 
late 2020 (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  
Under the current SFPA, a total of 40 EU purse seiners and 6 surface longliners are permitted 
to operate in the Seychellois EEZ, with the EU paying around EUR 5 million per year in access 
fee , m ch of hich i  ea ma ked fo  ppo ing he co n  ide  fi he ie  sector, including 
infrastructure upgrades and supporting livelihoods through community-based projects.25 The 
industrial tuna fishery is also inclusive of Seychelles-flagged purse seiners, acting as a de facto 
extension of the EU DWFN fleet, but operating on the basis of private access agreements rather 
than under the SFPA.  Asian DWFN vessels (all longliners) also operate under private access 
agreements (Lecomte et al, 2017).  
A  al ead  no ed, Se chelle  comme cial fi he ie  ind  i  an impo an  componen  
of he co n  econom .  In 2018, he al e of Se chelle  e po ed fi h and fi h p od c  
was a little over USD 273 million, with canned tuna  mainly exported to the EU and Japan  
being the largest single fisheries export product by volume.26  As noted previously, Seychelles 
exports a little over USD 4 million (2018) worth of fish and fish products (mostly frozen fish) 
to Madagascar for further processing.  Also striking, however, is the USD 49.1 million (2018) 
 
25 See the following link for details on the Seychelles-EU SFPA: <https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/seychelles_en> 
(accessed 24 January 2019). 
26 All 2018 ade da a e e acce ed h o gh he In e na ional T ade Cen e  (ITC ) Trade Map Database, accessible at the following link: 
<www.trademap.org> (accessed 10-15 March 2019). 
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worth of fish and fish products (also mostly frozen fish) the country exports to Mauritius, where 
it is processed by a range of companies ope a ing nde  Ma i i  Freeport Seafood Hub, 
which aims to make Mauritius a centre for seafood processing in the Western Indian Ocean.27  
Bilaterally, the strongest political relationship within the Western Indian Ocean exists between 
Mauritius and Seychelles.  While not without tensions (which will be detailed in the following 
chapters), this relationship is marked by a number of practical examples of mutual cooperation, 
including on commercial issues.   
Under a bilateral ten-year fisheries agreement signed in 2005 (and renewed in various 
stages over the period 2015-2019), Mauritian and Seychellois-registered vessels (and by 
e en ion companie ) a e p o ided i h ecip ocal igh  o fi h in he o he  a e  EEZ.28 
Regular exchanges have also been established through the renewed agreement between 
commercial actors in the two states.  In both 2017 and 2018, for example, senior staff from the 
Development Bank of Seychelles (DBS) and the Development Bank of Mauritius (DBM) held 
joint retreats to discuss best practice  approaches and shared learning for strengthening their 
co n ie  e pec i e a i anal and emi-industrial fisheries sectors through the provision of 
development finance to small, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs).  The ideas generated 
h o gh he e e change  e e inco po a ed in o he e agencie  b dge ed ec o -specific 
support plans (Researcher Interview: Honourary Consul of Mauritius in Seychelles).   
The o co n ie  na ional chambe  of comme ce have also undertaken cooperative 
measures, albeit not consistently.  In 2015, representatives from the Seychelles Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (SCCI) and the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(MCCI), along with select fisheries firms  particularly the large canneries, IOT in Seychelles 
and Princes Tuna in Mauritius  met to develop a joint action plan to identify common 
challenge  hinde ing he fi he ie  ec o  g o h, a  ell a  o p opo e policie  ha  he o 
co n ie  e pec i e go e nments could enact to address these challenges  (Researcher 
Interview: External Adviser, Indian Ocean Tuna, Ltd.).  While collaboration in the 
development of this plan does not seem to have generated lasting momentum for ongoing 
private sector engagement between the two states, many of the ideas generated  for example 
on how to entice foreign direct investment in fisheries firms, national port authorities and in 
mariculture  e e adop ed a  co e componen  of bo h co n ie  na ional blue economy  
 
27 For a summary of the Mauritian Seafood Hub initiative, see the following link:  
<http://oceaneconomy.govmu.org/English/Pages/Fisheries---SEA-FOOD-HUB.aspx> (accessed 22 June 2019). 
28 See the following link on the re-negotiation of the Mauritius-Seychelles Fishing Agreement: 




strategies (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Adviser, Government of Seychelles; 
Researcher Interview: External Adviser, Indian Ocean Tuna, Ltd.). 
 F om a echnical andpoin , Se chelle  fisheries institutions (Table 3.6) are arguably 
the most competent in the Western Indian Ocean.  This, in turn, has allowed them to play a role 
in supporting (albeit at modest scale) the capacity development of fisheries institutions in 
neighbouring island states.  The key institution is the SFA, a parastatal that operates 
independently of  but in close collaboration with  the MFA.  The SFA performs all 
management, planning, development, scientific and training functions, as well regulatory 
functions pertaining to the national fisheries sector.   Unlike Comoros and Madagascar, where 
the institutions responsible for overall fisheries management and MCS are administratively 
separate, the body responsible for MCS coordination in Seychelles, the Fisheries Monitoring 
Centre (FMC), is an administrative component of the SFA.  The SFA has also gradually 
brought under its purview all issues pertaining to the licensing of domestic and DWFN fishing 
vessels (a function that is also administratively separate in neighbouring islands).  The SFA, 
through its Research and Development Section, al o ho  he co n  main cien ific 
research capacity.  
 
Table 3.6: Key Fisheries Institutions & Legislation – Seychelles* 
Competent Authority Fish Inspection and Quality Control Unit (FIQCU) of the Seychelles Bureau of Standards (SBS) 
Government Ministries 
Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture (MFA) 
  
Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA)  a parastatal that serves as the executive 
arm of the MFA on all fisheries-related matters.  The SFA is responsible for 
operationalising all MFA directives in the fisheries sector, whether pertaining to 
commercial and environmental objectives. 
Key Legislation Fisheries Act (1986), revised in 2001 to establish a stronger legal framework for MCS compliance and enforcement 
Monitoring, Control & Surveillance 
(MCS) Fi he ie  Moni o ing Cen e (FMC) (pa  of he SFA  Depa men  of MCS) 
Professional Associations Se chelle  Fi he men and Boa  O ne  A ocia ion (FBOA) 
Key Private Sector Operators Development Bank of Seychelles (DBS); Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT); Oceana Fisheries; SAPMER; Sea Harvest;  
Scientific Research Institutes 
SFA Research and Development Section 
Blue Economy Research Institute (BERI), University of Seychelles 
Technical Training Centres Seychelles Maritime Academy (SMA)  
* The above listing of institutions is not exhaustive, but includes most of the headline institutions responsible for fisheries governance in 
Seychelles.  The above institutions are also those that will be referenced in the following chapters. 
 
As already alluded to, the SFA is closely linked to the IOTC Secretariat.  In addition to 
supporting the IOTC through its own sample-based collection of length-frequency data29 to 
 
29 Length-based data are commonly collected in tropical fisheries to estimate the health of prevailing fish stocks.  Data are collected  through 
a measurement of a wide sample of landed fish at port facilities.   
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assess fish stocks, SFA technical staff have led technical workshops on this topic at IOTC 
Scientific Committees and have undertaken field visits with both the Comorian DGRH and the 
Malagasy MHRP and IHSM to provide training in proper data collection and analysis 
approaches using length-frequency methods (Researcher Interview: Former Director, SFA; 
Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  While the utility of this SFA outreach may 
be questionable (the high turnover of technical staff in Comorian and Malagasy fisheries 
agencies is particularly problematic from a capacity-building standpoint), these efforts as well 
a  he SFA  ea lie -no ed ppo  fo  Como o  CNCSP in de eloping an imp o ed 
Management Information System for MCS, all point to the existence of technical rigour in the 
SFA.  From an MCS perspective, the SFA has also been at the forefront in leading activities 
under the Plan Regional de Surveillance de P che (PRSP), a core component of the IOC 
SmartFish p og amme.  Unde  he PRSP, aff f om he SFA  FMC ha e e ed a  echnical 
leads in the training of counterparts from other Western Indian Ocean islands (and East African 
coastal states) on the use of satellite-based surveillance technology (Researcher Interview: 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser, Government of Seychelles).   
Thi  i  no  o a  ha  Se chelle  fi he ie  in i ion  cannot be improved.  As Bueger 
and Wivel (2017) note in their analysis of Seychellois diplomacy, the country is as hampered 
by financial and human capacity limitations in the same ways as other SIDS.  However, the 
general strength of governance institutions like the SFA, as well as the commercial success of 
companie  like IOT, al o einfo ce B ege  and Wi el  poin  on he benefi  ha  acc e o 
these islands from trying to develop strength in particular sectors.  For all the constraints it still 
faces, Seychelles has pro-ac i el  in e ed in o king o make i elf ome hing of a fi he ie  
po e  i hin he egion; ome hing ha  he compa a i el  high ali  of i  poli ical em 
helps to facilitate.  
 
Mauritius 
Mauritius possesses one of the largest EEZs in the Western Indian Ocean at 2.3 million 
square kilometres (Table 3.7).  Contestation exists over the political status of Tromelin Island 
east of Madagascar, which is claimed by both Mauritius and France, and which currently 
con i e  pa  of F ance  Indian Ocean EEZ.  Mo e ell-kno n i  Ma i i  claim o he 
Chagos Islands (British Indian Ocean Territory), whose indigenous inhabitants were evicted in 
the late 1960s/early 1970s by the British government in order to make way for an American 
military base.  The Chagossian diaspora, still claiming a right of return to their islands, now 
constitute an economic underclass in both Mauritius and Seychelles (de l E ac, 2011).  
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Mauritius continues to claim the Chagos Islands as part of its EEZ, but the country has no de 
facto presence in these waters.   
In the same way that Seychelles serves as a landing and transshipment point for DWFN 
purse seiners in the Western Indian Ocean, Port Louis in Mauritius plays the same role for 
DWFN longliners. Overall fisheries production in Mauritian waters is notably lower than in 
either Madagasca  o  Se chelle .  M ch of he co n  fi he ie  ec o  ope a e  on he ba i  
of importing frozen fish from these neighbouring islands and processing it for re-export.  While 
fi he ie  acco n  fo  onl  abo  2% of Ma i i  GDP, fi h and fi h p od c  account for 
almost 15% of national exports by volume (World Bank, 2017).  Similar to the other islands, 
industrial fishers, whether DWFN or domestic, mainly harvest tuna, though marlin and 
swordfish are also harvested in sizeable volumes.  Artisanal fishers also harvest these latter 
species, as well as groupers, snappers and lobsters (among others).   
 
Table 3.7: Key Fisheries Statistics - Mauritius 
Size of EEZ 2,300,000 sq. km (1,900,000 sq. km excluding contested territories) 
Total fisheries production (annual) 9,702 MTs (2000); 10,255 MTs (2005); 7,934 MTs (2010);  16,515 MTs (2015); 19,083 MTs (2016) 
Main species harvested bonitos, groupers, lobsters, marlins, octopus, sailfish, sea cucumber, sharks, snappers, swordfish, trevally, tunas (albacore, bigeye, skipjack, yellowfin) 
Fisheries contribution to GDP 2%  
Traditional fishing Yes, but small in scale - carried out by non-motorised (or motorised) canoes as well as speedboats; also includes shore-based fishing 
Artisanal fishing Yes - carried out by planked or fibreglass boats, usually motorised with outboard engines; also involves some schooners with inboard engines 
Industrial fishing Yes  tuna fishing carried out by large DWF fleets (and a smaller domestic fleet), mainly longliners and smaller numbers of purse seiners;  
Mariculture Still emerging, with annual production of just over 1,000 MTs per year (primarily sea bream, red drum and cobia) 
Revenues from granting DWF access 
rights (annual) EUR 575,000* 
MTs = metric tons, EUR = Euros. 
* Revenue data taken from the text of the bilateral Mauritius-EU FPA.  Based on the SFPA, EUR 575,000 in financial contributions was to 
be provided to Mauritius over the period 2014 to 2021. Out of these amounts, 50% was to be allocated to supporting the development of the 
wider Mauritian fisheries sector. 
Sources:  All data obtained from SmartFish Programme Country Review  Mauritius (2014), except for production data, which are drawn 
from the World Bank/FAO dataset: Total Fisheries Production (2016) and revenue data, which are taken from the Mauritius-EU SFPA (2017). 
 
Some of the richest fishing grounds within the Mauritian EEZ lie within the waters of 
the Mascarene Plateau.  This marine area provides another notable example of inter-island 
technical cooperation, with Mauritius and Seychelles agreeing in 2012 to the development of 
a Joint Management Area (JMA), under which the two countries would share jurisdiction over 
the Plateau.30 While he JMA foc e  e plici l  on he join  managemen  of he Pla ea  
 
30 For an overview of the Mauritian-Seychellois Joint Management Area pertaining to the Mascarene Plateau, see the following link: 
<http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/11255/Seychelles%2C+Mauritius+negotiate+shared+approach+to+underwater+plateau> 
(accessed 12 July 2019) 
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seabed and its mineral resources and less prominently on fisheries, the JMA has contributed to 
a mode  in en ifica ion of join  e el pa ol  b  he o a e  MCS a ho i ie , a  ell a  
spurring an increase in joint scientific fieldwork (e.g. on the health of fish stocks and wider 
marine biology), for example by the SFA and the Fishe ie  Re ea ch Di i ion of Ma i i  
Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping (Researcher 
Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius; 
Researcher Interview: Managing Director for the Department of the Blue Economy, 
Government of Seychelles).   
The bilateral SFPA that governs EU DWFN fishing within the Mauritian EEZ remains 
in force.  As with Seychelles, the EU recognises Mauritius as having undertaken fairly robust 
action to combat IUU fishing (though Chapter 6 will suggest that this is not entirely the case).  
Mauritian institutions also enjoy a high level of trust and are deemed to be transparent, meaning 
that the EU has shown little hesitation in maintaining the SFPA (Researcher Interview: Former 
Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  Under the terms 
of the SFPA, which runs to the end of 2021, a total of 40 EU purse seiners and 45 surface 
longline  a e pe mi ed o ope a e in Ma i i  EEZ, ho gh beca e of the higher volumes 
that are able to be harvested from the Seychellois EEZ versus its Mauritian counterpart, the 
reference tonnage by which the SFPA determines annual access fees, is considerably higher 
under the EU-Seychelles SFPA. While Seychelles receives around EUR 5 million per year in 
access fees, Mauritius receives a much more modest EUR 575,000 per year (EC, 2014).  In 
addition to EU-flagged e el , ome A ian DWFN longline  al o ope a e in Ma i i  EEZ, 
mainly targeting tuna under private access agreements. A small number of domestic longliners 
al o ope a e in he co n  EEZ (Lecom e et al., 2017). 
In 2018, Mauritius exported USD 150 million worth of fish and fish products, with 
canned tuna  exported to the EU, United States and Japan  being the largest export by volume.  
Smaller volumes of non-fillet frozen fish are exported, mainly to Asian markets.  Whereas 
Madagascar and Seychelles export frozen fish for processing in Mauritius, exports of Mauritian 
fish to other Western Indian Ocean islands are marginal.31 Thi  eflec  Ma i i  
aforementioned position within the regional fisheries value chain, characterised by relatively 
low levels of domestic production but serving as a processing centre for product caught in the 
o he  i land  EEZ .  As already noted, Mauritius has undertaken investments to establish itself 
as a duty-free fish product processing centre, with the Freeport Seafood Hub being developed 
 
31 All 2018 ade da a e e acce ed h o gh he In e na ional T ade Cen e  (ITC ) Trade Map Database, accessible at the following link: 
<www.trademap.org> (accessed 10-15 March 2019). 
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to serve as a focal point for Mauritian and non-Mauritian-owned companies to access basic 
fisheries services such as landing and transshipment, as well as handling, grading, weighing, 
packaging, labelling, storage and canning (Researcher Interview: Managing Director, Princes 
Tuna).  The Seafood Hub also provides ancillary services pertaining to vessel maintenance, 
hile he H b  T ade and Ma ke ing Cen e e e  a  a one- op hop  fo  ope a o  looking 
to facilitate the import and re-export of fish and fish products.    The logistics services available 
at the Hub are in-line with EU standards (particularly on cold chain storage) and are in 
accordance with internationally-recognised Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) standards of food safety.32 All of this has contributed to making the Hub a core 
component of what Mauritius e m  i  ocean econom  (Re ea che  In e ie : Fo me  
Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius). 
 Ma i i  fisheries institutions (Table 3.8) are deemed technically competent and 
reasonably well-resourced.  Whereas the other Western Indian Ocean island states have broadly 
kep  hei  diffe en  ma i ime ec o  iloed nde  diffe en  mini ie , Ma i i  Mini  of 
Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping brings these sectors under a single 
administrative framework.   
 
Table 3.8: Key Fisheries Institutions & Legislation – Mauritius* 
Competent Authority Competent Authority Seafood 
Government Ministries Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping, Fisheries Division  
Key Legislation Fisheries and Marine Resources Act (2007) 
Monitoring, Control & Surveillance 
(MCS) 
Fisheries Protection Service (FPS) 
Monitoring, Control, Surveillance/Vessel Monitoring System/Port State Control 
and Import/Export Division 
Professional Associations Mauritius Fishermen Cooperative Federation, Ltd. 
Key Private Sector Operators Bella Amigo Co. Ltd.; Development Bank of Mauritius (DBM); Freeport Seafood Hub; Mer des Mascareignes Ltée.; Princes Tuna 
Scientific Research Institutes 
Albion Fisheries Research Centre (AFRC) 
Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI) 
Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA) 
Technical Training Centres 
Fisheries Training and Extension Centre (FiTEC) 
Mauritius Maritime Training Academy (MMTA) 
* The above listing of institutions is not exhaustive, but includes most of the headline institutions responsible for fisheries governance in 
Seychelles.  The above institutions are also those that will be referenced in the following chapters. 
 
Additionally, all key fisheries bodies, including those pertaining to MCS, scientific 
e ea ch and po  con ol mea e  all fall nde  he aegi  of hi  Mini .  The Mini  
 
32 For an additional overview of services made available at the Freeport Seafood Hub, see the following link: 
<http://www.mfd.mu/en/supplychain-solutions-services-seafood-hub.php> (accessed 12 February 2019). 
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Fisheries Division has responsibility for overall sector management and planning initiatives.  
Mauritius has two separate bodies dealing with MCS.  The Fisheries Protection Service (FPS) 
operates under the Fisheries Division and is mainly a law enforcement unit tasked with 
comba ing IUU fi hing; a a k ha  i  mainl  lef  o adi ional  MCS bodies, with support 
from coast guard authorities, in the other islands.  Core MCS functions lie with the broadly-
mandated Monitoring, Control, Surveillance/Vessel Monitoring System/Port State Control and 
Import/Export Division, which is administratively separate from the Fisheries Division, but 
which is closely aligned in day-to-day workplans.   
There is comparatively little evidence of direct capacity building exchanges between 
Mauritian fisheries governance bodies and their counterparts in the other Western Indian Ocean 
island states.  However, in regards to scientific research, inter-island connections are 
considerably more prominent.  There are three main marine science institutes/groups operating 
in the country: the Albion Fisheries Research Centre, Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI) 
and the previously mentioned Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA).  
The latter is an international body that brings marine scientists together from across the 
Western Indian Ocean SIDS and East Africa.  I  a  no ed ea lie  ha  Madaga ca  IHSM 
has been (at least in the past if not the present) a key contributor to WIOMSA symposiums.  
The same is true of staff from the MOI, which plays a prominent role in developing core 
training modules for the WIOMSA Marine Protected Area Professional Programme.  The MOI 
has also regularly hosted training seminars and experience exchange workshops bringing 
together oceanographers and marine biologists from across the island grouping.  
 
France (Mayotte & Réunion) 
Unlike the four independent Western Indian Ocean island states, the French territories 
of Mayotte and Réunion play far less prominent roles in the Western Indian Ocean tuna fishery.  
This is one reason why these islands are less of a focus in this study than are the other island 
states discussed above.  However, in order to provide a comprehensive picture, a brief summary 
is provided below on the fisheries sector in these two islands.   
F ance  i eable EEZ in he Western Indian Ocean (Table 3.9) includes the separate 
EEZs of Mayotte and Réunion, plus the EEZs established as a result of French control over 
ha  a e e med he Sca e ed I land : Ba a  da India, E opa and J an de No a in he 
Mozambique Channel, the Glorioso Islands northwest of Madagascar and Tromelin Island east 
of Madaga ca .  Poli icall , he Sca e ed I land  (all npop la ed) a e go e ned b  he 
senior administrator of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), based in Réunion.  
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So e eign  o e  he Sca e ed I land  i  disputed between France/the EU and various 
Western Indian Ocean island states.  Madagascar claims the three islands in the Mozambique 
Channel, while Comoros claims the Glorioso Islands (as well as Mayotte).  Finally, Mauritius 
continues to lay sovereign claim to Tromelin Island.  Given the existence of these disputes, it 
ho ld no  be p i ing ha  he collec i e e en  of F ance  ma i ime EEZ in he We e n 
Indian Ocean, sitting a little over one million square kilometres, is also contested and acts as 
an irritant in the relations between France, its constituent territories and the other states within 
the island grouping.  This is a topic that will be returned to, particularly in Chapter 5. 
The fisheries profile of Mayotte is similar to that of Comoros.  With an EEZ also located 
at the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel, the same types of fish species harvested 
in Comorian waters are also harvested in Mayotte.  Domestic fisheries production is either 
traditional or artisanal, taking place within a large barrier reef-lagoon complex surrounding the 
territory.  Industrial fishing is mainly the preserve of DWFN purse seiners harvesting tuna.  A 
considerable number of Seychellois purse seiners are permitted to operate in Mahorais waters 
under the terms of a 2014 Seychelles-EU Fisheries Access Agreement (FAA).33  This FAA, a 
global first for the EU in allowing a third country to access its waters for commercial fishing, 
provides Mayotte with needed revenue in the form of private access fees.  A share of revenue 
f om he e fee  i  ili ed b  Ma o e  main fi he ie  a ho i , he Chambre d'Agriculture, 
de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture (CAPAM) (Table 3.10), to cover its administration and training 
costs, as well as undertake MCS operations.    Five purse seiners are registered to Mayotte 
itself34 and e e a  pa  of he EU  DWFN flee  ope a ing in o he  i land  EEZ  (pa ic la l  
Madagascar), as well as fishing within the EEZs of the various Scattered Islands  (Ojamaa 
and Martí, 2015; Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, CAPAM).  A smaller number of 
(mostly Asian) long liners also operate around Mayotte, mainly targeting swordfish.  
Similar to Comoros, none of the industrial tuna catch from Mahorais waters is landed 
in Mayotte, instead being landed and transshipped in Seychelles.  As such, the industrial sector 
does not act as a generator of employment on the island and Mayotte does not export fish and 
fish products.  Nor, because of Mayo e  a  a  an EU e i o , doe  he i land ecei e 
access fees from the EU in the same manner as the independent Western Indian Ocean islands.  
Instead, Mayotte (as well as Réunion) benefits from EU development assistance provided by 
 
33 The Seychelles-EU FAA is distinct from the Seychelles-EU FPA.  See the following link:  
<https://www.fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?monthyear=&day=18&id=64820&l=e&special=&ndb=1%20target> (accessed 9 
January 2019).    




the European Fisheries Fund (EFF).  This assistance is valued at around EUR 90 million for 
the two departments over the period 2014-2020 (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
CAPAM).   
CAPAM is responsible for key functions pertaining to fisheries governance, including 
MCS.  Efforts are underway to develop on-island capacity for scientific research and technical 
training.  For the moment, however, the island relies on technical expertise sourced primarily 
from Réunionnais institutions such as the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) 
(Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, CAPAM).  What is most notable about Mayotte, 
however, is that in spite of its position within the Western Indian Ocean tuna fishery, the 
ongoing territorial claim that Comoros makes on Mayotte (a claim that neighbouring Western 
Indian Ocean islands broadly support), means that Mayotte is not an IOC member and 
Mahorais representatives (e.g. from CAPAM) are not always welcome to participate in key 
regional initiatives, such as various components of the IOC SmartFish project (Researcher 
Interview: Fisheries Officer, CAPAM).      
 
Table 3.9: Key Fisheries Statistics – France (Mayotte & Reunion) 
Size of EEZ 63,078 sq. km (Mayotte); 315,058 sq. km (Réunion); 640,000 sq. km ( Sca e ed I land ) = 1,018,136 . km (To al) 
Total fisheries production (annual) 29,826 MTs (2012), ~20,000 MTs (2016) (Mayotte); ~10,000 MTs (2017) (Réunion) 
Main species harvested 
cuttlefish, marlin, sailfish, sardinellas, sharks, snapper, swordfish, tuna 
(albacore, bigeye, mackerel, skipjack, yellowfin) (Mayotte); lobster, mahi 
mahi, pompanos, sharks, swordfish (Réunion) 
Fisheries contribution to GDP ~8-10% (Mayotte); 1.5% (Réunion) 
Traditional fishing Yes - carried out by non-motorised, outrigger dugout canoes (Mayotte); N/A (Réunion)_  
Artisanal fishing 
Yes - carried out by planked or fibreglass or polyester boats, sometimes 
motorised, as well as my motorised canoes (Mayotte); carried out by 
planked or fibreglass or polyester boats (Réunion)_ 
Industrial fishing 
Yes - carried out by large DWFN fleets, mainly purse seiners but also a 
small number of long liners (Mayotte); DWF purse seiners and longliners 
operate as part of the Southern Ocean fishery (Réunion)  
Mariculture Yes  marginal production in the range of 70 MT per year (Mayotte) and 50 MT per year (Réunion) 
Revenues from granting DWF access 
rights (annual) 
N/A  as Outermost Regions of the EU, neither Mayotte nor Réunion collect 
access fees to allow EU DWFN fleets to operate in their EEZs.  Some 
private access agreements are in place.  Also, a considerable level of EU 
funding is provided annually to support economic development and fisheries 
mode ni a ion  h o gh he E opean Fi he ie  F nd (EFF).  EFF F nding 
to Mayotte and Réunion is EUR 90 million over the period 2014-2020. 
MTs = metric tons, EUR = Euros. 
Sources:  All data obtained from European Parliament Directorate-General (2015), except for revenue data, which have been obtained from 
European Commission (2019). 
 
R nion  po i ion i hin he egional fi he ie  ec o  i  ome ha  ni e.  The 
i land  fi he ie  ind  i  compa a i el  mall hen a e ed again  neighbo ing i land  
 e.g. the sector accounts for 0.5% of formal employment in Réunion vs. 13% in Seychelles 
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(European Parliament Directorate-General, 2015).  The industrial sector includes both 
domestic and DWFN long liners, mainly harvesting swordfish, with this catch being landed 
either in Réunion or in Mauritius.  Processing for export, almost entirely for the EU market, 
ake  place in R nion (fi h and fi h p od c  ep e en  20% of R nion  e po  b  ol me), 
i h he i land  p oce ing ope a o  al o d a ing on he ca ch of a i anal fi he , a  ell a  
fish product impo  f om Madaga ca , o e e he i land  dome ic ma ke  (Re ea che  
Interview: Associate Director, Réunimer).   
 
Table 3.10: Key Fisheries Institutions & Legislation – France (Mayotte & Réunion)* 
Competent Authority 
Direction de la Mer Sud Océan Indien (DMSOI, D   Importation / 
Exportation des Produits de la Pêche Directorate for the Southern Indian 
Ocean, Fish Product Import/Export Division 
 
Government Ministries 
Direction de la Mer Sud Océan Indien (DMSOI) Directorate for the Southern 
Indian Ocean  based in Réunion to administer maritime affairs, including 
fisheries, across the French EEZs in the Western Indian Ocean and Southern 
Ocean; includes a territorial unit in Mayotte 
 
C a b e de A c e de a P c e e  de A ac e de Ma e 
(CAPAM) Chamber of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture of Mayotte 
Key Legislation Art.5(3) of Reg. (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11. Dec, 2013 of the Common Fisheries Policy 
Monitoring, Control & Surveillance 
(MCS) 
Centre Régional Opérationnel de Surveillance et de Sauvetage (CROSS) 
Regional Operational Centre for Surveillance and Rescue  
Affaires Economiques (AE) Economic Affairs  a component of DMSOI that is 
responsible for vessel licensing, particularly in the artisanal sector   
Professional Associations 
Association Réunionnaise Interprofessionnelle de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture 
(ARIPA) Réunion Interprofessional Association of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Key Private Sector Operators Réunimer (inclusive of key companies like Le Martin P cheur, Le P cheur Créole and Réunip che);  
Scientific Research Institutes 
Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) Research Institute for 
Development 
La Délégation Ifremer Océan Indien (DOI) Ifremer Indian Ocean Delegation 
Université de La Réunion (Laboratoire ECOMAR) (University of Réunion 
ECOMAR Laboratory) 
Technical Training Centres 
L'École d'Apprentissage Maritime de La Réunion (EAM) Maritime Training 
Academy 
   
All aspects of fisheries governance are under the purview of the Direction de la Mer 
Sud Océan Indien (DMSOI), a French government agency based in Réunion, under which sit 
a number of different components with responsibility for tasks such as assessing fish and fish 
product sanitary standards, MCS as well as providing support to private sector operators.  These 
bodies, in turn, operate in accordance with the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and under 
the supervision of the European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.   The French 
presence in the Western Indian Ocean, valued by neighbouring islands from a cultural, 
economic and security perspective, but also resented as something of a colonial relic, will be 
returned to as a factor that affects political dynamics within the island grouping.  It is important 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 78 
to note, however, that French technical assistance plays a considerable role in supporting the 
functioning of fisheries bodies across the region.   
For example, the Réunion branch of IRD has worked closely with researchers at both 
the Comorian INRAPE and the Malagasy IHSM to develop these latter insti ion  ocio-
economic and scientific research capacity.  This has included undertaking joint research 
p ojec  foc ed on acking change  in ma ine biodi e i  i hin he e a e  e i o ial 
waters, as well as socio-economic studies exploring the impact of Marine Protected Areas on 
bo h coa al fi h ock  and fi he  li elihood  (Re ea che  In e ie : Re ea ch Office , IRD).  
F ance  echnical a i ance e end  o he con ib ion he co n  (and b  e en ion he EU) 
makes in financially and technicall  ppo ing he ope a ion  of he We e n Indian Ocean  
inter-governmental organisations, particularly the IOC, and the projects they launch, including 
SmartFish.  This is a theme that will be returned to in Chapter 5 and its discussion of the 
region  in e -governmental bodies. 
 
4. The Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Sector: Inter-Governmental Organisations 
& Key Projects 
 The key inter-governmental organisations and projects that characterise the fisheries 
sector in the Western Indian Ocean will be introduced in considerable detail in Chapter 5.  As 
such, only a brief overview is set out below.  Both the IOTC and SWIOFC operate under the 
auspices of the FAO and a e mainl  echnoc a ic le  e ing  o gani a ion  ha  o k o 
establish and enforce international norms around fisheries management, both within member 
state EEZs and on the high seas.  The IOTC carries out this role with a direct focus on the tuna 
fishery, while SWIOFC mainly focuses on non-tuna pelagic resources.  Both bodies have 
memberships that extend beyond the island states of interest to this study, also encompassing 
East African coastal states and a number of Asian states with Indian Ocean coastlines.         
 Both the IOC and IORA have mandates to foster cooperation among their member 
states on a broad range of issue areas, with fisheries being only one component of this 
cooperation.  IORA is undeniably the most ambitious of the inter-governmental bodies, seeking 
to foster closer trade and investment linkages between all Indian Ocean rim countries, promote 
collaboration in regards to maritime security, support disaster risk reduction strategies, as well 
as encourage broad-based academic, scientific and tourism exchange (Meng, 2018).  In spite 
of the broadness of this mandate, however, IORA is the organisation with the least amount of 
executive power , with its assorted functions being almost entirely dialogue-based rather than 
involving the creation and enforcement of binding agreements between members.  For its part, 
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the IOC promotes technical fisheries cooperation, as well as cooperation in other sectors, such 
as agriculture, transport and tourism (to name just a few).  Unlike IORA, however, the IOC  
membership is exclusive to the Western Indian Ocean island states and the body aims to 
promote tangible outputs in the form of binding agreements, joint area management schemes 
(such as that governing the Mascarene Plateau between Mauritius and Seychelles) and political 
commitments towards joint policy initiatives  though the degree to which it is able to do so 
will be explored at various points in the study. 
Two key fisheries-related projects are worth briefly highlighting: 1) the SmartFish 
Project, implemented primarily through the IOC, with funding from the European 
Commission; and 2) the SWIOFish Project, implemented under the auspices of both SWIOFC 
and the IOC with funding from the World Bank.  The SmartFish Project was a large, multi-
phased initiative implemented from 2011 to 2018 at a cost of twenty-one million Euros.  While 
the IOC was the primary implementing agency, the geographic scope of the project also 
included a number of East African coastal states and involved collaboration with SWIOFC and 
the IOTC, as well as with additional East and Southern African regional organisations.  
SmartFish focused its activities on five main themes: fisheries development and management; 
fisheries governance; MCS; facilitation of trade in fish and fish products; and food security.  
The SWIOFish Project, initiated in 2015 and now in its third phase of implementation, was 
launched with many of the same objectives as SmartFish, albeit with a much larger 
implementation budget of over 200 million U.S. Dollars.  Like SmartFish, SWIOFish took a 
particular focus on fisheries governance, institutional strengthening and capacity-building 
(including in MCS), as well as improving livelihoods in the traditional and artisanal fisheries 
sectors.  Both of these projects will be a main focus of Chapter 5 and its discussion of inter-
island political dynamics in the context of fisheries-focused inter-governmental organisations.    
 The e a e a n mbe  of o he  egional  o gani a ion  ha  pla  a ole in diffe en  a pec  
of fisheries development in the Western Indian Ocean.  These include the African Union, 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), to name just a few.  However, these organisations tend to 
provide funding or participate in technical initiatives through projects like SmartFish and 
SWIOFish rather than by creating their own separate fisheries projects or programmes.  As 
such, it is the perspective of this study that these bodies do not occupy the same level of primacy 
when it comes to initiating detailed fisheries engagement between the Western Indian Ocean 




This chapter has provided a descriptive overview of the Western Indian Ocean fisheries 
sector, both at a macro-level and with a situational analysis for each individual island state.  
This overview has outlined the commercial and policy-related trends that define this sector.  It 
has also introduced the key national institutions, companies, non-state actors, inter-
governmental organisations and transnational projects that will be discussed throughout the 
emainde  of he d  anal ical in e iga ion.  The chap e  ha  al o i a ed, if a  a c o  
le el, he egional  fi he ie  ec o  in he con e  of a ide  con ide a ion of he bl e 
econom   a policy framework that is likely to be of ever-greater importance to each of the 
Western Indian Ocean SIDS in future.  Building on the descriptive overview provided in this 
chapter, Chapter 4 will now delve into the first of the d  anal ical len e , focusing on the 
























CHAPTER 4: The Limits of Indianocéanie: Island Fisheries Ministries & 
the Politics of Enacting MT&Cs for DWFN Vessel Access  
 
1. Introduction and Chapter Overview  
In this chapter, the dissertation begins its analytical exploration of how existing political 
dynamics between the Western Indian Ocean island states incentivise (or fail to incentivise) 
deepening cooperation, integration and collective diplomacy among these states in the fisheries 
sector.  Returning to the tenets of new regionalism  detailed in Chapter 2, this exploration 
also begins to query whether these political dynamics allow for the Western Indian Ocean 
island grouping to be thought of as a distinct and socially-constructed region characterised by 
commonly-held regimes.  Finally, the chapter starts to shed light on whether, based on the 
bounded geographic and thematic contexts of this study, there is merit to the view posited by 
some scholars that inter-island cooperation and ganging up  can serve as an effective means 
for these types of states to boost their collective bargaining power.  
Going back o hi  d  h ee in e iga i e lenses , introduced in Chapter 1, the 
analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the first lens, exploring cooperative dynamics, 
collective action and regime-building at the state-to-state ministerial level.  Much of the 
interaction on fisheries that takes place between the Western Indian Ocean island states occurs 
within the four inter-governmental organisations introduced earlier: IOC, IORA, IOTC and 
SWIOFC.  The political dynamics at play within these organisations will be the focus of 
Chapter 5.  However, a considerable level of political engagement also takes place between 
island state governments outside of  or at least in parallel to  these organisational structures.  
Engagement between ministry officials often serves to foster the working relationships that 
underpin the work done in the technical committees and working groups of bodies like the IOC 
and IOTC (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles). 
Clea  e ample  of echnical coope a ion be een he diffe en  i land  a e fi he ie  
institutions and their ministry officials were provided in Chapter 3.  A number of these 
examples will again be referenced in the analysis that follows.  This chapter will argue, 
however, that there is little evidence that this technical cooperation is serving to catalyse 
political moves towards deeper fisheries-based integration or collective diplomacy among the 
Western Indian Ocean SIDS.  On the contrary, the political dynamics at play between the 
islands, particularly between their respective fisheries ministries, seem to disincentivise the 
active construction or maintenance of what Ruggie (1975: 570) would identify as actionable 
regimes in the fisheries sector: mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, 
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organisational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of 
states .  
Why is this so? It will be argued that there are two main factors that hinder fisheries 
ministries in the islands from working towards closer integration and the development of robust 
collective fisheries regimes.  First, the disparities in levels of socio-economic development and 
political cohesiveness between the Western Indian Ocean islands, particularly between 
Mauritius and Seychelles on one side and the poorer island states of Comoros and Madagascar 
on the other, creates a mismatch when it comes to the dominant policy and political priorities 
of he i land  e pec i e mini  ac o .  Thi  i  e peciall  e iden  ega ding he e en  o 
which sustainability should sit at the centre of collective fisheries-based initiatives among the 
islands.  While a mix of sustainability and resource maximising objectives characterise all of 
he i land  fi he ie  ec o , he i land  diffe  con ide abl  on he deg ee he  belie e hei  
political capital should be dedicated towards long-term fisheries sustainability versus shorter-
term goals related to employment generation, foreign investment and broad sectoral growth.  
The more developed  islands, and Seychelles in particular, are likelier to advocate a stronger 
sustainability focus that the poorer islands deem a constraint to the development of their own 
fisheries industries.   
 Second, the political power dynamics that exist between the different islands, evident 
but not necessarily that impactful when dealing with issues of basic technical cooperation, 
come into much sharper relief when matters turn directly to the economic gains to be made 
from the fisheries sector.  Professed unity quickly gives way to individual interest as the 
different island state governments seek to competitively exploit commercial arrangements, 
specifically with DWFNs, to their own benefit.  The development of strong integrative regimes 
become  le  poli icall  compelling fo  he i land  fi he ie  mini ie  hen ch egime  n 
the risk of upsetting commercial arrangements over the short-term, even if these regimes could 
potentially lead to longer-term economic gains for the island grouping as a whole.   
This means that, in spite of the basic technical cooperation they may engage in with 
each o he , he i land  mini  ac o  all oo of en lack poli ical ill o  a common concep ion 
of how a more integrated Western Indian Ocean fisheries sector should be operationalised.  It 
then becomes considerably more difficult for these actors to move beyond more superficial 
forms of cooperation and towards the types of integrative and tangible regimes that would 
demonstrate a true sense of collective interest among these states.  When the above arguments 
are interpreted in light of new regionalism , they paint a picture of an island grouping that 
cannot  at least on the basis of examining ministerial interactions  be deemed a socially-
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constructed region.  Or, more accurately, these islands cannot be spoken of as a region with a 
high level of regionness.  Cooperative dynamics clearly exist between the islands, at least at a 
technical or functional  level.  The importance of these dynamics should by no means be 
dismissed.  However, new regionalism  and its social constructivist ethos expects something 
more than mere technical interactions at the state level.  Indeed, it envisions a transformation 
of a group of states f om a pa i e objec  o an ac i e bjec  capable of a ic la ing he 
transnational interests of the emerging region  (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 461).   
The outward messaging put forward by the islands themselves over fisheries  islands, 
close and united  (IOC, 2013)  would appear to suggest that this transformation should be 
evident.  As the above arguments will make clear, however, the Western Indian Ocean island 
states fall short, at least at present, of being an active subject  in the political sense.  A 
collectively constructed identity around the concept of Indianocéanie, while perhaps existing 
as an ideal, does not find practical expression among ministry actors in the fisheries sector.  
This does not preclude the possibility of these islands ganging up  to boost their collective 
ba gaining po e .  Ho e e , gi en he pa ci  of e idence gge ing ha  he i land  
respective fisheries ministries have found it worthwhile to do so, the chapter will reiterate that 
it is not enough to assume that these states will choose to gang up  merely because they are 
islands in close proximity and with some shared traits.  At least in the context of the fisheries 
sector, complex political dynamics play a decisive role in determining the degree to which 
these islands view ganging up  with one another as an advantageous diplomatic strategy. 
Given the technical and policy complexity of fisheries as a socio-economic sector, it is 
difficult to articulate the above arguments with clarity unless the analytical focus is placed on 
a set of specific issue areas.  The chapter will present its evidence for the above arguments 
through the detailing of one specific issue area that captures important interactions between the 
i land a e  fi he ie  mini ie : he ongoing efforts among the islands to collaboratively work 
towards enacting collective MT&Cs for granting territorial access rights to DWFN vessels. 
 
2. Introducing MT&Cs as an Approach for Collective EEZ Fisheries Management 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that DWFN operators wishing to fish within the EEZs of other 
countries are usually expected to meet certain terms and conditions in order to be granted 
territorial access.  Globally, these terms and conditions are applied with different levels of 
rigour, but are broadly centred around ensuring: 1) that DWFN vessels hold valid and updated 
fishing licenses; 2) that DWFN vessels adhere to particular reporting requirements in relation 
to both vessel movements and catch volumes; 3) that DWFN vessels adhere to port controls 
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and do not attempt to evade these controls by transshipping their catches at sea; and 4) that 
DWFN vessels make allowance for the presence of on-board observers to ensure compliance 
with MCS controls aimed at combatting IUU fishing.  In addition, the terms and conditions 
governing EEZ entry require DWFN operators to pay both access and licensing fees.  These 
are levied per vessel and typically on an annual basis (Campling, 2008; Mwikya, 2006).         
In the Western Indian Ocean, agreements covering these terms and conditions have 
been worked out bilaterally, between individual island state governments and the DWFNs 
seeking to operate in their EEZs.  Access negotiations sometimes take place exclusively at the 
government-le el.  The i land  SFPA  i h he EU, fo  e ample, in ol e i land a e official  
negotiating with the European Fisheries Commission over access rights for EU-registered 
purse seiners.  Alternatively, these access negotiations can involve island state governments 
negotiating directly with DWFN fishing companies through private access agreements, as is 
currently done with the Asian long liner operators that are becoming a marked presence in 
island waters.  What is important to note about the Western Indian Ocean, however, is that 
when it comes to the global island state context, this bilateral approach to access negotiations 
is not always the norm.  Among island states in the Central and Western Pacific, for example, 
access negotiations are carried out collectively.  Moreover, the Pacific island states have 
developed a common set of regulatory regimes, in the form of MT&Cs and complementary 
ag eemen , ha  anda di e DWFN acce  condi ion  ac o  he e i land  na-rich EEZs.  
In the analysis that follows, it will be argued that the failure of the Western Indian 
Ocean island states to work collectively at the ministerial-level to enact common MT&Cs 
serves as a significant demonstration of the lack of regionness among these islands.  The factors 
noted earlier as inhibiting the development of actionable regimes among these island states 
differing policy priorities resulting from disparate levels of development and political 
cohesiveness, as well as economic competition  a e cen al o he e a e  inabili  o gene a e 
the sustained inter-ministerial cooperation required to enact MT&Cs. This is despite 
acknowledgment that the enactment of MT&Cs would serve to strengthen collective island 
fisheries governance (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of 
Seychelles; Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).   
 
3. A Brief Detour: MT&C Development in the Pacific Island Context 
Before diving into an analysis of the Western Indian Ocean context, it is worth 
discussing how a number of island states in the Central and Western Pacific came together to 
develop a collective set of MT&Cs.  The purpose here is not to dwell on the technical details 
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of these MT&Cs.  Rather, it is to highlight how cooperative political dynamics, particularly 
between the fisheries ministries of individual Pacific island states, incentivised these countries 
towards the creation of practical and integrative fisheries regimes.  This will later be contrasted 
with the absence of comparable political dynamics among the Western Indian Ocean island 
states.  A useful entry point for understanding the politics of fisheries cooperation in the Pacific 
is the 1982 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of 
Common Interest (Nauru Agreement).35 As has been noted by a number of scholars, the Nauru 
Agreement has come to symbolise not only the merits of inter-island cooperation and regime 
building, but has also spurred the formation of a collective identity and common political 
purpose around fisheries for a number of Pacific island states (Aqorau, 2002; Hanich, Parris 
and Tsamenyi, 2010).                             
         The Nauru Agreement is directly linked to the formation of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) in 1979.  The FFA was notable for being the first regional fisheries 
body created at the initiative of island states themselves (Aqorau, 2002; Hanich, Parris and 
Tsamenyi, 2010; Van Dyke and Heftel, 1981).36  Formed to promote dialogue, technical 
cooperation and policy harmonisation among Pacific island states looking to improve their 
managemen  of mig a o  fi h ock , he FFA  echnoc a ic foc  omewhat belied the fact 
that its creation was very much a political act.  By the late-1970s, most of the Pacific island 
states had only achieved their independence (nominally or in-full) in the preceding decade.  
These states were economically and politically fragile and maintained a high degree of aid 
dependency on outside powers, such as Australia, France, Japan and the United States.  Both 
France (acting through the European Commission) and Japan, in particular, were also major 
DWFNs with interests in the Pacific tuna fishery (Lodge, 1992).  In founding the FFA, the 
Pacific island states recognised that an upshot of their aid dependence was being played-off 
against each other by DWFNs in negotiations over vessel access terms and conditions.  
Granting concessions to DWFNs on the rigour by which MCS controls would be enforced or 
on vessel access and licensing fees, to provide just two examples, served to maintain DWFN 
favour and the flow of aid.  Not wishing to lose this favour, individual island states had been 
compelled to match the concessions made by others, losing out on revenues and leading to 
something of a regulatory race to the bottom , in hich indi id al a e  fi he ie  go e nance 
 
35 The original signatories to the Nauru Agreement were: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.    
36 The creation of the FFA was an initiative of the 8th South Pacific Forum in 1977.  The international treaty establishing the FFA, the South 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, was initiated at the behest of the less-developed Pacific island states, but with Australia and New 
Zealand also signing on as members. 
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structures came to hold little oversight over the fish stocks migrating through their EEZs 
(Hanich, Parris and Tsamenyi, 2010; Lodge, 1992).    
 The FFA represented a concerted political effort by the Pacific island states to at least 
modestly redress this power imbalance.  Acting under the aegis of the South Pacific Forum 
(SPF), which was created in 1971 and later re-named the PIF, the founders of the FFA 
understood that efforts to improve inter-island technical or functional  cooperation in fisheries 
management would amount to little unless the islands were able to truly assert authority over 
DWFN fishing in their EEZs (Fry, 1991; Fry and Tarte, 2015). The FFA consequently 
advocated for member states to pool their human and financial resources, as well as work to 
e abli h ha ed polic  po i ion , all i h he objec i e of boo ing he i land  collective 
bargaining power in negotiations with DWFN partners.  While having no illusions about their 
relative diplomatic stature compared to these DWFNs, the island members of the FFA gambled 
that the overriding desire of DWFNs to maintain access to the lucrative Pacific tuna fishery 
gave them an opening.   
If he i land  co ld follo  Schiff  (2010) ad ice o fo m a ni ed nego ia ing bloc and, 
in the words of Lodge (1992: 211), hold their nerve  in the face of potential threats of aid 
reductions, then they could leverage their legal authority over their EEZs, as well as their 
resulting power to grant vessel access rights.  This, in turn, could be used to minimise both the 
prospects of individual island states continuing to be played-off against each other, as well as 
o p h back again  pa ic la  DWFN p ac ice  ha  e e nde mining he i land  (admi edl  
limited) MCS controls and which were preventing them from obtaining fair economic returns 
(Fry and Tarte, 2015; Hanich, Parris and Tsamenyi, 2010).  A KI from the Government of 
Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e Econom , ho e ed a  an ad i o  i hin he FFA in i  
fo ma i e ea , mmed p he diploma ic pe pec i e ha  d o e he FFA  c ea ion: The 
Agency [FFA] was created to give these islands a louder voice.  They [island states] knew that, 
ac ing alone, he F ench, he Japane e, he Ame ican he e co n ie  o ld not take them 
seriously.  Working together, these islands suddenly understood that they controlled vast parts 
of the ocean [through their EEZs] and especially the tuna migration routes. They could control 
[ e el] acce  and e en  po e le  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in 
the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles). 
Arguably the most tangible manifestation of he FFA  effo  o p omo e a common 
front, as well as a pushback against DWFN power, was the forging of the Nauru Agreement.  
Entered into by a sub-set of those FFA members most heavily engaged in the migratory tuna 
fishery, the Nauru Agreement outlined a number of common EEZ fisheries management 
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practices to be enacted by island state signatories.  These included agreement on, and a promise 
to strictly monitor and enforce (as much as capacity constraints allowed), a set of collective 
MT&Cs that would determine whether DWFN vessels would secure (and maintain) access to 
any island EEZ.  Failure to adhere to MT&Cs in one island state EEZ would preclude the 
possibility of vessels continuing to fish in that EEZ or gain access to any of the other Pacific 
island EEZs (Fry and Tarte, 2015).  The migratory nature of tuna stocks made access to 
multiple EEZs a commercial imperative for DWFN operators.  As such, provided the Pacific 
island states could indeed hold their nerve  against DWFN pressure and develop the 
governance capacity required to ensure compliance, the enactment of MT&Cs was seen as a 
logical means by which these states could obtain political leverage and oversight over the 
industrial tuna fishing occurring in their waters.     
The majority of MT&Cs concerned MCS, stipulating requirements that: all DWFN 
e el  o ld e i e alid pe mi  ene ed ann all ; ha  ob e e  f om he i land  MCS 
bodies would be placed on all vessels to guard against IUU fishing; that transshipment would 
be prohibited at sea to prevent avoidance of port controls; and that vessels would maintain 
standardised log books and would follow a timely process for reporting catches, as well as 
p o iding EEZ en , e i  and o he  e el mo emen  pda e  o he i land a e  na ional 
authorities.37  E all  impo an , he Na  Ag eemen  MT&C  al o fo mali ed he da a 
sources and negotiation process through which the islands would collectively determine vessel 
access and licensing fees. They also mandated that these fees would, once negotiated with 
DWFNs, include development assistance aimed at improving the technical capacity of the 
i land  fi he ie  a ho i ie . Finall , fee le el  o ld be applied in a nifo m manne  ac o  
all island state EEZs (Campling, 2006; Hanich, Parris and Tsamenyi, 2010). 
There is a notable literature that discusses the technical outcomes of the Nauru 
Agreement, its MT&Cs, as well as the range of complementary provisions that have emerged 
o e  he pa  hi  ea  o e pand pon he Na  Ag eemen s original scope.  Fry (1991) 
and Campling (2006), for example, touch on how the introduction of MT&Cs contributed to 
gradual capacity improvements in the fisheries MCS bodies of the Pacific islands.  Fry and 
Tarte (2015), Hammond (2012), as well as Morris and Fisher (2015), detail the role that the 
FFA, the Nauru Agreement and complementary measures have played in improving Pacific 
i land a e  economic e n  f om mig a o  na e o ce .  Implici  in he e anal e  i  a 
recognition that the signatories to the Nauru Agreement  who collectively came to be known 
 
37 The MT&Cs noted in the text are not exhaustive.  The full text of the Nauru Agreement, inclusive of amendments made in 2010, is available 
at the following link: <https://www.pnatuna.com/content/nauru-agreement> (accessed 24 July 2019). 
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as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)  were broadly successful in their aims.  Indeed, 
that DWFNs have largely accepted and adhered to the MT&Cs put in place by the Pacific island 
states, even as these MT&Cs have evolved over time, is reflected in the terms of such 
agreements as the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, signed between the PNA and the United States 
in 1988 (and extended three times since  most recently in 2016).38  
It would be incorrect to suggest that there has been no counter-pushback by DWFNs 
against the MT&Cs introduced by the Nauru Agreement, or that these MT&Cs are not still 
subject to political contestation.  The fact remains, however, that these MT&Cs remain pillars 
of fisheries governance in the Central and Western Pacific, with the Pacific island states 
suffering few consequences  such as the feared loss of foreign aid  for enacting them.  This 
would seem to point to the benefits of a gang up  approach being used by island states to 
indi id all  e cape a i a ion akin o B e ning  (2007) compliance foreign policymaking  
in favour of a more assertive collective stance that delivers beneficial fisheries outcomes.   
For this study, what truly matters in relation to the above description is not so much 
what the Nauru Agreement achieved (although this is important), but rather the nature of the 
inter-island political dynamics that allowed the Nauru Agreement and its MT&Cs to emerge 
in the first place.  As was alluded to earlier, the Nauru Agreement did not arise out of any real 
change in he Pacific i land a e  geo-political or economic circumstances.  These states were 
still heavily aid dependent in 1982, when the Nauru Agreement was signed (as, indeed, many 
still are today).  Nor was there any large structural change in the nature of the Pacific tuna 
fishery (Fry and Tarte, 2015).  What really appears to have mattered is what Hanich, Parris and 
Tsamenyi (2010) identify as a change in the political calculus among Pacific island states.  
Foreign aid from DWFNs was undoubtedly important.  However, the prospective risk of losing 
at least some of this aid was deemed a risk worth taking in exchange for enacting MT&Cs that 
would allow the island states to strengthen their governance authority over their EEZs and 
obtain fairer economic returns from their fisheries resources. 
It is the perspective of this study that a key driver behind this change in political 
calculus was the emergence of more cooperative political dynamics between the fisheries 
ministries of individual Pacific island states.  The creation of the SPF in 1971 already 
guaranteed that an institutional platform existed for Pacific island state officials to engage one 
another on a multitude of issues (Fry, 1991; Havice, 2007; Peebles, 2005).  From a fisheries 
 
38 See the following link for an overview of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/259201.htm> 




standpoint, however, the formation of the FFA, and particularly the process of determining its 
organisational scope and structure, served to qualitatively change the nature of inter-island 
ministerial relations.  In the early years of the SPF, these relations had been constrained by a 
relatively high turnover of fisheries ministers, aides and technical officials (Havice, 2007).  
Recognising that the technocratic focus required to lay out the parameters of the FFA 
necessitated a professionalisation  of he indi id al i land  e pec i e fi he ie  mini ie , 
concerted efforts were made by these ministries to develop and maintain a stable roster of 
technically-knowledgeable individuals who would become fixtures in their roles.  In time, this 
stability made it possible for ministers and ministry officials from the different island states to 
regularly interact and to begin developing familiarity, trust, as well as political camaraderie 
(Fry, 1991; Havice, 2007; Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department 
of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).   
The upshot of regular engagement between a consistent and technically competent 
roster of fisheries ministry officials from across the different island states, was an increase in 
the number of inter-island ministerial coordination meetings (Fry and Tarte, 2015; Havice, 
2007).  A review of primary documentation suggests that these meetings became a regular 
fixture of Pacific island diplomacy in the years leading up to (and immediately following) the 
formation of the FFA.  Notably, this documentation also reiterates the presence of a consistent 
roster of ministry attendees at these gatherings, as well as a stable leadership team within the 
FFA  enio  management once the body had been established (SPF, 1978, 1980).  Most 
important in the context of the Nauru Agreement and the creation of MT&Cs, however, is what 
the KI f om he Go e nmen  of Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e Econom , he elf p e en  a  a 
number of these ministry coordination meetings, calls the ideational exchange  that took place 
between ministry officials at these gatherings: As ministry officials became more familiar 
with one another, developed trust and interacted at meeting after meeting, they began to really 
foc a  ha  I o ld call a g an la  le el on e  pecific echnical and go e nance i e  
[concerning fisheries].  Broad discussions and aspirations were not put aside, but familiarity 
and repetition of interaction allowed our [Pacific island state] ministers to focus on policy 
specifics, of which terms and conditions [MT&Cs] became among the most important  
(Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, 
Government of Seychelles). 
The professionalisation of fisheries ministries and repeated interaction among a 
consistent roster of ministry officials, created a new political dynamic that fostered more 
detailed and policy-specific cooperation than had previously been evident among the Pacific 
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island states.  Fry (1991), Fry and Tarte (2015) and Havice (2007) all point to examples of how 
key components of the Nauru Agreement were developed by engaged fisheries ministries, most 
often working within the institutional structure of the FFA.  It was through inter-ministerial 
working groups of state fisheries officials that common vessel licensing criteria were 
established, as was the standardising of what had been disparate island vessel reporting 
requirements into a single harmonised system that would be applied to DWFN purse seiners 
(Fry, 1991).  It was at a series of two multilateral summits between island fisheries and finance 
ministers in 1981 and 1982, that Pacific island governments established the criteria for vessel 
access and licensing fees that would form the foundation for collective negotiations with 
DWFNs (Fry and Tarte, 2015; Havice, 2007).  Underlying all of this technical or functional  
cooperation was the burgeoning formation of something of a common political identity around 
fisheries (Hanich, Parris and Tsamenyi, 2010).  Said the KI from the Seychelles Department of 
Blue Economy: Fo  he Pacific i land , I eall  do belie e ha  he c ea ion of he i land  o n 
access terms and conditions [MT&Cs] was a point where they began to really see themselves 
a  a collec i e he e he  ood oge he  and aid ha he e a e o  a e  and e ill 
unite to be treated fairly and assert our sovereignty  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance 
Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles). 
What is important to understand about the above, particularly when it comes to a 
comparative consideration of the Western Indian Ocean island state context, is that the Pacific 
island state fisheries ministries have continued to deepen their cooperation over time, building 
on the MT&Cs first put forward in the Nauru Agreement and constructing them into the types 
of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial 
commitments  that would be recognisable to Ruggie (1975) as actionable regimes.  Under the 
terms of the 1995 Palau Arrangement, for example, the Pacific islands introduced the Vessel 
Day Scheme (VDS), which set legal limits on the number of days in a calendar year that DWFN 
vessels would be licen ed o fi h in he i land  collec i e EEZ .  Join  eg la ion  ha e al o 
been developed to allow each individual island state to withdraw the license of any DWFN 
vessel found to be operating in areas of the high seas collectively designated by the islands as 
off-limits to commercial fishing.  A series of Implementing Agreements, such as the Federated 
States of Micronesia Arrangement, have been established to enforce a multilateral licensing 
regime for DWFN vessels.  These agreements also establish  and monitor/enforce through 
peer review  the specific procedures through which islands are expected to harmonise their 
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fisheries legislation, standardise their MCS systems, train vessel observers, as well as share 
commercial and scientific data upon which collective decisions can be made.39     
A series of agreements, such as the Koror Declaration, which commits the islands to 
joint efforts to increase their economic returns from tuna, and the Delap Commitment, which 
reiterates the shared objective of islands to not be bystanders in the development of their tuna 
fisheries  (PNA, 2018: Clause 3), further point to the existence of common energies, 
converging expectations and even a shared island political identity around fisheries objectives.  
Perhaps most representative of the existence of clear fisheries regimes among the PNA was the 
decision of these islands to transition their series of increasingly complex agreements into a 
new institutional structure, an inter-governmental organisation also known as Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement, that would have executive powers to enforce compliance with all enacted 
measures, especially MT&Cs.  This organisation was formally established in 2010, with a 
dedicated Secretariat based in the Marshall Islands and with an operating budget funded 
relatively equally by each individual member state.40 
When considering MT&Cs as a specific issue area, the evidence above points to the 
Pacific islands having a reasonably high level of regionness.  A recognition of mutual interests, 
not least the fact that DWFNs were capitalising on the weakness of individual islands to 
renegotiate heavily imbalanced access terms and conditions, catalysed an initial desire among 
the islands to gang up  and strengthen their bargaining power.  A shift in political dynamics 
towards greater inter-ministerial engagement, aided by ministry professionalisation, 
regularised interaction and growing familiarity among a consistent roster of island state 
fisheries officials, served as a foundation upon which the island states could construct common 
policy responses that would redress these imbalanced terms and conditions.  Equally important, 
the political camaraderie forged during these interactions lent political weight to the enactment 
of MT&Cs and equipped Pacific island state officials with the sense of collective will needed 
to enact these measures even in the face of potential DWFN retaliation.  The sense of common 
identity and collective purpose created by the process of MT&C formation has been enhanced 
by moves towards deeper cooperation over time, including through the creation of more 
sophisticated integrative regimes.  In all of the above, the Pacific island states clearly reflect 
He ne and S de ba m  (2000) new regionalist  view of states moving from passive object  
to active subject  with clear regional  interests.  They also reiterate the social constructivist 
 
39 Evidence for the regimes noted in the text have been determined based on a review of primary documents (all publicly available) taken from 
the website of the Partners to the Nauru Agreement: <https://www.pnatuna.com> (accessed 24 July 2019).  




view of region formation  as being driven by regularised interactions, which in turn foster 
common values that deepen political bonds over time.       
 
4. Potential Barriers to MT&C Enactment in the Western Indian Ocean 
The enactment of MT&Cs played a significant role in allowing the island states of the 
Central and Western Pacific to boost their collective bargaining power and attain a greater 
degree of control over (and economic value from) their fisheries resources. It is striking, 
therefore, that a comparable set of codified MT&Cs has yet to emerge among the island states 
of the Western Indian Ocean.  First, however, some clarification.  It would be wrong to suggest 
that MT&Cs have never been on the policy agenda for these islands.  In fact, the development 
of MT&Cs was central to the mandate of the short-lived Western Indian Ocean Tuna 
Organisation (WIOTO), a body established in 1992 that was intended to replicate many of the 
functions performed by the FFA in the Pacific.  A lack of political agreement among members 
 inclusive of the Western Indian Ocean island states as well as African littoral states  as to 
how WIOTO should be institutionally structured and financed, scuttled the organisation before 
it had the opportunity to get off the ground (Edeson, 2009). 
Following the collapse of WIOTO, intensive efforts to re-visit MT&C development 
periodically re-emerged, with documented evidence pointing to a substantial prioritisation of 
efforts in the early-2010s, pursued largely at the inter-governmental level and particularly 
through SWIOFC.  In 2015, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) presented a draft concept paper 
outlining a preliminary set of MT&Cs for the Southwest Indian Ocean.41 These draft MT&Cs 
were actively discussed within the fisheries ministries of individual island states (DGRH, 2017; 
SFA, 2016, 2017). They were also debated within the technical committees and working groups 
of the IOTC and SWIOFC (IOTC, 2016; SWIOFC, 2017b), as well as within the technical 
research outputs of WIOMSA (WIOMSA, 2017).  In March 2017, SWIOFC members 
tentatively endorsed a revised and supposedly final set of MT&Cs, very similar in nature to 
those codified in the Pacific through the Nauru Agreement.  However, this endorsement has 
not produced any tangible moves towards actual MT&C enactment.  Instead, ongoing 
discussion of the still unfinished MT&C process  continues to be found within regional  
fi he ie  doc men a ion, mo  ecen l  in connec ion i h SWIOFC  Ninth Working Party on 
Collaboration and Cooperation in Tuna Fisheries, held in Maldives in September 2019.42  
 
41 The position paper can be accessed through the following link: <http://wwf.panda.org/?208719/DEVELOPING-REGIONAL-MINIMUM-
TERMS-AND-CONDITIONS-FOR-GRANTING-TUNA-FISHING-ACCESS-IN-THE-WESTERN-INDIAN-OCEAN>   
(accessed 14 March 2019). 
42 See SWIOFC  Polic  B ief on a Po ible So h e  Indian Ocean Fi he ie  F ame o k Ag eemen   
<http://www.fao.org/3/ca6115en/ca6115en.pdf> (accessed 25 November 2019). 
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MT&Cs have hardly been neglected by the Western Indian Ocean islands, to be sure, but nor 
have they been meaningfully operationalised. 
What has made the process of enacting MT&Cs seemingly more difficult in the 
Western Indian Ocean than in the Pacific? An argument will be put forward that the absence 
of cooperative political dynamics between Western Indian Ocean island fisheries ministries, in 
contrast to the experience of the Pacific island states, is central to answering this question.  
Prior to articulating this argument, however, it is worth briefly discussing a few of the other 
explanations put forward in the (admittedly limited) comparative literature on this topic.  This 
literature is generally unanimous in arguing that MT&Cs are desirable as a means for the 
Western Indian Ocean island states to assert authority over their EEZs and ensure fairer 
economic returns from DWFNs.  Uniformity in the access terms and conditions applied across 
he i land  EEZs is seen as likely to reduce the incidence of IUU fishing, improve vessel 
adherence to port controls, guarantee a role for island state observers onboard DWFN vessels, 
as well as raise the collective value of vessel access and licensing fees through the 
implementation of a multilateral vessel licensing regime (Andriamahefazafy, Kull and 
Campling, 2019; Campling, 2008; Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, 
Government of Seychelles; Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy 
Commission, Government of Mauritius; Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC). 
However, whereas the Nauru Agreement and the regimes emerging from it were 
constructed exclusively among Pacific island states, Sawyer (2015) acknowledges that the 
debate around MT&Cs in the Western Indian Ocean has tended to involve a much wider array 
of states, including not only the islands of interest to this study, but also African littoral states 
and even some Asian states like Maldives and Sri Lanka.  This reflects the primacy of 
SWIOFC, with its broad membership, in leading the discussions around MT&Cs; something 
generally supported by the Western Indian Ocean island states to ensure that fisheries 
regulations are standardised across as many of the Western Indian Ocean EEZs as possible 
(Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  Logically, it would seem more difficult to 
establish agreement on common MT&Cs among a more diverse cross-section of states.   
Interestingly, however, this argument found little traction among the KIs interviewed 
for this study.  This is because the Western Indian Ocean island EEZs encompass the heart of 
the migratory path for most harvested tuna species.  Fisheries also constitute a much more 
significant part of the economy for the Western Indian Ocean island states than for most coastal 
African or Asian states.  As such, it is the Western Indian Ocean island states themselves that 
are seen to be at the forefront when it comes to driving the MT&C agenda (Researcher 
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Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  Said the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government 
of Seychelles, formerly the Secretary-General of the IOC: Nothing stops our IOC islands from 
taking the lead in enacting them [MT&Cs].  We could have come to agreement among 
ourselves and, given the size of our EEZs, we could have provided leadership on this issue with 
he o he  SWIOFC co n ie fa  mo e han e ha e.  O  i e  a e in e nal e can  ag ee 
among ourselves how exactly they [MT&Cs] should be put in place  (Researcher Interview: 
Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles). 
A compelling argument is put forward by Andriamahefazafy, Kull and Campling 
(2019), who contend that among the Pacific island states, the migratory routes of harvested 
tuna species almost entirely align with their inter-locking EEZs.  This gives DWFNs little 
choice but to adhere to the MT&Cs put forward by these islands if they wish to engage at all 
in the Pacific tuna fishery.  In the Western Indian Ocean, on the other hand, tuna migration 
routes do not conform perfectly to the island EEZs and also traverse the high seas, where the 
islands have no de jure authority over the resource and where MT&Cs can simply be bypassed.    
This supposedly gives DWFN operators an incentive to concentrate their operations in the high 
seas and weakens the political compulsion among the island states to make enacting MT&Cs 
a priority.  The problem with this argument, as Chapter 3 clearly demonstrated, is that there is 
undoubtedly a great deal of industrial tuna fishing taking place in island EEZs.  There is little 
observable indication that DWFN operators are foregoing fishing in these waters to concentrate 
primarily on high seas fishing grounds.  Also, there is nothing that theoretically prevents the 
Western Indian Ocean island states from developing common MT&Cs for their own EEZs and 
working to obtain buy-in to institutionalise aspects of these within the IOTC, which does have 
authority over the regulation of high seas fishing (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of 
the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius; Researcher Interview: Secretary-
General, IOTC).   
In seeking to understand why MT&C enactment in the Western Indian Ocean has yet 
to be realised, this study contends that it is essential to seek explanations that go beyond the 
above factors and to instead look primarily at inter-island political dynamics.  These dynamics, 
so conducive to incentivising regularised engagement, personal relationship building and 
political camaraderie among dedicated fisheries ministries in the Pacific, are defined by much 
more fraught political contestation among the Western Indian Ocean island states.  At the heart 
of this contestation are the disparities in socio-economic development and political 
cohesiveness that define the Western Indian Ocean islands and which drive them towards 
policy objectives, including in fisheries, that cannot easily be reconciled.   
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5. Development Disparities and the Shaping of Political Incentives: Implications 
for MT&C Enactment  
In Chapter 3, a number of examples were presented of how the Western Indian Ocean 
island states cooperate with each other on a range of technical fisheries issues.  Often, this 
coope a ion ha  in ol ed p blic in i ion  in Ma i i  and Se chelle , linked o he i land  
respective fisheries ministries, providing capacity-building support to their counterparts in 
Comoros and Madagascar.  Such examples include the support provided by the SFA to the 
Comorian CNCSP for the creation of an MCS-focused Management Information System; the 
Se chelle  Ma i ime Academ  ho ing of Como ian and Malaga  den  on bo h ho  and 
long-term professional development courses; and the work done by the MOI to promote 
experience exchanges among oceanographers and marine biologists from Comorian and 
Malagasy research organisations like INRAPE and CNRO.   
Implicit in this support is an acknowledgment of marked differences in the technical 
quality of state fisheries institutions.  These differences, in turn, are representative of the 
disparities in levels of socio-economic development and state cohesiveness, described in 
Chapter 1, which typify the Western Indian Ocean island states.  How do these disparities relate 
to the enactment of MT&Cs? Based on the interview data collected for this study, two points 
stand out.  First, these disparities serve to create a mismatch in the fisheries policy priorities 
held by the different Western Indian Ocean SIDS  and, by extension, a mismatch in their 
overriding political incentives.  Second, these mismatched incentives produce political 
dynamics that, while sufficient to foster the above types of functional  cooperation, serve to 
nde mine he poli ical ill of he i land  e pec i e fi he ie  ministries to engage in the types 
of regularised interactions and relationship-building that allowed for MT&Cs to not only be 
debated, but also operationalised and continuously deepened in the Pacific island context.   
MT&C enactment is, by its nature, a strategic exercise that looks towards establishing 
norms and regulatory commitments that will govern DWFN fishing over the long-term.  In 
recounting how the PNA have been able to achieve and maintain a common strategic outlook 
on MT&Cs, Havice (2007) notes he impo ance of he e i land  ela i e homogenei  hen 
it comes to their levels of socio-economic development and internal political cohesiveness.  
While by no means suggesting that the Pacific islands are (or ever have been) identical on these 
measures, Havice argues that the absence of glaring disparities in economic status and political 
cohesion makes it likelier that each state will take a similar outlook regarding the prospective 
benefits, drawbacks and trade-offs associated with specific types of collective fisheries action 
(this is a view cautiously echoed by Andriamahefazafy, Kull and Campling, 2019).  There are 
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legi ima e g o nd  o c i i e Ha ice  (2007) ie  on he ela i e economic and poli ical 
sameness  of the Pacific island states.43 For the purposes of the argument that follows, 
however, it is important to state that any disparities between the Pacific islands on these 
measures do pale in comparison to those highlighted earlier among the Western Indian Ocean 
island states.               
Dealing first with how these disparities create a mismatch in the fisheries policy 
priorities and political incentives held by the different Western Indian Ocean island states, it is 
helpful to look at the contestation that exists over the relative importance the island states place 
on sustainability  vs. sectoral growth  as the main drivers of their fisheries-based 
policymaking. Each of the Western Indian Ocean SIDS seeks to maximise its economic returns 
from fisheries resources.  However, working alongside this commercial imperative is an 
evident Mauritian and Seychellois government focus on strengthening measures around 
fisheries sustainability.   
In Seychelles, this sustainability ethos is arguably more ingrained as an ideological 
project, reflecting the role that ex-President Michel has played in promulgating the idea of the 
blue economy , both regionally and internationally.  The Government of Se chelle  ell-
p blici ed i ing of he o ld  fi  o e eign blue bond  in October 2018 also reflects this 
commitment to sustainability.44 The Department of Blue Economy, housed within the Office 
of the Vice-President, has a specific mandate that is focused as much on conservation and 
p omo ing ainable app oache  o ocean go e nance and no  j  on e ac ion fo  i  o n 
sake  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, 
Government of Seychelles).  References to sustainable development , blue economy 
sustainability objectives  and conservation of fish stocks for future generations  are peppered 
h o gho  he Go e nmen  of Se chelle  fi he ie  polic  doc men a ion (SFA, 2017, 2018; 
SMA, 2018, 2019).           
  For Mauritius, an emphasis on sustainability is arguably more commercially-driven, 
with Port Louis seeing the implementation of fisheries sustainability measures across the 
Western Indian Ocean as being beneficial for its Freeport Seafood Hub, which  as Chapter 3 
described  sources both fresh and processed fish and fish products from other island EEZs 
 
43 Fo  e ample, m ch like Madaga ca  in he We e n Indian Ocean, Pap a Ne  G inea i  a compa a i e gian , bo h geog aphicall  and in 
terms of population compared to other members of the PNA.  Political instability and state fragility are the factors that likely prevent Port 
Mo e b  f om pla ing a dominan  ole in Pacific i land affai .  Economicall , he e a e di pa i ie  be een la ge  i land states like Fiji, 
with more sophisticated service sectors, and micro-island states like Nauru and Kiribati, which lack this economic sophistication.      
44 See the following link: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/29/seychelles-launches-worlds-first-sovereign-blue-




before exporting these products to markets like the EU.  Sustainability measures that allow the 
Seafood Hub to promote its ethical sourcing  of these products is seen as a means by which 
it can potentially expand its reputation and market share in future (Researcher Interview: 
External Advisor, Indian Ocean Tuna, Ltd.; Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the 
Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  Even if the Mauritian focus on 
sustainability is somewhat less egalitarian than that of Seychelles, ministry documentation still 
discusses pursuing fisheries development with due consideration of ocean economy 
objectives that prioritise long-term sustainability  (Mauritian Ministry of Ocean Economy, 
Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping, 2018). 
Expectedly, the upshot of the emphasis both Seychelles and Mauritius place on 
sustainability is a higher degree of political alignment when it comes to the MT&C process .  
On matters pertaining to proper vessel licensing, the enforcement of port controls and 
mandating an observer presence onboard DWFN vessels, there is broad agreement between 
the two countries on the importance of these terms and conditions and, I would say, reasonable 
agreement on how they should be put in place  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  Said the Former Chairman of the Government of 
Ma i i  Ocean Econom  Commi ion: We [Ma i i ] and he Se chelloi  don  ag ee 
100% on e m  and condi ion  and I hink e e no  on he ame page hen i  come  o [ e el 
access and licensing] fees.  But on other measures, and especially on those based around some 
degree of conservation or sustainability, there is at least a broad consensus  (Researcher 
Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  
The areas of contestation that do exist between Mauritius and Seychelles on MT&Cs will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  For the moment, what is important to recognise is that, with 
sustainability as a broadly shared policy priority, these two island states have political 
incentives that are more aligned than not on many aspects of MT&C enactment.   
This same sustainability focus is not found as a policy priority, at least in any actionable 
sense, within the state fisheries bodies in Comoros or Madagascar.  A content analysis of 
ministry literature from both the Comorian DGRH and the Malagasy MRHP reveals that while 
references to fisheries sustainability  conservation  and blue economy objectives  are not 
entirely absent, they are comparably few in number and far less detailed when it comes to 
offering specific policy prescriptions, including on issues pertaining to combatting IUU fishing 
(DGRH, 2015; MRHP, 2018, 2019).   
What is given greater comparative emphasis in the Comorian and Malagasy literature 
are issues that pertain to sectoral growth , particularly the development of indigenous 
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fisheries processing capacities.  Indeed, the 2019 Annual Report from the Malagasy MRHP 
reiterates the overall goals of the ministry as being: Enhancing the contribution of fisheries to 
national GDP  and Creating employment in value-added areas of export-led fisheries .  
Simila l , he Como ian DGRH, in a 2018 polic  b ief, e abli hed he in i ion  p ima  
objective as being: The reduction of poverty through the creation of formal employment, 
including [through] the creation of an industrial fisheries sub-sector  (DGRH, 2018).   
To be clear, these economic development aims are hardly neglected within the state 
fisheries literature produced by Mauritius and Seychelles.  In the latter two countries, however, 
these aims are not discussed with the same exclusive primacy and nor are they discussed 
separately from broader sustainability objectives in the way they are in Comoros and 
Madagascar.  In regards to their prioritisation of sustainability  vs. growth , there seems to 
be a clea  diffe ence be een he We e n Indian Ocean  more developed  and less 
developed  island states.  While it would perhaps seem imprudent to arrive at such a conclusion 
based on a review of this ministry literature alone, it should be acknowledged that when this 
difference in prioritisation was raised with KIs, there was considerable agreement that these 
differences were not merely the product of chance.  Indeed, KIs were of the view that these 
differences in prioritisation were directly linked to the disparities in socio-economic standing 
between the different island states.  Because both Seychelles and Mauritius have already 
developed stable and sophisticated value-added fisheries sectors that provide employment as 
well as sizeable export revenues, these islands are in a position to think differently about how 
their fisheries industries can be structured to better account for sustainability objectives over 
the long-term (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, 
Government of Mauritius; Researcher Interview: Vice-President, National Association for Fish 
Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).    
For Comoros and Madagascar, by contrast, the suspension of their SFPAs with the EU 
in 2016 has led to a loss of the fisheries development funds that they had previously used to 
support the maintenance of even their basic fisheries infrastructure.  As such, these islands are 
in a fai l  de pe a e i a ion he e f nd  [f om he EU SFPA ] e e ppo ing in e men  
in a lot of the small-scale industry and fish processing.  Our [Malagasy] government and likely 
Comoros too, now faces lots of pressure from people who were expecting to go fish 
[commercially] and get jobs [in canneries], but with the outside financial support no longer 
there to make it happen  (Researcher Interview: Vice-President, National Association for Fish 
Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar). Said a KI from Comoros: There is definitely a 
difference between what we prioritise and what they [Mauritius and Seychelles] prioritise.  
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We e a poo  co n .  Thi  bl e econom  o nd  g ea .  S ainabili  ounds great.  But we 
need job  fi  and o  policie  a e ba ed a o nd hi .  We don  hink ainabili  i  
nimpo an , b  e hone l nfo na el ha e o hink ho -term first.  For a country 
like Seychelles, maybe they have the luxury of making that [blue economy] their number one 
issue  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH). 
 For Comoros and Madagascar, economic fragility and the need to urgently recoup 
development support that was lost with the suspension of their SFPAs with the EU, makes a 
short-term focus on growth more important than the longer-term perspective around 
sustainability adopted by Mauritius and Seychelles.  For Comorian and Malagasy fisheries 
policymakers, this makes the allocation of political capital towards strategic long-term 
objectives like MT&Cs less compelling.  This is particularly true if working collectively with 
other islands on vessel licensing, the enforcement of port controls or mandating the presence 
of observers onboard DWFN vessels involves a trade-off when it comes to losing out on 
possible aid and/or investment from DWFNs.  In the words of the KI from the Comorian 
DGRH: O  foc  i  on a ac ing in e men .  The e e m  and condi ion e ha e ag eed 
to them in principle, I think, through SWIOFC.  But will we insist on them if they [DWFNs] 
come to us with investment in our fisheries sector but insist on some concessions [on these 
MT&Cs]? Probably not  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).   
This sentiment would seem to preclude the likelihood of MT&Cs ever being codified 
in a legally binding treaty similar to the Nauru Agreement.  Moreover, this view places 
Madagascar and Comoros at odds with Mauritius and Seychelles which, while also very much 
engaged in trying to attract investment and grow their fisheries sectors, appear to view 
actionable MT&Cs as a tool to pursue sustainability objectives that they deem strategically 
relevant (ideologically and/or commercially).  From this description, it should be apparent that 
unlike the Pacific island states, where there was evident unity among islands on the political 
imperative of asserting greater authority over industrial fishing in their collective EEZs, even 
if this came with the potential for a reduction in foreign aid from DWFNs, this shared political 
imperative is not so evident in the Western Indian Ocean.     
Two specific examples illustrate the practical implications of how socio-economic 
disparities between the Western Indian Ocean islands have affected  and ultimately hindered 
 the MT&C process .  These examples concern the private access agreements that, as 
Chapter 3 highlighted, each of the Western Indian Ocean island states have entered into with 
private fishing companies from Asian DWFNs  mainly from China, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan.  With the suspension of the SFPAs, these private access agreements are now the main 
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ways through which Comoros and Madagascar engage with DWFNs.  It was noted earlier that 
Comoros lacks its own export-oriented commercial fisheries industry.  Attempts to create such 
an industry through the development of the Comoros National Fishing Company, funded 
through investments from Qatar and Sri Lanka, have been unsuccessful.  However, steps were 
taken by the Comorian government in 2016 to seek South Korean and then Chinese financing 
o make he Compan  planned mall-scale canning facilities operational.  This financing was 
to come mainly in the form of commercial loans to purchase capital equipment (DGRH, 2016; 
Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).   
A condition of the loan offerings from both DWFNs was a request to the main 
Como ian MCS bod , he CNCSP, o ed ce he epo ing f e enc  b  hich he e co n ie  
vessels (mainly long liners) would be required to report their movements and catch volumes to 
Comorian authorities.  While the motivations behind this request remain somewhat opaque 
(and neither financing agreement went through), the implication on inter-island efforts to move 
forward the MT&C process  were clear: We were at the stage where each of the IOC islands 
seemed to be close to agreement on at least a preliminary set of access terms and conditions.  
However, once we knew the Comorians were going to concede on the [vessel] reporting 
requirements to get [DWFN] funding, we realised that the political will was not there.  We 
were not a united group on this issue and for us in Mauritius and Seychelles, upholding DWFN 
reporting standards was a deal-breaker  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, 
Government of Seychelles).   
In another similar example, the Malagasy government sought Chinese financing to 
pg ade facili ie  a  he co n  main comme cial canne  (PFOI) in 2017 (PFOI, 2017).  
Like in Comoros, this financing was to take the form of commercial loans and was offered in 
exchange for a concession on vessel access conditions; in this case, an insistence that all 
observers serving onboard Chinese long liners be Malagasy nationals rather than including a 
mix of nationalities (as the IOC has consistently promoted as part of its technical fisheries 
cooperation initiatives among the Western Indian Ocean islands).  Collective IOC pressure, 
along with promises of French investment in PFOI, compelled Madagascar to reject this 
concession, but its effect was to once again disrupt the process of generating real vessel access 
terms and conditions  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of 
Seychelles).  Said a Malagasy KI: Madagascar, and I suppose the Comoros too, we have 
become very opportunistic.  Regional standards agreed with the other islands become a priority 
until the promise of money from a DWFN is there.  Then these standards become negotiable  
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(Researcher Interview: Vice-President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters 
of Madagascar). 
What does the above analysis suggest in relation to the overall focus of this study? 
Perhaps the most obvious point is that technical cooperation between the island states, as 
outlined in Chapter 3 and again at the beginning of this section, does not guarantee policy 
alignment or an assured desire among island states to gang up  on integrative measures.  
Functional  cooperation that involves few, if any, trade-offs  such as capacity-building 
training or experience exchanges between officials from state institutions  are readily 
undertaken.  However, moves towards deeper fisheries-based integration or collective 
diplomacy, which is what the enactment of MT&Cs represents, involve more complex trade-
offs (e.g. a potential loss of DWFN aid and/or investment).  
An acceptance of these collective measures is thus conditioned upon there being 
commonalities (if not outright consensus) in policy alignment and shared political incentives.  
In the Pacific island context of the late 1970s, these priorities and incentives aligned and the 
result was the Nauru Agreement and its MT&Cs.  The fact that these policy priorities and 
political incentives have mostly remained aligned in the Pacific, a result  according to Havice 
(2007)  that is at least partly due to these island  economic and poli ical imila i ie  p od cing 
commonly-held perspectives  has allowed these MT&Cs to be deepened over time and to take 
the form of ever more sophisticated cooperative regimes.  Among the Western Indian Ocean 
islands, starker disparities in levels of socio-economic development have created different 
policy priorities and different political incentives, with Mauritius and Seychelles being broadly 
aligned on one side, while Comoros and Madagascar are aligned on the other side.  This then 
weakens any possibility for MT&C enactment for the island grouping as a whole.   
 
6. Development Disparities, Political Cohesiveness and the Shaping of Ministerial 
Political Dynamics: Implications for MT&C Enactment  
 To bring this analysis full circle, it is necessary to take the discussion back to the types 
of political dynamics that emerge among the Western Indian Ocean island states, at the 
ministerial-level and specifically around MT&Cs, as a result of the mismatched political 
incentives identified above.  In the Pacific island states, a shift in political dynamics towards 
greater inter-ministerial engagement, aided by ministry professionalisation, regularised 
interaction and growing familiarity among a consistent roster of island state fisheries officials, 
was central to these states both entering into the Nauru Agreement and building additional 
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cooperative regimes thereafter.  In the Western Indian Ocean, a comparable positive shift in 
political dynamics among island fisheries ministries is not so evident.   
Looking back, it could be argued that the failure of WIOTO to become established as a 
technical fisheries body akin to the FFA hindered the emergence of a true technocratic space 
in which fisheries issues could be discussed at a high level among these islands (Researcher 
Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of 
Seychelles).  For reasons that will be discussed further in Chapter 5, none of the other inter-
governmental organisations involved with fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean, including the 
IOC and SWIOFC, have provided a platform for high-level policy engagement fully equivalent 
to the FFA.  Given how important the formation of the FFA was in catalysing fisheries ministry 
professionalisation in the Pacific, the lack of a truly comparable institution in the Western 
Indian Ocean perhaps provides a decent explanation for why ministry professionalisation never 
got off the ground in quite the same way among these islands.  Using the Pacific context as a 
guide, this lack of ministry professionalisation can then be said to have hindered the emergence 
of cooperative political dynamics that would have made collective action, including the 
enactment of MT&Cs, a greater priority among the Western Indian Ocean SIDS.   
The above perspective, while broadly true, is also somewhat oversimplified.  This is 
because fisheries ministry professionalisation did occur, over time, in both Seychelles and 
Mauritius.  As a consequence, these two islands have considerably deeper cooperative ties, 
being broadly aligned on sustainability-focused MT&Cs and engaging in high levels of 
functional  cooperation, as described in Chapter 3.  Rather than ministry professionalisation 
in these two states being the result of a regional  catalyst, such as the formation of an inter-
governmental fisheries body, however, this professionalisation came about mainly due to 
internal governance reforms pursued in each state.  These reforms were introduced in 
Seychelles following the full restoration of democratic politics in 2004 and in Mauritius during 
a drive for ministerial consolidation under the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) 
governments of the early-2000s (de L E ac, 2009).   
It is in Comoros and Madagascar where this ministry professionalisation has never 
really taken place.  In Comoros, this is seen to be due to the widespread emigration of skilled 
professionals, the collapse in aid for budget support due to ongoing civil conflict, as well as 
the inter-island rivalries that feed this conflict and which see ministerial postings mainly as 
prizes to be traded among the three competing islands (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
DGRH).  In Madagascar, fisheries scientific institutes tend to be staffed with reasonably 
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effective technical personnel, but ministry positions themselves are typically allocated on the 
basis of patronage rather than technical competence (Ramariandrasoa, 2016).   
A conclusion that can be drawn from thi  i  ha  he p ofe ionali a ion of he i land  
fisheries ministries was not dependent on the formation of an inter-governmental body akin to 
the FFA, but was also possible to achieve through internal political processes in the different 
islands.  The fact that Mauritius and Seychelles achieved this professionalisation, while 
Como o  and Madaga ca  ha e no , i  again he p od c  of he e i land  diffe ence  in ocio-
economic development and, crucially, political cohesiveness.  Ongoing state fragility in 
Comoros and Madagascar has prevented these states from ever making a serious effort at 
developing professional bureaucracies. It is often difficult to know who you will be dealing 
with from their [fisheries] ministries from meeting-to-meeting  (Researcher Interview: Chief 
Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles). 
Differing policy priorities and political incentives over fisheries, combined with 
profound differences in the level of fisheries ministry professionalisation, all of which are 
linked in some way to disparities in socio-economic development and political cohesiveness, 
create practical challenges when it comes to fostering inter-island cooperation. They also 
generate a shortage of political will at the ministerial level, to engage in the regularised 
interactions and relationship-building that were so important to MT&C enactment in the 
Pacific.  Turning first to practical challenges, fisheries coordination between ministries in the 
Western Indian Ocean islands are not characterised by regularised engagement by a stable 
roster of ministry officials.  A review of the meeting minutes from over twenty gatherings 
involving fisheries ministry personnel from each Western Indian Ocean island, held between 
2013 and 2018 and with MT&Cs a dedicated agenda item, revealed that at 90% of these 
gatherings, at least two names from the SFA have been present at every meeting.  From the 
Fisheries Division of the Mauritian Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries 
and Shipping, this figure is 75%.  From the Malagasy MRHP, this figure is 40%.  Finally, from 
the Comorian DGRH, at least two names were present for only 15% of these meetings.45   
These data would seem to clearly highlight the lack of stability characterising the 
Comorian and Malagasy fisheries ministries, with near continuous turnover in personnel 
making it difficult to build any type of personal working relationships between ministry 
officials, not to mention any sense of camaraderie and common political ethos  the very notion 
 
45 These meeting minutes were accessed during the KII with the Secretary-General of the IOTC.  These files were maintained as part of this 
KI  pe onal file  a he  han being a ailable a  e  of in i ional doc men .  
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of Indianocéanie.  The Ocean Governance Advisor serving in the Seychellois Department of 
Blue Economy offered a succinct observation on her time spent working with ministry officials 
in both the Pacific and Western Indian Ocean: For a lack of better terminology, I would say 
there is no personal chemistry between fisheries ministry officials here, particularly when 
Comoros and Madagascar do not send a regular group of officials to key meetings.  In the 
Pacific, this regularity was really important, especially when discussing something fairly 
sensitive like [vessel] access terms and conditions  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance 
Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).  The Chief 
Diplomatic Adviser to the Government of Seychelles concurred, adding: The islands already 
have some key differences in what they think is most important.  The e diffe ence  a en  
impossible to bridge, but the familiarity is not there between negotiators [ministry officials].  
We [in Seychelles] know our counterparts in Mauritius, but with Madagascar we make progress 
for a while and then someone [at the MRHP] leaves and we are back to square one.  With 
Comoros, sometimes no one [from the DGRH] shows up to our meetings to discuss [vessel 
access] terms and conditions  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government 
of Seychelles).   
Returning for a moment to the Pacific context, it was noted how important sustained 
engagement between ministry officials was among these islands in ensuring the creation of 
assorted working groups to pin down specific details over MT&Cs, including common vessel 
licensing criteria and standardised DWFN vessel reporting requirements.  These types of 
working groups do exist in the Western Indian Ocean and have functioned successfully 
between Mauritius and Seychelles, not least in the joint committee these countries have 
established to share management of the Mascarene Plateau.  For the island grouping as a whole, 
however, equivalent working groups of ministry officials  usually established under the 
auspices of the IOC, IOTC or SWIOFC  have faltered on the practical basis of fisheries 
ministries from the less developed  islands not being professionalised enough to provide a 
stable roster of officials who can make consistent contributions to policy discourse.   
Equally important is what the above issues mean when it comes to generating political 
will at the ministerial level.  In the Pacific, MT&C enactment was a political calculation.  Island 
states were ganging up  to represent their collective interests against DWFNs with 
considerably more diplomatic clout.  Doing so necessitated risk that only became acceptable 
once the island states had generated enough mutual engagement and trust among themselves 
to be sure that they could hold their nerve  in the face of potential threats, such as a loss of 
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aid from their DWFN partners.  The success the Pacific islands had in securing recognition of 
the MT&Cs enacted under the Nauru Agreement, as well as the success they had in deepening 
subsequent cooperative regimes, also created a sense of shared island identity.   
The Western Indian Ocean, unsurprisingly, tells a different story: I think the fisheries 
mini ie  in he e i land he e i  li le en e of cama ade ie.  If e a e no  oriented around 
the same objectives and we do not get to know each other on a personal level, then we do not 
feel m ch lo al  o each o he .  We a e no  looking o  fo  each o he  in e e  (Researcher 
Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  The final section of this chapter will relate the discussion 
above to the tenets of new regionalism .  As a point of departure for that discussion, however, 
it is worth briefly touching on how the evidence presented above reflects on the regionness of 
the Western Indian Ocean islands as a grouping of states.  Returning to Hettne and 
S de ba m  (2000: 461) overarching definition of regionness as involving an evolution of a 
group of states f om a pa i e objec  o an ac i e bjec  capable of a ic la ing he 
transnational interests of the emerging region , it is difficult to find evidence of such an 
evolution and indeed, if MT&Cs and associated regimes are taken as a focus, any evidence to 
suggest the existence of firm transnational interests  with the possible exception of some 
shared commonalities between the more developed  island states of Seychelles and Mauritius.   
Considering the social constructivist view of region-formation, with the emphasis it 
places on regularised interactions as a pathway towards the fostering of common values, 
identities and deepening political bonds, it is difficult to credibly assign the Western Indian 
Ocean islands the label of a true region .  I  i  al o ha d o ee an  e idence of he e SIDS 
building-up the collective political capi al ha  o ld make a gang p  app oach to fisheries-
related diplomacy worthwhile or effective. 
 
7. Enacting MT&Cs in the Western Indian Ocean: Island Dis(Unity) and 
Economic Competition 
 In addition to inter-island disparities in levels of socio-economic development and 
political cohesiveness, one additional issue is worth highlighting to shed light on how efforts 
around MT&C enactment reflect the limits of regionness among the Western Indian Ocean 
island states, specifically at the ministerial level.  It was noted earlier that among the key 
MT&Cs introduced by the Pacific island states was a set of collectively-defined DWFN vessel 
access and licensing fees.  Indeed, one of the prime motivations for the Pacific islands to gang 
up  in the first place and enter into the Nauru Agreement was the perception that they were 
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being deliberately played-off against each other by DWFNs seeking to leverage foreign aid as 
a means to gain fee concessions.   
In the Western Indian Ocean, the idea of establishing common vessel access and 
licensing fees has been debated between islands at the ministerial level (Researcher Interview: 
Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles; Ramariandrasoa, 2016; SWIOFC, 
2017b).  Similar to other MT&Cs, however, these common fees have yet to be operationalised 
in any consistent and meaningful way.  When searching for an explanatory factor for this 
situation, inter-island economic competition over fisheries emerges as an important 
consideration.  To be clear, this competition does not relate directly to islands attracting DWFN 
operators to their EEZs.  The migratory routes of key species such as skipjack and yellowfin 
na de e mine bo h he le el of fi hing ac i i  in each i land  EEZ a  a gi en ime, a  ell 
as when (and for how long) DWFN operators seek to be active in each EEZ.  Because tuna 
migration routes and the resulting level of fisheries productivity in each EEZ are determined 
mainly by the characteristics of local marine ecosystems, there is nothing that individual islands 
can do to drastically impact the productivity differences between their EEZs and those of 
neighbouring islands.  Where economic competition does exist, however, is in attracting 
fisheries-related investment from DWFNs  particularly to support the island  o n al e-
added fisheries production.   
Examples of this desired investment were presented earlier in relation to efforts by the 
Comorian and Malagasy governments to attain Chinese and South Korean loans for their 
canneries.  On the issue of competition over this investment, however, political cleavages are 
actually most apparent between Mauritius and Seychelles, the two islands that were previously 
identified as having a considerable degree of alignment on many fisheries issues, including 
sustainability-foc ed MT&C .  The i e a  pla  i  ha  he Fo me  Chai man of Ma i i  
Ocean Economy Commission termed a emp  a  Ma i ian di p ion in he egion  
[We e n Indian Ocean ] na al e chain  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the 
Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).   
Thi  di p ion cen e  a o nd o main i e .  Fi , Ma i i  Ocean Econom  
Strategy was updated in early 2018 to include, as part of its intended approach for the expansion 
of the port in Port Louis, objectives focused on attracting some of the purse seine vessels 
currently using the Port of Victoria in Seychelles as their centre of offloading, transshipment 
and vessel maintenance.  The strategy goes so far as to directly reference Seychelles as an 
economic competitor: In developing its strategic framework for the Ocean Economy, the GoM 
[Government of Mauritius] will focus on maintaining its competitive edge as a centre for the 
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egion  long line fi hery and seek to attract a greater portion of the [DWFN] purse seine 
ope a o  c en l  ing Se chelle  po  facili ie  a  hei  main egional h b  (Mauritian 
Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping, 2018).  Second, and 
connected to this, are efforts by the Mauritian government to position the Freeport Seafood 
Hub and its two national tuna canneries, Princes Tuna and Thon de Mascareignes as a 
processing and export centre for purse seiners  something that would come at the commercial 
expense of the Indian Ocean Tuna cannery in Seychelles (Researcher Interview: Former 
Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  
There is broad consensus that the Mauritian strategy to capture market share from 
Seychelles in serving DWFN purse seiners is unlikely to be successful, not least because the 
recent expansion of vessel maintenance facilities at the Port of Victoria, as well as the 
additional travel time (and expense) required for purse seiners to travel to Port Louis, are likely 
to allow Seychelles to maintain its dominant market position (Researcher Interview: External 
Adviso , Indian Ocean T na, L d.).  Ho e e , he diploma ic effec  of Ma i i  a emp  o 
assert its economic interests at the expense of Seychelles, for which economic linkages to the 
purse seine fishery are absolutely central to the national economy and for providing 
employment, has been an undermining of inter-ministerial relations: There is no real logic to 
the Mauritian proposal.  Most of the goals they have set out [on capturing market share in 
servicing DWFN purse seiners] do not have a sound economic reasoning. So for us [in 
Seychelles] it seems that part of this strategising is just to shake confidence in the ability of 
Seychelles to continue e ing he [DWFN] p e eine .  I ill be hone hi  ha  o ed 
some distrust between us that was not there before  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles).   
Relating this issue back to the setting of common DWFN vessel access and licensing 
fees, one of the Mauritian strategies for trying to attract investment, particularly from Asian 
DWFNs, for port expansion and for the canneries at the centre of the Freeport Seafood Hub, 
has been to undercut the tentative negotiations that have occurred with Seychelles on the 
creation of a bilateral vessel licensing regime and set of common access fees (Comoros and 
Madagascar have been involved in these discussions at a general level, but with Mauritius and 
Seychelles taking the lead on proposing specific tangible agreements).  For instance, agreement 
on an initial bilateral draft of common vessel licensing criteria was undermined as a result of 
Mauritian agreements to waive these prospective criteria in exchange for Chinese investment 
in processing facility upgrades at its Thon de Mascareignes cannery (Researcher Interview: 
Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  An initial agreement on a common set 
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of acce  fee  o be applied ac o  he o i land  e pec i e EEZ , and which were to apply 
to all private access agreements with DWFN operators, was undercut when the Fisheries 
Division of the Mauritian Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and 
Shipping decided entered into an access agreement with a South Korean long liner operator 
that disregarded these fees in favour of lower fees that were charged in exchange for reciprocal 
investment in technology upgrading at Princes Tuna (Researcher Interview: External Advisor, 
Indian Ocean Tuna, Ltd.).  
Focusing on the political power dynamics that exist between the islands, the Former 
Chai man of Ma i i  Ocean Econom  Commi ion no ed: Mauritius is the little United 
States of the island grouping.  Our commitments with Seychelles [on the setting of common 
fees] are important and I think they are, at some level, undertaken in good faith.  But if we see 
an opportunity for self-in e e and he Seafood H b i  e  m ch a op economic p io i  
fo  o  go e nmen hen he e bila e al commi men , o  commi men  ha  may also involve 
Comoros and Madagascar, will always be secondary  (Researcher Interview: Former 
Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  Stated differently, 
while the power dynamics between the different islands, at which Mauritius sits atop the island 
grouping as a comparative economic giant, do not seem to affect issues around basic 
functional  cooperation, which continues apace even with the introduction of the competitive 
economic dynamics noted above, these power dynamics do seem to matter more when 
commercial interests come into play.  The willingness of the Comorian and Malagasy 
governments to similarly undercut MT&Cs in exchange for short-term commercial gains  
even if little tangible benefit has accrued to these countries for doing so  further demonstrates 
that any sense of unity among these islands will quickly give way to individual interest in the 
right commercial circumstances.   
When looking holistically at the economic potential of fisheries for the islands as a 
whole, this situation is unfortunate.  Said the Ocean Governance Advisor in the Government 
of Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e Econom : I think in the Pacific, the benefits of an 
integrated economic and political approach [to fisheries] have been clear.  You look at those 
islands and they have all mostly gained from collective action, at least over time.  They may 
not all have seen it that way at the beginning, but most have better [economic] returns from 
fisheries than they did.  In the [Western] Indian Ocean, the same thing could happen, but short-
term thinking about commercial benefits from the fishery still seems most important [to these 
islands]  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue 
Economy, Government of Seychelles).  F om he andpoin  of he i land g o ping  e pec i e 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 109 
fisheries ministries, the end result of a willingness to seemingly abandon regional  
commitments in favour of short-term economic goals, seems to be an undermining of trust and 
a view that on the creation of potentially integrative regimes, existing political dynamics simply 
do not exist to make them a reality. 
 
8. The Western Indian Ocean Islands as a Socially-Constructed Region: 
Considerations from the Perspective of Island Fisheries Ministries 
 The primary research question posed by this study relates to how existing political 
dynamics between the Western Indian Ocean island states incentivise (or fail to incentivise) 
deepening cooperation, integration and collective diplomacy among these states over fisheries.  
This chapter has shown that on the specific issue of enacting MT&Cs, and looking at political 
dynamics that affect inter-i land coope a ion be een he e a e  fisheries ministries, these 
dynamics are generally not conducive to allowing these islands to move beyond basic forms of 
technical or functional  coope a ion and o a d  he enac men  of R ggie  (1975: 570) 
actionable regimes: mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies 
and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.    
Two arguments were put forward for why this appears to be the case.  First, the 
disparities in socio-economic development and political cohesiveness between the island 
states, with more developed  Mauritius and Seychelles on one side and less developed  
Comoros and Madagascar on the other, give the different islands contrasting policy 
preferences.  While all of these islands are focused, to some degree, on maximising the 
economic value they receive from their fisheries, both Seychelles and Mauritius are 
comparatively more sustainability-minded.  Comoros and Madagascar, reeling from the loss of 
structural development funding from the EU, which had been used to support the development 
of their value-added fisheries industries, are focused on short-term sectoral growth.  The 
implication for MT&Cs is that the two less developed  island states see far less to be gained 
from a policy initiative that is, by its nature, strategic and focused on long-term fisheries 
governance  particularly if pursuing this policy initiative runs the risk of upsetting relations 
with DWFNs willing to provide immediate investment.   
 Compounding these differences in policy priorities and resulting political incentives, 
are the sharp disparities between Seychelles and Mauritius, both stable and democratic, versus 
Comoros and Madagascar, characterised by acute stage fragility.  A consequence of these 
disparities relates to the profound differences that exist in levels of fisheries ministry 
professionalisation.  Unable to contribute a stable roster of technically-proficient ministry 
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officials due to their own internal political dynamics, the ability of both Comoros and 
Madagascar to contribute substantively to key discussions around MT&Cs is inherently 
limited.  This means that while MT&C enactment can be debated, at least to a degree, among 
ministry officials in Seychelles and Mauritius, who have the opportunity to regularly interact, 
build personal relationships and even develop a degree of camaraderie with each other, similar 
interactions cannot he held with Comorian and Malagasy policymakers.  This creates political 
dynamics that are not conducive to the sustained hard work of developing truly integrative 
cooperative regimes. 
 Even among these two more developed  island states, however, economic competition 
over fisheries serves to inhibit progress towards developing lasting cooperative regimes.  Even 
if these regimes, such as collective DWFN vessel access and licensing fees, could serve to 
benefit all of the islands over the long-term, short-term commercial imperatives tend to take 
precedence.  This is true even if these serve to undermine progress towards regime creation.  
From all of the above points, it is necessary to conclude that in spite of the basic technical 
coope a ion he  ma  engage in i h each o he , he We e n Indian Ocean i land a e  
fisheries ministries too often lack political will or a common conception of how a more 
integrated regional  fisheries sector should be operationalised.  As such, it becomes difficult 
for these actors to move beyond more superficial forms of cooperation and towards integrative 
measures  such as MT&Cs  that would demonstrate the true sense of collective interest that 
these state , clo e and ni ed  o ld p ofe  o hold. 
 What do the above observations say when it comes to querying whether or not the 
Western Indian Ocean islands represent a socially-constructed region? The technical 
cooperation that does take place between these islands does demonstrate the clear existence of 
inter-island linkages.  These linkages take the form of capacity-building and experience 
exchange among fisheries officials, but also pertain to the often-substantial economic linkages 
be een he i land  fisheries firms, which were described in Chapter 3.  As such, it seems 
acceptable to define these islands as a region  ing N e  (1968: xii) accepted minimal 
definition of a region  as a limited number of states linked together by a geographical 
relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence.   Indeed, even drawing on Powers and 
Goe  (2011: 2389) similar but more updated definition of a region  as geography plus 
something,  would seem to apply adequately to the Western Indian Ocean island states. 
 However, given that the above definitions are largely lacking in analytical 
sophistication, it is worth considering more varied notions when it comes to interpreting the 
factors involved in region-formation.   Hettne and Söderbaum  (2000: 461) new 
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regionalist  definition of a region , referenced elsewhere in this chapter, as a geographical 
area transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the 
transnational interests of the emerging region , offers interesting pathways for interpretation.  
On one hand, there are enough functional  linkages between these islands, as well as dedicated 
inter-governmental organisations established to coordinate their interactions, that it is likely 
unfair to consider them merely as a passive object.   Nor, however, does the evidence 
presented in this chapter point to the islands as an active subject , at least at the ministerial 
level, with clearly defined transnational fisheries interests.  Interactions between the i land  
fisheries ministries are too fragmented, too ad hoc and too prone to be undermined by short-
term opportunism, for a reliable defence to be provided as to the existence of these interests.   
Going back to the discussion of regionness introduced in Chapter 2, the absence of clear 
transnational interests at present does not preclude the possibility that these interests could be 
established in the future.  Regionness, after all, assumes that regions  are politically contested 
and that their structure, purpose and definition will fluctuate as political dynamics change over 
time (Hurrell, 1995).  Looking at the typology of regionness introduced by Hettne (2005: 548), 
in which states can constitute a regional space , a regional translocal system , a regional 
social system , a regional international society , a regional community  or a regionalised 
institutional polity , it is possible to offer a judgment as to where ministerial interactions 
between the Western Indian Ocean island states place these islands on a fisheries-focused 
regionness spectrum.  A regional space  is merely a geographic area, delimited by more or 
less natural physical barriers.   It is a given that the islands meet these criteria.  The translocal 
social system  is one in which the region is organised by human inhabitants, at first in 
relatively isolated communities, but more and more creating some kind of trans-local 
relationship.   Again, the islands easily meet these criteria of regionness, with established basic 
poli ical and economic ela ion hip , fo e ed b  he i land  e pec i e fisheries ministries, 
being clearly evident.   
The discussion becomes more interesting when moving up this spectrum to the 
regional social system , defined by Hettne as involving ever widening translocal relations, 
in which the constituent units are dependent on each other, as well as on the overall stability of 
the system.   From a fisheries standpoint, there is a reasonable case to be made that the islands 
fall within this category.  Translocal relations between the island states are reasonably 
sophisticated, with considerable technical or functional  ties between a variety of ministry-
linked fisheries institutions.  Whether the islands are dependent on each other or on the overall 
stability of the system is more questionable.  However, it is largely the case that commercial 
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ini ia i e  ch a  Ma i i  Freeport Seafood H b and Se chelle  Indian Ocean T na, L d. 
canning factory all have business models that depend on sustaining regional  supply chains.  
The fac  ha  he i land  mini ie  place con ide able impo ance in ppo ing he e ppl  
chains lends credence to come notion of inter-island dependency.  The issue of MT&Cs is at 
the heart of whether ministry interactions allow the islands to be deemed a regional society , 
which is characterised by norms and rules which increase the level of predictability in the 
system.   The failure of the islands to enact robust MT&Cs would appear to preclude the 
possibility of applying this level of regionness to the island states.   
He ne  regional community  takes shape when an enduring organisational 
framework facilitates and promotes social communication and convergence of values and 
behaviour throughout the region.   Interestingly, the Western Indian Ocean islands do 
theoretically have such an organisational framework in the form of the IOC  and to a lesser 
degree, IOTC and SWIOFC.  Chapter 5 will delve into why these bodies do not really succeed 
in p omo ing he con c i i  ideal of con e ging al e  and beha io .  A  he mini e ial 
level and looking at MT&Cs, however, it is clear that this framework does not exist in any real 
sense.  The failure (so far) of the MT&C process  also suggests that ministerial interactions 
have not facilitated the convergence of values or behaviours among the islands over fisheries.  
Finally, the regionalised institutional polity  has a more fixed structure of decision-making 
and stronger actor capability.   Indeed, this final category of regionness is defined by what 
Hettne calls actorness  the capacity of states to act on commonly-defined priorities.  The 
Pacific island states, in institutionalising their commonly-held MT&Cs in an inter-
governmental body with executive powers (the PNA), has arguably become a regionalised 
institutional polity  in regards to fisheries.  There is little, however, to suggest a high degree 
of actorness in the Western Indian Ocean.  For the two less developed  island states  
Comoros and Madagascar  it is not clear that any real level of actorness exists at all.   
The follo ing chap e  ill e ie  he e i land  regionness using the same typology, 
albeit from alternative perspectives  through the lenses of inter-governmental organisations 
(Chapter 5) and non-state actors (Chapter 6).  This chapter concludes with a brief thought on 
what ministerial interactions around MT&Cs say about the social constructivist ethos that 
defines new regionalism.   Constructivism assumes that cooperation is constructed  through 
consistent social practice and interaction. Constructivists give credence to the notion that this 
system is actively developed  and consistently changed  based on the prevailing interests, 
values and identities held by participating political actors (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999).  
Given the observations of this chapter, indicating that social practice and interaction are, at 
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best, ad hoc occurrences between fisheries ministry officials, it should come as no surprise to 
suggest that there is, so far, little to indicate the active construction of common ideas, common 
values or a common fisheries identity among these states. 
Speaking to the overarching issue of SIDS diplomacy, this chapter reinforces the fact 
ha  i  i  comple  poli ical d namic , a he  han i landne  per se, that determines whether 
these types of states to have the will (and even the practical ability) to gang p .  The Pacific 
SIDS, in part due to their relative socio-economic homogeneity and their common perceptions 
of being played against each other by DWFNs over vessel access terms and conditions, made 
a conscious political choice to enforce greater control over their fisheries resources.  The 
creation of the FFA was a political act that set-in motion processes of fisheries ministry 
professionalisation. This, in turn, incubated an ongoing culture of interaction that made 
ganging p  o create MT&Cs a politically acceptable (and seemingly valuable) choice for 
each of these SIDS. In the Western Indian Ocean, many of the same motivations should exist 
for these SIDS to enact MT&Cs. However, these islands, largely because of their comparative 
he e ogenei , ha e ne e  ie ed ganging p  o do o a  he be  e of hei  poli ical capi al.  
The fact that the Western Indian Ocean SIDS are islands has never been enough to ensure that 
they find common cause.  As Graham (2017) noted in her analysis of small state diplomacy, 
these states are not necessarily that different from any other type of state.  Their national 
in e e  a e defined in comple  a  and he fac  ha  he  a e mall  o  a e i land  ho ld 
not be seen as a decisive indicator for how these states will choose to behave diplomatically.    
Having explored inter-island political dynamics at the state-to-state ministerial level, 
Chapter 5 will now con in e he d  anal i  b  foc ing on ho  he e ame d namic  
manifest themselves within the key inter-governmental organisations  IOC, IORA, IOTC and 













CHAPTER 5: Building Sustainable Fisheries Regimes in the Western 
Indian Ocean: Island Cooperation and Contestation within Inter-
Governmental Organisations 
 
1. Introduction and Chapter Overview  
Follo ing on he p e io  chap e  di c ion of in e -island political dynamics at the 
state-to-state ministerial level, this chapter considers these dynamics as they relate to the 
econd of he d  in e iga i e lenses   he We e n Indian Ocean  ke  in e -
governmental organisations.  As was noted in Chapter 3, the Western Indian Ocean island states 
are members of four inter-governmental bodies that seek to play a role in facilitating 
cooperation in the fisheries sector: IOC, IORA, IOTC and SWIOFC.  This chapter will focus 
primarily on the IOC and IOTC, while drawing on examples from IORA and SWIOFC where 
relevant.46 Focusing on the political dynamics that are evident between the island states within 
he e bodie , hi  chap e  con in e  i h hi  d  o e a ching foc , a king ho  he e 
dynamics appear to incentivise deepening cooperation, integration and collective diplomacy 
among the islands on fisheries issues.  The chapter further interrogates what these political 
dynamics say about the Western Indian Ocean island states in the context of new regionalist  
thinking around the social construction of regions.  Finally, the chapter continues with a 
discussion around the implications of these political dynamics when it comes to the actual and 
prospective utility of island states ganging up  to address common interests. 
In Chapter 4, it was argued that at the state-to-state ministerial level, two main factors 
hinder closer cooperation, integration and collective action among the Western Indian Ocean 
island states over fisheries.  First, the disparities in levels of development between the islands 
creates a misalignment in their respective policy and political incentives.  Second, economic 
competition between the islands, particularly over fisheries-related investment from DWFNs, 
e e  o limi  he e a e  illingne  o e pend poli ical capi al on he c ea ion and 
maintenance of integrative regimes.  In contrast to the Pacific island grouping, these factors 
lead to an evident lack of regionness and provide little indication that these islands constitute 
a socially-constructed region. This chapter continues with this line of argument and contends 
that within the institutional structures of the main fisheries-focused inter-governmental 
organisations, particularly the IOC and IOTC, the political dynamics at play between the 
 
46 The decision to focus on the IOC and IOTC in this chapter partly reflects the fact that the researcher was able to interview KIs from these 
two organisations.  Efforts to interview KIs from IORA and SWIOFC were unsuccessful.  However, it is also the case that when it comes to 
issues pertaining to the migratory tuna fishery, the IOC and IOTC are the two inter-governmental bodies at the forefront of most cooperative 
efforts.  SWIOFC, in spite the prominent role it plays in the MT&C process  discussed in Chapter 4, mainly deals with non-tuna fisheries.  
IORA, on the other hand, has initiated a number of fisheries projects, but does not have the dedicated institutional focus on island-specific 
fisheries cooperation held by the IOC.  Nor does IORA deal with tuna fisheries governance in a manner akin to the IOTC. 
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Western Indian Ocean islands again fail to incentivise sustained moves towards the 
construction of actionable and integrative fisheries regimes.  Nor are the political dynamics 
evident within these organisations conducive to fostering common diplomatic action among 
the island states over fisheries.  This is in spite of the fact that these inter-governmental bodies 
exist largely to facilitate such collective endeavours. 
This chapter will argue that three key factors are at play in explaining these outcomes.    
First, while inter-governmental organisations are often highly effective in fostering technical 
fisheries cooperation among the islands, there is an evident lack of coordination between these 
bodies.  An upshot of this is considerable duplication in the types of fisheries projects and 
programmes implemented under the auspices of each organisation.  This duplication is highly 
inefficient since it forces each of the islands to overstretch their limited financial and human 
resources to try and participate as uniformly as possible in a number of administratively 
epa a e b  nea l  iden ical fi he ie  ini ia i e .  The e l  of he i land  ca ce e o ce  
being pulled in multiple directions is an uneven level of real engagement, particularly by under-
resourced Comoros and Madagascar, in any of these initiatives.  This, in turn, weakens the 
likelihood of these organisations fostering political dynamics conducive to sustained 
integration, regime-building or collective action for the island grouping as a whole.     
Second, and somewhat connected to the above, the islands appear to each have a 
different political calculus in regards to which inter-governmental organisations are most 
worthy of their political capital.  For Seychelles, the Victoria-based IOTC, with its apolitical 
and technocratic approach to fisheries governance, is given political prioritisation.  For 
Mauritius, which alone among the islands has ambitions to be a prominent actor in the wider 
Indian Ocean economy, IORA and the political connections it allows Mauritius to strengthen 
with countries like Australia and (especially) India, is of paramount importance.  Comoros and 
Madagascar, on the other hand, invest more effort in the IOC, where their comparative 
economic underdevelopment and political instability do not serve to marginalise them; a 
problem both countries face in IORA and the IOTC, with their much broader collections of 
member states.  With the different Western Indian Ocean island states investing their energies 
in different inter-governmental bodies, the result is that none of these organisations serve to 
effectively foster the types of political dynamics required to sustainably deepen fisheries 
cooperation, compel the islands to undertake integrative measures or support them to 
consistently gang up  for collective diplomatic efforts.  This does not mean that these inter-
governmental organisations are unimportant.  However, without any of these bodies having the 
f ll backing of he i land  collec i e poli ical capi al, he cope fo  an  of hem o eme ge a  
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platforms to support the transformation of these islands f om a pa i e objec  o an ac i e 
subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region  (Hettne and 
S de ba m  (2000: 461) is conspicuously limited.  
 The third factor is the influence of France, both as a regional  state (through its 
sovereign control of Mayotte and Réunion) and in its role as an external power keen on 
enforcing its territorial/EEZ claims in the Western Indian Ocean.  Neither Mayotte nor Réunion 
have nearby as prominent a position within the Western Indian Ocean tuna fishery as do the 
four independent island states.  It is for this reason that these islands were not given much focus 
in the previous chapter on MT&C enactment.  Despite this, France does exert considerable 
influence within the institutional structures of the IOC  h o gh R nion  membe hip in he 
o gani a ion, he EU  ob e e  a  i hin he bod , a  ell a  h o gh he EU f nding ha  
comp i e  a o nd half of he IOC  co e ope a ing b dge  and mo  of its project-based funding 
(IOC, 2018).  French power within the IOC does not necessarily manifest itself directly in 
fisheries issues.  Rather, the tendency of France to (often successfully) use IOC structures to 
play off member states against each other  particularly when it comes to pressing its contested 
territorial claims  has the effect of creating political tension and contestation between the four 
independent island states.  Efforts towards fisheries cooperation, integration and collective 
action through the IOC then become something of an indirect casualty as the islands struggle 
to overcome stoked internal divisions in order to pursue collective fisheries interests.         
Similar to what was argued in Chapter 4, the cumulative result of the above factors is 
an island grouping that, while very much engaged in functional  fisheries cooperation, 
evidences few signs of true regionness and very little of what a new regionalist  thinker would 
identify as a commonly constructed identity over fisheries.  Interestingly, the Pacific example 
again offers something of a contrast, with both the FFA and PNA standing out as inter-
governmental organisations that have been largely successful in fostering rationalised 
collective action, regime-building and a common fisheries-focused regional identity among 
island states.  As was done in the previous chapter, the analysis that follows will draw attention 
to pertinent examples from the Pacific context, particularly where these can be used to compare 
and contrast the functionality of fisheries-focused inter-governmental organisations in this 
island geography with those in the Western Indian Ocean. 
The chapter will present its evidence for the above arguments through an examination 
of one specific issue area: MCS capacity-building and the harmonisation of fisheries 
surveillance systems across the island grouping; something that serves as a central focus for 
each of he We e n Indian Ocean  in e -governmental bodies.  
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2. Inter-Governmental Organisations in the Western Indian Ocean: The Evolution 
of Mandate Creep  in the Fisheries Sector 
 Chapter 3 provided a brief introduction to each of the four fisheries-focused inter-
governmental organisations to which the Western Indian Ocean island states belong.  From this 
introduction, it was possible to identify, based on their founding mandates and in spite of their 
varying collections of member states, a fairly clear and complementary division of 
responsibilities between these organisations.  Both the IOTC and SWIOFC, for example, 
operate under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO) and are primarily technocratic rules setting  organisations.  These bodies work to 
establish and enforce international norms around fisheries management, both within member 
state EEZs and on the high seas.  The IOTC carries out this role with a focus on the tuna fishery.  
While its membership encompasses all of the African and Asian nations with Indian Ocean 
coastlines, as well as DWFNs like China, Japan and South Korea, its core focus tends to be on 
managing the tuna fishery in the Western Indian Ocean (Researcher Interview: Secretary-
General, IOTC).  The membership of SWIOFC is more limited, encompassing the Western 
Indian Ocean island states, coastal East African states, as well as two Asian countries (Maldives 
and Yemen).  In spite of its prominent role in the MT&C process  described in Chapter 4, 
SWIOFC  foc  i  la gel  on non-tuna pelagic resources.47       
 Both the IOC and IORA have mandates to foster cooperation among their member 
states on a broad range of issue areas, with fisheries being only one component of this 
cooperation.  IORA is undeniably the most ambitious of the inter-governmental bodies, seeking 
to foster closer trade and investment linkages between all Indian Ocean rim countries, promote 
collaboration in regards to maritime security, support disaster risk reduction strategies, as well 
as encourage broad-based academic, scientific and tourism exchange (Meng, 2018).  In spite 
of the broadness of this mandate, however, IORA is the organisation with the least amount of 
executive power , with its assorted functions being almost entirely dialogue-based rather than 
involving the creation and enforcement of binding agreements between members.  For 
e ample, IORA  Fi he ie  S ppo  Uni  (FSU), ba ed in he Omani capital of Muscat, operates 
exclusively as a dialogue forum and research unit, working to bring together fisheries officials 
from across member states to engage in scientific studies and exchanges of experience, but 
with no expectation that these outputs will lead to IORA itself driving the creation of actionable 
fisheries regimes among member states (Geest, 2017).   
 
47 See the following link for an overview of SWIOFC: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/swiofc/en> (accessed 17 September 2018). 
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At one time, the IOC was the most political of the four inter-governmental 
organisations.  Being the only one of the bodies to have its membership be exclusive to the 
Western Indian Ocean island states, the IOC has always provided a deliberative space for the 
i land  head  of a e, mini  officials and scientific personnel to engage with each other on 
issues specific to their interests, rather than having to also encompass the interests of other 
Indian Ocean countries.  However, whereas the IOC began as an anti-colonial body 
(McDougall, 1994, 1997), he o gani a ion  admi ance of R nion (and b  a ocia ion 
France) as a member in 1986, marked the beginning of a gradual move by the IOC towards 
becoming a largely technocratic and project-focused organisation.  As will be discussed later 
in this chapter, this move towards organisational technocracy has not always been welcomed: 
The IOC no  e i  la gel  o ecei e and pend he E opean Union  de elopmen  f nd .  
Tha  abo  i  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, 
Government of Mauritius).   
Like IORA, the IOC promotes technical fisheries cooperation, as well as cooperation 
in other sectors.  Unlike IORA, however, the IOC promotes cooperative efforts in fisheries that 
are intended to produce not just dialogue, but also tangible outputs in the form of binding 
agreements, joint area management schemes (such as that governing the Mascarene Plateau 
between Mauritius and Seychelles) and political commitments towards joint policy initiatives, 
including a common strategic framework for the blue economy  (Ramariandrasoa, 2017).  
Unlike SWIOFC and the IOTC, the IOC is not fundamentally focused on rule making  per 
se, but rather on operationalising practical cooperation, such as on the sharing of fisheries 
surveillance assets, harmonising port control measures and developing training curricula for 
MCS personnel, such as island state observers serving aboard DWFN vessels (Researcher 
Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles; Researcher Interview: 
Secretary-General, IOTC).  Finally, whereas IORA, the IOTC and SWIOFC are all focused 
primarily (though not exclusively) on issues affecting advanced artisanal and industrial fishing, 
the IOC also implements a number of projects that support the islands to maintain livelihoods 
in the traditional fishing sector (Sherbut, 2008).  
The Western Indian Ocean island states have a clear vested interest in all of the above 
inter-governmental organisations, not least since the IOTC Secretariat is based in Seychelles, 
while ho e of he IOC and IORA a e head a e ed in Ma i i  (SWIOFC  Sec e a ia  i  
based in the Mozambican capital of Maputo).  The organisations all, in theory, should play 
niche roles in different aspects of the fisheries sector, all of which could have value for the 
islands.  The IOTC establishes and governs norms relating to the industrial tuna fishery.  
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SWIOFC does the same for the non-tuna fishery.  IORA promotes dialogue and scientific 
collaboration, while exposing the Western Indian Ocean island states to scientific and policy 
expertise from across the Indian Ocean rim.  The IOC is more localised and island-specific in 
focus, while working mainly through practical projects to create a more unified approach to 
the fisheries sector.  Efforts by the islands to engage with each other (and with their other 
maritime neighbours) through these organisations would appear to present clear opportunities 
for them to achieve a deeper level of mutual fisheries integration.   
An evident problem has emerged in recen  ea , ho e e , a  he e o gani a ion  
founding mandates have gradually given way to mandates that are both more expansive and 
more muddled.  Indeed, a review of the annual reports from each organisation, even over the 
period 2010 to 2019, reveals the emergence of what could be termed mandate creep , as an 
ever-increasing number of fisheries priorities are added to organisational agendas.    Rather 
than the organisations having clear areas of fisheries specialisation that they started with, and 
which are alluded to in the descriptions above, they have increasingly come to take on many 
of the same objectives and areas of focus.  This is particularly the case on issues relating to 
fisheries MCS.  While not always identical in their operating modalities (e.g. IORA remains 
dialogue-focused and the IOC focused on tangible projects), each of the four inter-
governmental organisations now have specific initiatives focused on the training of vessel 
observers and the training of port control authorities.  Each body also has an overlapping focus 
on supporting countries to develop fisheries surveillance Management Information Systems 
(MIS ) (IOC, 2017; IORA, 2019; IOTC, 2018a; SWIOFC, 2017b).      
This mandate creep  has not gone unnoticed.  Said the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to 
the Government of Seychelles, formerly the Secretary-General of the IOC: It is certainly true 
that these organisations are now trying to do many of the same things.  This was not always 
the case.  We [at the IOC] focused for a long time on vessel observer training, for example, but 
then it was decided that SWIOFC would do the same thing.  Then the countries in IORA 
decided ha  ob e e  aining ho ld be pa  of ha  o gani a ion  ole oo  (Researcher 
Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  Rather than clear 
complementarities, the organisations are increasingly defined by a fairly substantial level of 
duplication and overlap.  More detailed depictions of this duplication, as well as its implications 
for inter-island political dynamics, will be presented in the next section of this chapter.  For the 
moment, it is useful to ask why this duplication and overlap have emerged.  For the KIs 
interviewed for this study, the explanation lies with the increasingly donor-driven nature of 
he e o gani a ion  e pec i e ope a ion .  While membe  a e  con ib e d e  o each 
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organisation, these contributions are rarely sufficient to cover the operating costs of these 
bodie  Sec etariats nor the expenses involved in organising annual summits or even the 
smaller and more frequent meetings held between member state officials (Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC). Much of this core funding instead comes from 
multilateral bodies like the World Bank, from within the UN system or  as with the IOC  
from the European Commission.  Moreover, project-based funding is almost entirely 
contributed by donors (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, ITOC; IOTC, 2017a; 
SWIOFC, 2016b). 
A degree of donor dependence among these organisations is unavoidable.  This is 
particularly the case for bodies like the IOC and SWIOFC, where many of the member states 
are small and/or impoverished countries with few resources of their own to contribute.  Indeed, 
from a project perspective, most members of the four inter-governmental organisations eagerly 
welcome donor funds as vital contributions to support a range of fisheries initiatives 
(Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  However, as donors have become more 
attuned to trying to address key fisheries problems, such as the drivers of IUU fishing, they 
have been eager to fund an ever-wider range of initiatives.  Inter-governmental organisations, 
in turn, have adjusted their remits accordingly: You have to understand that the member states 
of each o gani a ion an  f nding fo  fi he ie .  If an o gani a ion  e i ing manda e i  no  
ideal for attracting this funding, then members will simply tweak the mandate so that it 
becomes more aligned with what the donors have an interest in funding  (Researcher 
Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  
The Ocean Go e nance Ad i o  in he Go e nmen  of Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e 
Economy concurred: If donor funds are available, none of the member states will worry too 
much about whether the projects being funded fully align with a specific organisational 
mandate.  These mandates are movable  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in 
the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles). 
A cynical interpretation of the above perspectives would indicate that member states 
view the inter-governmental bodies they are a part of as serving primarily to deliver funding 
rather than having value for the specialised technical roles they are intended to play.  There is 
clearly an element of truth to this, but while mandate creep  may be conducive to attracting 
more in the way of donor funds for inter-governmental organisations, it brings with it the need 
for member states to stretch their resources, and particularly their human resources, ever more 
thinly.  This is particularly the case if members are to meaningfully participate in the increasing 
array of overlapping initiatives implemented through the different organisations.  The 
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implications of mandate creep  on he We e n Indian Ocean i land  ca ce e o ce , and 
what this means for the political dynamics fostered among the islands at the inter-governmental 
organisation level, are detailed in the analysis that follows. 
 
3. Mandate Creep , Resource Scarcity and the Undermining of Effective Political 
Engagement among the Western Indian Ocean Island States: The Case of 
Fisheries MCS  
 It was suggested above that there is considerable overlap among the four inter-
governmental organisations when it comes to implementing projects and programmes around 
fisheries MCS.  In fact, this overlap often takes the form of direct duplication, with nearly 
identical types of initiatives being launched under the auspices of each organisation or even 
similar projects being implemented by the same organisation.  Two of the most prominent 
fisheries projects implemented with the involvement of the Western Indian Ocean island states 
are the SmartFish Project, implemented primarily through the IOC, with funding from the 
European Commission, as well as the SWIOFish Project, implemented under the auspices of 
both SWIOFC and the IOC with funding from the World Bank.  Both of these projects were 
briefly introduced in Chapter 3.   
The SmartFish Project was a large, multi-phased initiative implemented from 2011 to 
2018 at a cost of twenty-one million Euros.  While the IOC was the primary implementing 
agency, the geographic scope of the project also included a number of East African coastal 
states and involved collaboration with SWIOFC and the IOTC, as well as with additional 
regional organisations like the African Union, COMESA, the East African Community (EAC) 
and SADC, to name only a few.48 SmartFish focused its activities on five main themes: fisheries 
development and management; fisheries governance; MCS; facilitation of trade in fish and fish 
products; and food security.   
External evaluations of the SmartFish project point to a number of positive outcomes 
in the above areas, particularly in relation to MCS. For instance, the project provided 
opportunities for exchanges of experience between MCS officials, including a very well-
regarded exchange that saw technical personnel from the SFA welcome Comorian officials 
from the CNCSP for a six-week placement.  This placement was used to strengthen the capacity 
of CNCSP officials on best practice  approaches to the development of MCS management 
strategies, the planning of scientific data collection, the interpretation of scientific data, as well 
 





as how to carry-out effective stakeholder consultations with traditional and artisanal fishers 
(IOC, 2016).  The project also developed a standardised curriculum that could be applied to 
the training of on-board vessel observers across the island states (and beyond), with this 
curriculum subsequently being adopted as a gold standard  for training by educational 
institutes like the Seychelles Maritime Academy (Researcher Interview: Deputy Director, 
Seychelles Maritime Academy).  Finally, the SmartFish project was deemed highly successful 
in encouraging agreements for the sharing of MCS surveillance assets, such as helicopters, 
light aircraft and remote sensing equipment - between the Western Indian Ocean island states, 
as well as between the islands and nearby East African countries (IOC, 2016; Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  Sma Fi h  con ib ion  o eng hening MCS 
capaci  e e ecogni ed h o gh he p ojec  receipt of two global prizes for leading the fight 
against IUU fishing.49 
The SWIOFish Project, initiated in 2015 and now in its third phase of implementation, 
was launched with many of the same objectives as SmartFish, albeit with a much larger 
implementation budget of over 200 million U.S. Dollars.  Like SmartFish, SWIOFish took a 
particular focus on fisheries governance, institutional strengthening and capacity-building 
(including in MCS), as well as improving livelihoods in the traditional and artisanal fisheries 
sectors.  SWIOFish placed a greater emphasis than SmartFish on engaging with private sector 
fisheries operators, emphasising value addition within export-led fisheries value chains.  
SWIOFish also placed a more direct focus on conservation, encouraging project members  
inclusive once again of both the Western Indian Ocean island states and East African coastal 
states  to pursue the creation and enactment of Marine Protected Areas within their EEZs.50 
Like SmartFish, SWIOFish has been a well-regarded initiative, with external evaluations 
poin ing o he p ojec  con ib ion o imp o ing he ali  of bo h bila e al and m l ila e al 
protocols and procedures for combatting IUU fishing, supporting fisheries processors within 
the island states and in East African coastal states to undertake the steps needed to meet EU 
sanitary and phytosanitary export standards for fish and fish products, as well as in encouraging 
member states  and particularly the island states  to develop protocols for joint vessel patrols 
(SWIOFC, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a).   
 
49 See the following link: <https://asiapacificreport.nz/2016/03/11/indian-oceans-smartfish-wins-global-award-for-fight-against-illegal-
fishing/> (accessed 17 June 2020). 
50 See the following link for an overview of the SWIOFish Project: < https://symposium.wiomsa.org/wp-




From the above, it can be broadly acknowledged that both SmartFish and SWIOFish 
have been implemented with reasonable levels of success.  Both projects have clearly 
facilitated technical cooperation between their constituent member states, with inter-
governmental organisations  namely, the IOC and SWIOFC  playing leading roles in project 
coordination.  The KIs interviewed for this study were admittedly less sanguine about the two 
projects than was the evaluative literature.  Indeed, the sustainability of these projects was held 
in doubt by some interviewees: Both [of these projects] achieved a lot.  This should be 
acknowledged.  However, these projects have been so bureaucratic that by the time we got to 
implemen ing an hing, he majo  p oblem e peciall  i h IUU fi hing had e ol ed and 
needed new responses that that the project plans had not considered  (Researcher Interview: 
Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  Said 
another respondent: In my view, these projects are great at using the availability of lots of 
b dge  [ ic] o make hing  happen in he momen .  B  o  ake a a  ha  f nding I hink 
Sma Fi h j  ended and ha  compel  o  i land  o keep cooperating with the same 
energy? A lot of what these projects achieved may not be sustained  (Researcher Interview: 
Former Chief Fisheries Officer, Government of Mauritius). 
The purpose here is not to evaluate the efficacy of the above projects.  However, 
commentary raising doubts about the sustainability of these initiatives is relevant to considering 
whether these projects have really been able to go beyond functional  cooperation towards 
promoting deeper integrative ties among participating states, including the islands.  The above 
perspectives, while not wholly authoritative, suggest not.  Said the Chief Diplomatic Advisor 
to the Government of Seychelles, speaking of his time serving as Secretary-General of the IOC: 
I am proud of both projects.  They have allowed cooperation to happen that might not have 
happened [o he i e].  E opean f nding and he EU  p ojec  managemen  e pe i e pla ed 
a big role in helping us with this.  But is it sustainable? Sort of, but I am not sure we have done 
enough to build on our mutual cooperation in these projects and to ensure that this cooperation 
would inevitably continue afterward.  A lot has changed for the positive, but it could have been 
more  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles). 
Relating the above commentary back to the issue of mandate creep  among inter-
governmental organisations, one of the main observations about these projects, and a factor 
that was seen to raise doubt on their sustainability, was the extent to which they duplicated 
many of the same activities, usually while trying to meet the same objectives.  Both projects, 
for instance, included parallel efforts to develop training curricula and to organise practical 
training for vessel observers.  The two projects also introduced parallel efforts to provide 
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aining and echnical inp  in o he de elopmen  of fi he ie  eillance MIS , a  ell a  
promoting interventions focused on improving scientific data collection for catch volume 
assessments. Finally, both projects introduced initiatives geared towards improving 
community-level area management practices for the surveillance of coastal (non-tuna) fishing 
(IOC, 2016; Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries Officer, Government of Mauritius).  
Some of this duplication was well-intentioned, with parallel initiatives potentially acting to 
einfo ce each o he .  Gi en he IOC  manda e o nde ake p ojec -based technical initiatives, 
none of he abo e a e pa ic la l  o  of place in he con e  of hi  bod  cope of o k. 
However, it is not clear that the above duplication was done with complementarity as a 
priority.  Administratively, these were separate projects with no management overlap, no real 
coordination and no real sharing of results  (Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries 
Officer, Government of Mauritius).  Perhaps most important, in the context of mandate 
creep , is that while the IOC was the lead implementing body for both projects, initiatives 
focused on vessel observer training, MIS development and catch volume data collection were 
implemented under the auspices of the IOC for SmartFish but under SWIOFC for SWIOFish.  
This is in spite of the fact that, with the partial exception of catch volume data collection, these 
themes are not traditionally under SWIOFC  emi .  A e ie  of he min e  f om a mee ing 
of MCS officials from the Ninth Session of SWIOFC, held in South Africa in 2018, points to 
concerns around this institutional set-up, with talk of inefficiencies in project implementation  
and lack of project administration experience in SWIOFC, which has hindered some aspects 
of project implementation  (SWIOFC, 2018b).   
Said he Go e nmen  of Ma i i  Fo me  Chief Fi he ie  Office : It made little sense 
to house these projects in two different organisations.  Through SmartFish, the IOC had a track 
record in being able to manage projects.  The IOC Secretariat had a branch dedicated to project 
administration and knew where to find good project-based technical expertise.  SWIOFC was 
more of a scientific and technical policy body, but it did not have much of a project 
management function.  But members [of SWIOFC] decided that SWIOFC would benefit from 
project funding and the World Bank was happy to give funding to a UN [FAO] organisation  
(Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries Officer, Government of Mauritius).  The 
decision to give SWIOFC project management responsibilities outside of its traditional remit 
would not have been so problematic had there been active coordination between it and the IOC, 
particularly if this coordination would have allowed the IOC to share its technical and project 
management expertise.  However, there was very little coordination between the two 
organisations.  It is interesting.  The two organisations [IOC and SWIOFC] have member states 
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in common and want the same results, but the actual technical staff in their Secretariats guarded 
their turfs and project activities were done in a very siloed way  (Researcher Interview: Former 
Chief Fisheries Officer, Government of Mauritius).  The end result was duplication, often with 
very similar activities between the two projects happening at roughly the same time: I 
remember we [at the Comorian DGRH] took part in a training session for onboard vessel 
observers in Port Louis in November 2015.  This was hosted by the IOC and this was for 
SmartFish.  Two weeks later, we had almost exactly the same training in Mombasa, hosted by 
SWIOFC, with just a slightly different [training] curriculum for SWIOFish.  They were good 
trainings, but there was no logic in the repetition  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
DGRH). 
KIs al o no ed ha  he o p ojec  parallel efforts to assist Western Indian Ocean 
MCS a ho i ie  eng hen hei  eillance MIS  e ed p ima il  o nde mine both 
initiatives: The two projects were really engaged in assisting member states establish 
[Management Information] Systems.  This addressed a pressing need where we had very little 
capacity.  But while we thought that both projects would combine their resources and help us 
[IOC/SWIOFC member states] develop a single MIS, we actually found ourselves developing 
duplicate systems simply because both projects had a deliverable to the donors based around 
MIS development.  It put a real burden on our surveillance [CNCSP] personnel and we are 
frankly still trying to harmonise these Systems into something that is more coherent  
(Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  This example points to the fact that even 
with improved digital connectivity in the Western Indian Ocean, which should allow for 
considerable improvements in the technical parameters of MCS systems and their inter-
operability across national borders, bureaucratic inefficiencies are preventing these benefits 
from being fully realised. 
To further compound the duplication between SmartFish and SWIOFish, both the 
IOTC and IORA also launched, over the period 2015 to 2017, their own donor-funded 
initiatives, albeit at much smaller-scale, around vessel observer training and catch volume 
assessment analysis (IORA, 2016, 2017a; IOTC, 2017b).  In the case of the IOTC, these themes 
did fi  i hin he o gani a ion  co e manda e, b  he e a  again no p ojec -level coordination 
with the IOC or SWIOFC to ensure that these initiatives complemented the similar efforts made 
by SmartFish and SWIOFish on these focus areas.  Said the Secretary-General of the IOTC: 
We knew we were simply adding on to the types of initiatives that they [the IOC and 
SWIOFC] had implemented through SmartFish and SWIOFish.  Our observer training and our 
scientific analysis trainings were narrowly-focused and mostly within our remit, but I know 
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they served as yet another somewhat repetitive training for member state [MCS] officials.  
Could we have coordinated more effectively to make sure there was not no such duplication? 
Yes, probably so.  (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  Fo  i  pa , IORA  
FSU also hosted a series of repeated trainings for member state MCS officials on methods for 
catch volume data collection, data analysis and reporting.  While not problematic in itself, this 
training again overlapped with the initiatives on this theme already being duplicated through 
SmartFish and SWIOFish.  The end result was an almost constant demand being placed on the 
Western Indian Ocean island states (and coastal East African states) to make fisheries MCS 
personnel available for a consistent agenda of duplicated and (usually) uncoordinated 
initiatives from all of the different inter-governmental organisations.        
 What does the above mean when it comes to the political dynamics being fostered 
among the Western Indian Ocean island states through these inter-governmental organisations? 
Lack of coordination and resulting duplication of technical initiatives places a considerable 
b den on pa icipa ing a e  financial and h man e o ce , pa ic la l  if he  a e o  and 
participate in a meaningful way in all of these different initiatives.  From a financial standpoint, 
there is an expectation that the states participating in the inter-go e nmen al o gani a ion  
MCS projects will at least partly contribute to the costs of sending their MCS officials to attend 
trainings and will cost-share in core technical work, such as MIS design and maintenance as 
well as surveillance asset sharing, to name just two examples (Researcher Interview: Ocean 
Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).  
Logically, it thus seems prudent to contend that the financial burden to be borne in order for 
the island states to participate in a single initiative relating to a particular MCS focus area is 
lower than the financial burden that must be borne to participate in three or four discrete but 
structurally similar initiatives.  
 A coordinated and rational approach among the inter-governmental organisations 
towards fisheries MCS would necessitate: a) that particular MCS focus areas are housed within 
those inter-governmental bodies with the clearest founding mandate to address them; 
something that is not really possible given the existence of mandate creep ; or b) that the 
different organisations are compelled to pool shared energies into fully coordinated initiatives 
(e.g. where three or four separate trainings for onboard vessel observers becomes a single 
coordinated training). This acts as a challenge due to the nature of donor-funded projects, which 
is itself seemingly a central driver behind mandate creep .  Returning to the issue of 
development disparities between the Western Indian Ocean island states, discussed in Chapter 
4, the upshot of uncoordinated duplication is considerable difficulty for all of the island states, 
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but particularly for resource-poor Comoros and Madagascar, to make the financial 
commitments required to actively and consistently take part in key initiatives.  Referencing the 
aforementioned example of Comorian MCS officials attending two duplicate vessel observer 
trainings within a two-week span for both SmartFish and SWIOFish, the Fisheries Officer with 
the Comorian DGRH stated: Our overall budget [for the DGRH and CNCSP] is very small.  
Carving out the funds to send our officials to one of these trainings [for onboard vessel 
observers] is difficult.  Managing two of these trainings even more so.  We felt it was worth 
having a presence at both trainings, but it was a financial headache.  IORA had another training 
later [that year, 2015] and we only sent one [MCS] official because we could not afford another 
o k hop.  E en he e, he official onl  en  beca e IORA  f nding a  able o cover the 
full cost  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH). 
 Financial considerations were also highlighted by the Secretary-General of the IOTC, 
who noted that while MCS officials from Mauritius and Seychelles are mainstays of all of the 
organi a ion  MCS o king g o p  and cien ific commi ee , hei  co n e pa  f om 
Comoros and Madagascar are not.  Indeed, this KI recounted a series of six quarterly MCS 
working groups over an eighteen-month period, from the start of 2014 to the end of 2015, in 
which a representative from Comoros was present for only one meeting, while a representative 
from Madagascar was present for only three meetings (Researcher Interview: Secretary-
General, IOTC).  This is backed-up by a review of meeting minutes from these committees 
(IOTC, 2014, 2015).  While this period coincided with periods of political instability in both 
countries, the reasons for this absence were seen to be readily apparent: I think there are too 
many burdens placed on these countries with too many meetings and workshops.  We [the 
IOTC] bear costs and do help our poorer members participate.  But there is still some financial 
commi men  e i ed on hei  ide and a co n Como o  i  p obabl  he be  e ample j  
cannot handle it  (Researcher Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).    
 Related to these financial burdens are the related burdens that come with the island 
states being able to dedicate adequate human resources to participating in all of the varying 
inter-governmental organisation initiatives.  It was noted in Chapter 4 that a continuous 
turnover in personnel among island fisheries ministries, particularly in Comoros and 
Madagascar, hindered the establishment of strong working relationships between ministry 
officials that would usually serve as a precursor to Pacific island-style fisheries integration and 
regime-building.  Turnover in personnel is relevant in the context of the work done through 
inter-governmental organisations as well, particularly when this turnover produces a lack of 
continuity in the MCS officials involved in different types of inter-related initiatives.  There is 
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a close link, for example, between MCS officials being trained to effectively collect quality 
catch volume data and to then make optimal use of a fisheries surveillance MIS to input, 
process and analyse these data.  In the case of both SmartFish and SWIOFish, turnover  mainly 
in Comorian and Malagasy MCS personnel  was seen as a factor that did undermine prospects 
for these two states to maximise their technical gains from project participation (Researcher 
Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH; Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries Officer, 
Government of Mauritius).   
Equally important, however, is that for each of the island states, but especially for 
Comoros and Madagascar, the key national MCS bodies  the Comorian CNCSP and the 
Malagasy CSP  are typically understaffed and/or overburdened even when not experiencing 
rapid turnover in personnel.  Indeed, these MCS bodies have technical remits of their own that 
are often inflated and which go well-beyond traditional MCS functions.  The Comorian 
CNCSP, for example, is not merely responsible for typical MCS responsibilities, but is also 
expected to play a role in coordinating scientific research and (given the dearth of human 
resources in Comorian fisheries institutions more broadly) has even been expected to allocate 
ime and ene g  o a d  ppo ing he na ional go e nmen  effo  o o ce f nding fo  he 
moribund Comoros National Fishing Company (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
DGRH).  A similar broad mandate exists for the Malagasy CSP, while for Mauritius and 
Seychelles, better-resourced and more professionalised  MCS bodies play a narrower and 
more technically-focused role (Ramariandrasoa, 2017; Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles; Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries Officer, 
Government of Mauritius). 
The result of the above limitations is once again an inability of Comorian and Malagasy 
MCS officials to meaningfully participate in a large number of inter-governmental organisation 
initiatives, particularly when so many of these are duplicated and place additional time burdens 
on overstretched personnel: I would happily have tried allocating more time for CNCSP 
personnel to take part in trainings, on the [Management Information] System development, on 
mo e pe  of e pe ience e change  like e had i h Se chelle b  he demand  on o  
time for participation are too much.  We do not have that many MCS personnel and they cannot 
be freed up for training after training, particularly when so many of these have the same 
content  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  Reflecting on his time heading the 
IOC, the Chief Diplomatic Advisor for the Government of Seychelles noted: We have perhaps 
made a mistake looking at all the funding available for fisheries development in our region 
without necessarily trying to rationalise how it is used or to really think of how all of us [island 
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states] involved in these projects can fully benefit given our capacity [constraints]  (Researcher 
Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles). 
The above discussion relates somewhat back to the insights of Bueger and Wivel 
(2018), introduced in Chapter 2, in their commentary on Seychelles as an exemplar of small 
state diplomacy.  These scholars posited that for many small  and micro  states, the limited 
funds available for them to spend on diplomatic efforts, as well as the limited human resources 
they could draw upon to staff their diplomatic corps, acted as a constraint on their ability to 
maintain a consistent or sizeable presence at international fora.  These authors argued that to 
overcome these constraints, small  and micro  states had to leverage strategic positioning to 
attract material and financial investments from larger powers, they had to develop niche 
expertise and they had to adopt activist  foreign policies.  In many respects, the Western 
Indian Ocean i land a e  en h ia m fo  being pa  of he e fo  in e -governmental 
organisations lies with the fact that membership in these bodies makes it more likely that they 
will be able to gang up  and pursue these strategies.  However, the reality of mandate creep  
within these organisations and the fact that organisational members, including the island states, 
appear more committed to using these bodies as avenues to access donor funds, even if this 
comes at the expense of a rationalised set of mandates, seems likely to undermine at least some 
of he e o gani a ion  effec i ene . 
The above factors all serve to reinforce the same types of inter-island political dynamics 
highlighted in Chapter 4.  At the state-to-state ministerial level, these dynamics were, at least 
in pa , cha ac e i ed b  diffe ence  in he le el of p ofe ionali a ion among he i land a e  
respective fisheries ministries.  Unable to contribute a stable roster of technically-proficient 
ministry officials due to their own internal political dynamics, the ability of both Comoros and 
Madagascar to contribute substantively to key discussions around MT&Cs was seen to be 
inherently constrained.  This, in turn, placed limits on the degree to which the island grouping 
as a whole could realistically pursue the creation of integrative fisheries regimes.  In the 
discussion of relevant fisheries-focused inter-governmental organisations, specifically in the 
context of MCS, differences in professionalisation in fisheries institutions remain relevant, 
with MCS officials from Comoros and Madagascar again unable to engage as fully as the other 
islands in the complete range of organisational fisheries initiatives.  In this case, however, it is 
at least partly the structure of the inter-governmental organisations themselves  donor-driven, 
characterised by mandate creep  and prone to duplicating a wide range of technical MCS 
initiatives  that creates a challenging financial and human resource burden that the less 
developed island states struggle to overcome.   
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None of the above means that these organisations are failing to foster important types 
of functional  cooperation between the Western Indian Ocean island states, or within the 
Western Indian Ocean more broadly.  However, as can be interpreted from the concerns 
p e en ed ea lie  abo  he ainabili  of he e o gani a ion  coope a i e endea o , i  i  
not apparent that inter-governmental bodies operate in ways that will foster deeper fisheries 
cooperation or integration among the Western Indian Ocean island states.  Indeed, in spite of 
the degree of technical cooperation that the different organisations have fostered between the 
islands on MCS, not least through SmartFish and SWIOFish, there remains a notable absence 
of R ggie  (1975: 570) mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational 
energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states  when it 
comes to fisheries MCS. 
For example, there remain no formalised agreements among the island grouping as a 
whole when it comes to the sharing of surveillance assets, a process which remains largely ad 
hoc (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, 
Government of Seychelles).  For both Comoros and Madagascar, involvement in the exchange 
of surveillance assets, including vessel observers, is still mainly contingent on project budgets 
and project-based activities, rather than forming part of core fisheries budgets or being 
institutionalised as a practice within either the Comorian CNCSP or the Malagasy CSP 
(Ramariandrasoa, 2017; Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).   Cooperation in 
scientific data collection, in the form of catch volume assessments, remains, for all of the 
islands, driven more by project funding or funded directives from a body like the IOTC, rather 
than by consistent financial allocations made available by the islands themselves (Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  Finally, while both SmartFish and SWIOFish took 
afo emen ioned effo  o de elop fi he ie  eillance MIS , he e i  li le o gge  ha  
agreed commitments exist to further these S em  de elopmen .  In fac , i  doe  no  appea  
that the MIS development begun under SmartFish has continued at all post-project, while the 
ongoing efforts to build on the MIS under SWIOFish appears to have stalled since the end of 
project-based funding for this activity in 2017 (IOC, 2018; Researcher Interview: Fisheries 
Officer, DGRH).   
The above factors all reiterate the concerns raised by KIs around the likelihood of inter-
governmental organisation initiatives being sustained without the presence of donor funds.  
They also point to the failure of the Western Indian Ocean island states to develop Ruggie-
style tangible regimes in fisheries MCS.  Evident technical cooperation within inter-
governmental structures does not seem to be translating into lasting plans, institutional energies 
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or financial commitments that would ensure the existence of a regional  MCS framework 
among the islands.  To be fair, some of these regimes (e.g. state-funded surveillance asset 
sharing and joint vessel patrol protocols) are evident on a bilateral basis between Mauritius and 
Seychelles, mainly through the Joint Area Management Agreement they have in regards to the 
Mascarene Plateau.  For the island grouping as a whole, however, these regimes are 
conspicuously absent.  While inter-governmental organisation mandate creep , the 
duplication of technical initiatives and the resulting overburdening of scarce resources among 
the two less-developed island states are not the sole cause of this outcome, it was stated that: 
if you want to talk about a real regionalism among our islands, I do think the lack of 
coordination between the different [inter-governmental] organisations has undermined our 
progress.  These organisations and our governments, to be honest, have looked at quantity of 
cooperative projects as a priority.  This may be at the expense of real vision or buy-in from all 
of our islands  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).       
Before moving onto the next section of this chapter, it is worth briefly contrasting the 
above analysis with the context of inter-governmental fisheries organisations in the Pacific.  
The comparison is not entirely apt since the composition of inter-governmental bodies in the 
Indian Ocean is far more diverse, particularly within IORA and the IOTC.  Even SWIOFC, 
which (after the failure of WIOTO) may be the inter-governmental body that stood the best 
chance of evolving into an institution equivalent to the FFA in the Pacific, has a membership 
that is inclusive of the Western Indian Ocean island states plus a range of diverse coastal 
African states (as well as Yemen).  The political diversity within these organisations exceeds 
anything that could be found within an FFA or PNA comprised of relatively like-minded 
Pacific island states.   
However, purely from the perspective of institutional functioning and coordination, the 
FFA went to great lengths to ensure that its areas of competence were well-defined and that it 
maintained coordinating linkages with other inter-governmental fisheries bodies operating in 
the region.  This includes those organisations, like the PNA, which emerged directly from the 
FFA itself, but also other inter-governmental bodies like the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (SPRFMO), both of which were formed as separate UN organisations to take on 
various technical aspects of fisheries management in the high seas (Aqorau, 2002; Researcher 
Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of 
Seychelles).   
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 132 
When asked about the existence of mandate creep  among these bodies, the Ocean 
Go e nance Ad i o  f om he Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e Econom  eco n ed he  o n 
telling experience: There is far less fragmentation among the Pacific IGOs [inter-
governmental organisations].  I would not claim there to be no duplication in some of their 
initiatives, but there is a level of coordination there that is not evident among the organisations 
here [in the Western Indian Ocean].  Member states of the FFA acknowledge it as something 
of a coordinating body for all of the Pacific IGOs.  But the FFA itself does not try to take on 
everything and there are regular meetings between the Secretariats of each organisation to 
coordinate and even try to act as joint partners on some donor-funded projects.  That type of 
arrangement is starting to emerge here, but it is certainly not the norm in the [Western] Indian 
Ocean  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue 
Economy, Government of Seychelles).   
Notably, the types of Ruggie-like regimes identified above as lacking at an island 
grouping-level in the Western Indian Ocean, such as agreements on the sharing of surveillance 
assets, committed efforts to maintaining a harmonised regional  fisheries surveillance MIS, 
as well as financial allocations towards joint scientific research, are clearly evident among the 
Pacific islands (Fry and Tarte, 2015). Moreover, the maintenance of these regimes, while 
undoubtedly supported by (and even implemented through) bodies like the FFA, have also been 
institutionalised into the fisheries policy frameworks, budgets and operational strategies of 
each island state (Hanich, Parris and Tsamenyi, 2010).  There is thus a robustness and 
sustainability to these regimes that is conspicuously absent in the Western Indian Ocean.  
 
4. Island State Foreign Policy and Divergence in Support for Inter-Governmental 
Organisations 
 The preceding section provided a technical argument for the failure of inter-
governmental organisations to foster political dynamics conducive to deepening fisheries 
integration and regime-building among the Western Indian Ocean island states, particularly in 
relation to MCS.  However, additional factors are also at play, linked less to the technical 
workings of these organisations and more to broader issues of island state foreign policy and 
regional politics.  These issues are often related only tangentially to fisheries, but nonetheless 
have an apparent impact on shaping the inter-island political dynamics that affect fisheries 
cooperation.  Of particular importance is the comparative  and markedly different  political 
value that each of the island states assigns to each of the inter-governmental organisations.   
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 Of all the Western Indian Ocean island states, Seychelles follows a foreign policy that 
i  mo  di ec l  g ided b  fi he ie  in e e .  A  highligh ed in Chap e  3, he na fi he  
dominant position in providing formal employment and in generating export revenues, gives 
the sector a level of importance in Seychelles that is not as evident in the other islands: There 
a e o main fo nda ion  of o  [Se chelle ] diploma ic app oach.  Fi , we want to ensure 
that the tuna fishery is managed well, in our waters [EEZ] and on the high seas.  If stocks are 
healthy, we have jobs, exports and our [IOT] cannery will be viable.  Second, we want to 
generate buy-in, with the other islands, but really globally, for what we envision as the blue 
economy  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  As 
Chapter 3 recounted, Seychelles has been at the forefront of trying to operationalise the concept 
of the blue economy  into a workable set of detailed policies that can be used to guide the 
co n  ainable de elopmen .  The e policie  a e al o in ended o e e a  model  ha  
other small island states can emulate (Michel, 2016).  Bueger and Wivel (2018) in their detailed 
analysis of Seychellois diplomacy, further note the centrality of the tuna fishery and the 
tangible realisation of blue economy  objectives as domestic and foreign policy priorities.   
This emphasis on effective fisheries management and technocratic policy development 
has been accompanied by a clear prioritisation by successive Seychellois governments on 
building technical competence within its broad array of ocean governance institutions, 
including those dealing with fisheries.  The SFA and the Department of Blue Economy are two 
such institutions that this study has detailed as being technically proficient, even if achieving 
hi  p oficienc  ha  mean  occa ionall  o cing e pe i e f om o ide he co n  bo de  
(Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles; Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  Said the Ocean Governance Advisor within the 
Department of Blue Economy: I hink hi  Depa men  and Se chelle  fi he ie  in i ion  
in general, are represented foremost by technical strength.  All of us in this Department, in the 
SFA, the FIQCU [Fish Inspection and Quality Control Unit] are trained in how the industrial 
tuna fishery should be managed.  Fisheries are not political here and technical proficiency and 
competence matters above everything  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in 
the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).   
 The above perspective is perhaps unsurprising.  The professionalisation of the SFA was 
contrasted in Chapter 4 with the lack of comparable professionalisation within the Comorian 
and Malagasy fisheries ministries.  This disparity was seen to contribute to the misalignment 
in he co n ie  e pec i e fi he ie  poli ical and polic  p io i ie , hich in n nde mined 
prospects for regionness within the island grouping.  The high technical quality and consistency 
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of Se chelle  fi he ie  in i ion  a  al o presented in the previous section of this chapter 
as allowing the country to be a consistent contributor to the various inter-governmental 
o gani a ion  fi he ie  ini ia i e , e en hen he e e e ncoo dina ed, d plica ed and 
necessitated considerable resource allocations.  Equally interesting, however, is the implication 
hi  p ofe ionali a ion ha  on Se chelle  poli ical a i de  o a d  he diffe en  in e -
governmental organisations.  With the effective management of the tuna fishery being of 
central importance to Seychellois policymakers, a considerable level of importance is placed 
on the Victoria-based IOTC and its emphasis on setting the ground rules that guide the overall 
governance of this fishery. 
 While the mere fact that the IOTC is based in Seychelles undoubtedly contributes to its 
impo ance o na ional polic make , e all  impo an  i  he fac  ha  he IOTC  echnoc a ic 
rules-setting  na e p o ide  ample oppo ni  fo  Se chelle  co e ie of echnical fi he ie  
experts to play leading ole  in e ing he o gani a ion  agenda and in leading i  echnical 
initiatives: They [Seychellois] play a huge role within the organisation [IOTC].  Seychelles is 
quite unique in that while it is one of our smallest member states, they have an enormous 
amount of knowledge of the tuna fishery, how it functions, how it can best be managed and 
how the whole [tuna] value chain ties together.  With a lot of our MCS initiatives, in particular, 
you see the Seychellois serving as mentors to officials from other member states  (Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC).  The Go e nmen  of Se chelle  Chief Diploma ic 
Advisor offered a similar perspective: The mandate of the IOTC, or at least its core mandate 
since I acknowledge there has been an ongoing expansion of its mandate, is suited to our 
na ional e pe i e.  We look a  fi he ie  a  a echnical i e o be managed and he IOTC  
focus on the minutiae of fisheries management means that this expertise can be really be 
utilised  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  These 
sentiments seem to be supported by background documentation, which shows Seychellois 
officials, mainly from the SFA, chairing more IOTC working groups and committee meetings 
than officials from any other IOTC member state (IOTC, 2018a, 2018b).  
 The central importance of the IOTC to Seychelles does come, at least to an extent, at 
he e pen e of he co n  engagemen  in he o he  h ee in e -governmental bodies: I was 
Secretary-General of the IOC and I know that we [Seychelles] do not invest as much time or 
energy in the IOC as in the IOTC.  This does not mean we do not participate in the IOC.  
Seychelles was a major participant in SmartFish, for example.  But the IOC is more political 
and, at least with fisheries, I think Seychelles gets impatient with the give-and-take within the 
IOC, between Mauritius and Madagascar, Madagascar and France, and so on. We look for 
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concrete outcomes in finding ways to better manage the fishery and the IOTC is the agency 
that best helps us meet these outcomes  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, 
Government of Seychelles).  When asked whether this sentiment was widely held among 
Se chelle  fi he ie  polic make , he Depa men  of Bl e Econom  Ocean Governance 
Advisor broadly concurred: Ye , I hink i  e ha  he IOTC i  o  p io i  o gani a ion.  
Part of it is the balance between the technical versus the political.  The IOTC is less political, 
as is SWIOFC, but the IOTC is more focused on the tuna fishery.  IORA, for us, is a little 
neb lo .  I  hi  big o gani a ion and e e hing mo e  lo l  and i  of en abo  big 
picture ideas about fisheries management that do not always seem practical.  The IOTC is 
practical  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue 
Economy, Government of Seychelles). 
 The above points around organisational prioritisation are particularly important in light 
of B ege  and Wi el  (2018) a g men  abo  he limi a ion  of diploma ic capital available 
to small island states like Seychelles.  While the previous section of this chapter established 
that Seychelles is an active contributor to the projects and programmes initiated by each of the 
four inter-governmental bodies, it is prudent to suggest that it is still impossible for a state with 
limited diplomatic resources to channel its political capital equally between each organisation.  
At least for the KIs interviewed for this study, there was little doubt that the IOTC was 
something of a linchpin in he co n  effo  o en e he o nd managemen  of i  l c a i e 
fisheries resources. 
 For Mauritius, by contrast, fisheries do not enjoy the same exalted status as a domestic 
o  fo eign polic  p io i .  The co n  afo emen ioned effo  o a d  de eloping an Ocean 
Econom , i h he F eepo  Seafood H b at its centre, undoubtedly gives the sector 
importance to Mauritian policymakers.  However, with its diversified services-based economy, 
Mauritian KIs indicated that fisheries were eldom a  he fo ef on  of he co n  diploma ic 
considerations: I do not think I would be speaking honestly if I said that Mauritius gave the 
same importance to fisheries or to the blue economy as Seychelles.  For those guys 
[Seychellois] fisheries are their lifeblood.  For Mauritius, fisheries are important but the sector 
is also a little at odds with the high-tech trading island that Mauritius envisions itself to be or 
at least wants to become  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy 
Commission, Government of Mauritius).  This perspective was echoed by other KIs and was 
een o ha e an impac  on change  o he co n  diploma ic o ien a ion: You ask me about 
our ties with our neighbouring islands.  They are important.  But we see our diplomatic 
potential is lying beyond our region, frankly.  Through our diaspora, we have ties with India 
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that should only become more important over time.  We are in the middle of the Indian Ocean, 
o e ee o  ole a  b idging India, Singapo e, A alia ho e co n ie i h Af ica  
(Researcher Interview: Mauritian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Regional Integration). 
 In contrast with Seychelles, in other words, where the national interest is very much in-
line with what would be expected from a maritime-focused small island state, Mauritian 
national interests are far more expansive.  Indeed, there is a considerable literature around 
Ma i i  effo  o establish itself as an Indian Ocean entrepôt and services hub for finance 
and information technology (Beri 2011; Vines and Oruitemekai, 2008).  Since 2017, the 
Mauritian government has actively promoted an investment-focused national development 
strategy that is geared towards emulating the Singaporean model of economic growth and 
diversification (Tang, Shaw and Holden, 2019).51   
The upshot of adopting these priorities has been a shift in diplomatic approach that sees 
Mauritius investing less time and energy in engaging with its near island neighbours and 
instead allocating more of its diplomatic resources towards engagement with more distant 
Asian neighbours, especially India.  Said the Mauritian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for 
Regional Integration, with a specific mandate on fostering cooperation with the other Western 
Indian Ocean island states: Starting around 2010, I would say, my division [Regional 
Integration] has seen a fairly consistent reduction in budget and staff.  We have a cultural, 
linguistic and geographic affinity with the other islands, but as a practical consideration, I think 
you can understand that a country like India offers Mauritius far more economic potential as 
an investment and trade partner than do Comoros, Madagascar and Seychelles.  The result is 
ha  mo e of he Mini  [Fo eign Affai ] e o ce  ha e been alloca ed o diplomac  
outside our immediate region  (Researcher Interview: Mauritian Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for Regional Integration).   
 Turning the focus back to fisheries-focused inter-governmental organisations, one of 
he appa en  implica ion  of Ma i i  mo e e pan i e fo eign polic  and e l ing diploma ic 
orientation is a political prioritisation of IORA, somewhat at the expense of the country  
political engagement in the other three inter-governmental bodies.  Just as the IOTC gained 
fa o  in Se chelle  d e o i  alignmen  i h Se chelle  a egic in e e  and na ional kill  
base in the more technocratic aspects of fisheries management, so too does IORA align with 
he a egic in e e  of Ma i ian fo eign polic make .  Said he Go e nmen  of Ma i i  
Former Chief Fisheries Officer: IORA is the most strategic organisation for Mauritius.  The 
 




organisation is headquartered here, which means it allows our government to present the 
co n  a  being a  he hea  of he Indian Ocean im.  I don  kno  if hi  mean  Ma i i  
actually plays this role, but the symbolism matters.  IORA also gives Mauritian diplomats a 
platform to engage with India, with Australia, with Singapore and Malaysia.  It helps Mauritius 
expand its diplomatic horizons and visibility  (Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries 
Officer, Government of Mauritius).   
When queried whether he concurred with this sentiment, the Mauritian Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs for Regional Integration was in general agreement: The IOC does not really 
expand our horizons.  It funds useful projects, to be sure, but it also keeps us tied to France, in 
my view.  The IOTC and SWIOFC are important for what they do and we participate, 
especially in their research.  But they are niche organisations and fishing is less all-important 
for us than for Seychelles.  IORA is the organisation that, whether in fisheries or elsewhere, 
we can have dialogue with more partner nations and this is what best suits our interests  
(Researcher Interview: Mauritian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Regional Integration).  
Just as Seychellois officials played a seemingly outsized role in leading the technical 
committees and working groups within the IOTC, a review of IORA documentation indicates 
ha  Ma i ian official  con i e j  nde  half of all ke  po i ion  in he o gani a ion  
Secretariat (IORA, 2017b, 2018).  Mauritian officials, often at a senior level, have been a 
consistent presence at IORA fora, including those hosted by the FSU, while being increasingly 
unreliable as participants in IOC and IOTC meetings (IOC, 2017, 2018; IOTC, 2018a; 
Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of 
Mauritius).    Finally, IORA has established a Chair in Indian Ocean Studies at the University 
of Mauritius, which is intended to serve, at least in part, as a platform for training Mauritian 
natural and social scientists, a  ell a  b ine  leade , on i e  ele an  o IORA  c en  
and projected areas of focus (IORA, 2018, 2019). 
Some caution undoubtedly needs to be applied when it comes to over-interpreting the 
above information and what it says about the political values ascribed by Mauritian authorities 
to IORA versus the other three inter-governmental bodies.  However, the perspectives and 
doc men a  e idence p e en ed do gge  a clo e alignmen  be een IORA  objec i e  of 
closer integration among the Indian Ocean Rim co n ie  and Ma i i  a egic diploma ic 
goals of establishing itself as a central player in a wider Indian Ocean economy.  Contrary to 
Seychelles with its intense focus on fisheries as a foreign policy and diplomatic priority in 
itself, the fisheries sector is largely subsumed into a wider set of expansive diplomatic 
objectives for Mauritius.  IORA, seen as too nebulous and non-technocratic by Seychellois 
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officials, provides a dialogue-based forum that allows Mauritian diplomats to forge closer 
connec ion  i h he a e  like India and Singapo e, hich he  ee a  cen al o hei  co n  
future development.   
For Comoros and Madagascar, foreign policy and diplomatic priorities are, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, different yet again.  For these two countries, wracked by political instability 
and economic underdevelopment, obtaining international legitimacy after periods of 
authoritarian governance and political conflict, along with the foreign aid that comes with such 
legitimacy, are key drivers of diplomatic action.  In the case of Comoros, the Fomboni 
Agreement of 2001, which established the country as a federal state with the national 
presidency rotating between the islands of Anjouan, Grande Comore and Mohéli, was intended 
to establish lasting peace after decades of inter-island rivalry and conflict (Caminade, 2010).  
The failure of this accord, largely resulting from the efforts of political elites on Grande 
Comore to maintain their traditionally privileged access to power, has fostered ongoing 
separatist tensions.  These culminated in the brief separatist takeover of Anjouan in 2008, 
which was forcefully suppressed.  Since this time, levels of foreign aid to Comoros have fallen 
by two-thirds while diplomatic contacts have remained limited due to donor doubts about the 
Como ian go e nmen  commi men  o democ ac  and h man igh  (Caminade, 2018).         
 For Madagascar, the 2009 c  d a , which unseated the elected government of Marc 
Ravalomanana in favour of a military-backed government led by Andry Rajoelina, saw the 
pen ion of he co n  membe hip in bo h he Af ican Union and SADC.  Like Como o , 
Madagascar suffered an almost two-thirds reduction in its foreign aid in the months after the 
coup, including the loss of almost all direct budget support from donors (Andriamahazo, 2012).  
Aid levels have modestly risen since this time, but with levels of diplomatic engagement with 
the international community remaining well-below previous levels.  One consequence of 
foreign aid reductions has been a dramatic rise in absolute poverty from 40% of the population 
in 2007 to 70% of the population in 2016 (Ramariandrasoa, 2017).  
Unlike in Seychelles and Mauritius, it was not possible to gain insights directly from 
Comorian or Malagasy KIs with direct knowledge and experience of national diplomacy.  
Ho e e , he e ponden  f om he o co n ie  fi he ie  ec o  did e p e  hei  o n clea  
opinion  on he ke  fac o  nde l ing hei  na ion  e pec i e fo eign polic  objec i e : For 
Comoros, I think our key issue is the need to tap into ODA [Overseas Development 
Assistance]. You see the loss of this even with the cancelling of the EU-Comoros SFPA 
[Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement].  The government here in Moroni knows that 
getting these funds back is all that really keeps the country afloat  (Researcher Interview: 
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Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  Said a Malagasy KI: This country [Madagascar] has been on the 
verge of collapse since 2009.  Unless the Chinese are going to come to our rescue, we need the 
Europeans to restore previous aid levels.  I think this is what keeps our government up at night  
(Researcher Interview: Vice-President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters 
of Madagascar). 
 With these types of considerations, fisheries in these two countries are  like in 
Mauritius but unlike in Seychelles  generally tied into a broader set of strategic national 
objectives.  For Comoros, fisheries are (or at least could be) an important part of the aid 
relationship the country has with the EU, especially if the bilateral SFPA is ever re-instated.  
However, it is the restoration of aid in general, and the (admittedly questionable) perception 
by the Comorian government that a normalisation of relations with the EU will provide the 
country with leverage in negotiating with France over the political status of Mayotte, that are 
Mo oni  o e a ching objec i e .  Fo  Madaga ca , fi he ie  a e ce ainl  deemed impo an  a  
an economic d i e , b  he co n  co e poli ical cleavage, between a governing elite drawn 
from the highlands around Antananarivo and the historically marginalised coastal areas, is also 
seen to contribute to a side-lining of ocean-relevant issues  as a diplomatic priority among 
Malagasy policymakers (Martial, 2019).  For the Malagasy government, like its Comorian 
counterpart, fisheries are thus important to the extent that they serve broader diplomatic ends 
rather than necessarily serving as a core diplomatic issue in itself. 
 When it comes to the political value placed by the different islands on the four inter-
governmental organisations, this prioritisation by the Comorian and Malagasy governments on 
diplomatic normalisation with donor states and on the restoration of aid flows, leads to a 
political preference for the IOC.  However, rather than the IOC being valued by these two 
countries as a platform for inter-i land in eg a ion, he IOC  ke  al e i  een a  l ing i h 
the opportunities it provides these states to engage diplomatically with France and the 
European Union (and to a lesser degree with China) in order to push for development funding 
(Ramariandrasoa, 2017; Martial, 2019).  Some of this funding is provided to support fisheries-
focused projects like SmartFish and SWIOFish, while other funding is provided to support 
technical projects in sectors like tourism, maritime transport and agriculture (to name just a 
few).  The point, however, is that the IOC is the most developmentally-focused of the four 
inter-governmental bodies, which allows it to most directly meet the immediate diplomatic 
objectives of the Comorian and Malagasy governments: We [at the DGRH] take part in IOC 
projects and IOC meetings.  The organisation has really stopped being about promoting the 
unity of the four independent islands.  The IOC is really there now so that each member, but 
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especially us [Comoros] and Madagascar, can access development funds.  This is important 
because these funds are not so easy to access bilaterally  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries 
Officer, DGRH).   
 The IOC  al e o Como o  and Madaga ca  al o lie  i h he fac  ha  he 
o gani a ion  limi ed membe hip gi e  he e o co n ie  a pla fo m ha  i  na ailable o 
them in the other three inter-governmental bodies with their much broader memberships: I 
attended a few IOTC and IORA meetings as part of a national [Comorian] delegation. We had 
no visibility and no influence.  These organisations are dominated either by big countries like 
India or very invested countries like Mauritius and Seychelles.  For a poor country like us, 
he e e end mall n mbe  of delega e  o mee ing e can pa icipa e [in he e 
organisations] but not with any actual influence on the direction these organisations take.  The 
IOC is different.  It is small and is built on a principle of rotating leadership of the Secretariat  
(Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).  Said the Vice-President of the National 
Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar: The thing with the IOC is that 
it provides Madagascar with a chance to throw its weight around.  We are the biggest of all the 
islands, but only in the IOC can we really project our size.  In the other organisations, we either 
a en  ha  big compa ed o he A ian co n ie  o  e a en  echnicall  p oficient enough to 
have influence, which I think is our issue in the IOTC  (Researcher Interview: Vice-President, 
National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).   
 A review of organisational documentation indicates that, as of 2019, Comorian and 
Malagasy nationals comprised around half of the permanent positions in the IOC Secretariat 
versus none within the IORA and IOTC Secretariats.  Also, whereas a review of project 
meeting minutes and committee reports indicated that Comorian and Malagasy officials had 
not chaired any fisheries-related meetings within IORA, the IOTC or SWIOFC, officials from 
the two countries had frequently presided over working group and committee meetings within 
the IOC, particularly in relation to SmartFish (IOC 2016, 2017).  Once again, none of the above 
should be taken to suggest that Comoros and Madagascar are wholly more invested in the IOC 
at the expense of the other three inter-governmental organisations, but the evidence does 
suggest a much higher level of engagement in an IOC in which these two states feel they have 
more to gain from engaging development partners and where the more limited number of 
member states provides them with greater opportunity to establish influence. 
 Given the above analysis indicating that the various Western Indian Ocean island states 
ascribe political priority to different inter-governmental organisations, it is necessary to ask 
what this means for the inter-island political dynamics fostered through these organisations.  
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With each of the islands having different foreign policy and diplomatic priorities, as well as 
varying perspectives on which inter-governmental organisations are most relevant in 
addressing these priorities, the result is that none of the inter-governmental bodies emerges as 
a vehicle able to consistently harness common energies for sustained fisheries cooperation.  
Rather than allocating their limited amounts of diplomatic capital  whether in the form of 
financial commitments or fisheries personnel  towards mutual cooperation in a single 
institutional framework (as the Pacific island states have broadly done through the FFA), the 
Western Indian Ocean island states allocate their political capital in different directions.  This 
does not prevent any of the four inter-governmental bodies from fostering useful types of 
technical fisheries engagement between the islands.  However, whereas the FFA was allowed 
to emerge as a singular institutional space in which the Pacific island states could develop ever-
deeper working relationships and  over time  create durable fisheries regimes, this singular 
institutional space simply does not exist in the Western Indian Ocean.     
 Admittedly, the fact that the islands hold such strikingly different diplomatic objectives, 
within which fisheries play (except for Seychelles) an often-secondary role, is in itself a sign 
ha  he i land  ma  be oo he e ogeneo  fo  he ec o  o p od ce a con c i i  en e of 
shared political identity or regionness.  This again marks the Western Indian Ocean islands as 
being different from their Pacific counterparts, where the importance of fisheries and the joint 
work undertaken through the FFA to establish regimes such as the Nauru Agreement, do 
constitute a core component of a shared regional  identity.   Such a conclusion, however, is 
something of an indictment of the IOC. After all, the IOC is expressly mandated to promote a 
common sense of Indianocéanie among the islands, including through common fisheries 
endeavours.  The fact that the IOC has largely failed to inspire political cohesion among the 
islands (being valued instead as a mechanism through which donor development funding can 
be accessed) and that Mauritius, the most politically and economically dynamic of the islands, 
sees its strategic priorities as almost wholly lying outside the island grouping, once again raises 
doubts about whether Indianocéanie exists as a real political motivator for any of the islands.  
At the very least, Indianocéanie in the context of fisheries does not seem to exist as a means 
through which these islands can meaningfully articulate the types of transnational interests that 
Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) identify as being so important to the construction of regionness.  
 
5. France as a Disruptor of Regional Fisheries Cooperation within the IOC 
 The final factor that plays an apparent role in hindering inter-governmental 
organisations from fostering political dynamics conducive to deepening fisheries cooperation, 
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integration and regime-building in the Western Indian Ocean, is the role of France.  Bouchard 
and Crumplin (2011) have written provocatively about the two faces  of France in the Western 
Indian Ocean.  On one hand, F ance  o e eign con ol o e  bo h Ma o e and R nion mean  
that France is itself a regional  state with some of the same economic and sustainability 
concerns as the four independent island states.  Alternatively, France is an external power that 
sees the Western Indian Ocean as part of its (diminishing) sphere of influence in Africa.  This 
France, Bouchard and Crumpling argue, is committed primarily to leveraging its sovereignty 
over Mayotte and Réunion as a means to assert both economic and security interests.  This 
includes asserting territorial claims over the Scattered Islands and over Tromelin Island, which 
are claimed by Madagascar and Mauritius, respectively.  Sovereignty over these disputed 
territories is, in itself, of limited value.  However, the sizeable EEZs that accrues to France 
from control over these territories brings with it potential economic benefits from both fisheries 
and from oil and gas extraction. 
 As Chapter 3 indicated, neither Mayotte nor Réunion are themselves major components 
of the Western Indian Ocean tuna fishery.  While some tuna extraction does take place in the 
EEZ around Mayotte, these two islands are somewhat situated outside the core tuna migration 
routes.  Réunion does import both fresh and canned tuna from the other islands, most of which 
is for internal consumption and a small amount which is re-exported to France and the wider 
EU.  For the most part, however, France does not currently have the same vested interest in the 
tuna fishery as do the four independent island states.  This would potentially change were 
France to fully press its territorial/EEZ claims in the region since both the Scattered Islands 
and Tromelin Island are situated within the core tuna migration routes.  For the moment, 
however, fisheries are largely a side-interest for France, important in the context of the 
commercial and donor relationships the country leads, through the SFPAs, with the islands on 
behalf of the EU, but not necessarily a pressing political or diplomatic issue for Paris or its 
constituent islands.  Where French influence in the Western Indian Ocean does impact fisheries 
is in a more indirect way, with France using its clout within the IOC to (often successfully) 
play the other islands off against each other in order to press acceptance of its territorial claims.  
Fisheries cooperation and integration through the IOC becomes something of a casualty of the 
stoked internal divisions that arise between the independent island states as a result of this 
French approach. 
 It should be noted that in spite of the two French islands not being major commercial 
centres for the tuna fishery, Réunion possesses highly specialised fisheries research and 
competent MCS capabili ie .  The e la gel  e i  o ppo  F ance  admini a ion of he 
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French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF).  TAAF is inclusive of the Scattered Islands, but 
i  admini a ion i  foc ed mo e on he go e nance of F ance  b-Antarctic island 
territories, all of which are important in the context of Southern Ocean fisheries where IUU 
fishing  particularly in relation to Patagonian toothfish  emain  a majo  p oblem.  R nion  
technical expertise is valued and has played a central role in the work done by SmartFish and 
SWIOFi h a o nd pg ading all of he i land  e pec i e MCS em  (Re ea che  In e ie : 
Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  However, there is also a broad sense 
of distrust of French intentions among fisheries officials from the other islands: France, or at 
lea  he admini a ion in R nion, of en pla  a eall  con c i e ole.  B  e e  ime e e 
ga he ed a o nd a able i h he F ench, e peciall  a  he IOC, he e i  hi  en e ha  e e 
being lectured to and that our only option is to accept the French way of doing things.  Perhaps 
our anti-colonial mindset still exists and makes us resistant to this.  There is a general resistance 
among the rest of us [independent island states] to accept French advice or other support  
(Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of 
Mauritius). 
 According to interviewed KIs, the roots of antipathy towards France are based, at least 
in part, on what is seen as a politicisation of the IOC in favour of French interests.  The most 
con en io  of F ance  e i o ial claim  in he We e n Indian Ocean i  o e  Ma o e, hich 
has a majority Comorian population, but which voted in referenda in both 1974 and 1976 to 
retain links with France rather than join the other Comorian islands in independence.  Comoros 
has continued to lay sovereign claim to Mayotte, though with little credible chance of bringing 
the island back into its fold, particularly since most Mahorais continue to demonstrate a clear 
preference for remaining under French rule (Caminade, 2018).  Largely to avoid open conflict 
i h Como o , F ance ha  accep ed Ma o e  e cl ion a  a f ll membe  of he IOC.  Fo  
their part, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles all officially support Comorian claims over 
Mayotte, through only Madagascar has supported Comoros in strongly pressing the issue 
(Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  However, 
France has used its bilateral ties with these other islands, as well as IOC fora, as a means to 
p e  he o he  i land a e  in o ending hei  ppo  fo  Como o  claim: When I was 
Secretary-General of the IOC, France played a very quiet and but very skilled game in playing 
the islands against each other.  This was especially the case with Madagascar and Comoros, 
whereby the French would promise some increase in foreign aid or investment to Madagascar 
in exchange for the Malagasy dropping their support, or at least vocal support, for Comoros 
over Mayotte  (Re ea che  In e ie : Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).   
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This was acknowledged by a representative of TAAF based in Réunion: I was at a few 
IOC mee ing .  We [ he F ench] eall  an ed he Ma o e i e  e ol ed.  I  a headache.  
We thought one way to do that was to get Madagascar, which France is close to but which also 
tends to be most agitated about our claim over [the Scattered Islands] Bassas da India, Glorioso 
and o on o op ocall  gi ing ppo  o Como o  o e  Ma o e in exchange for a promise 
to re-visit sovereignty over the Scattered Islands in the future  (Researcher Interview: Senior 
Fisheries Administrator, TAAF Governance Authority).  Indeed, driving a wedge between 
Comoros and Madagascar, with Antananarivo dropping its robust support of Comoros in 
exchange for increased aid and a fair consideration of its territorial disputes with France, 
appears to be a common motivator for France taking an active role in IOC affairs (Caminade, 
2018).  There is little sign that France has a real interest in negotiating sovereignty over the 
Scattered Islands with Madagascar, but doing so Buys time.  Mauritius and Seychelles 
con ide  Ma o e a lo  p io i .  Madaga ca i  i  dependen  on F ance b  a  he ame 
time it still has an anti-colonial streak. An alliance between Comoros and Madagascar over 
di p ed e i o ie i  o ldn  cceed b  i  o ld c ea e in abili  and F ance e peciall  
does not want that in a part of the world they see as under their national influence  (Researcher 
Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles). 
While France typically engages in bilateral diplomacy with Madagascar to press 
Antananarivo on its support for Comorian territorial claims, there is recognition by France that 
fully resolving the Mayotte issue  requires putting the issue to rest within the IOC: The IOC 
no longer plays any real political role, but it has a lingering symbolism as an anti-colonial 
project.  So yes, I would argue that if France wants to resolve its territorial disputes with the 
other islands, having the IOC legitimise these claims is pretty essential  (Researcher Interview: 
Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  The other 
territorial dispute that France seeks to resolve through the IOC relates to Tromelin Island, over 
which it has disputes with Mauritius.  In this dispute, France also appears to be using both 
bilateral diplomacy and IOC structures as a means to find favour for its interests.  France has 
occasionally reached out directly to Mauritius, suggesting support for Mauritian claims over 
the Chagos Islands (currently under British sovereignty and used primarily as an American 
airbase following the forced re-location of its residents to Mauritius in the late 1960s) in 
e change fo  an accep ance of F ench claim  o e  T omelin I land (de l E ac, 2011).   
France has also sought to engage directly with the other islands to press its claims over 
Tromelin.  This includes engaging with the Seychellois government with promises of increased 
aid for maritime security in exchange for recognising French rather than Mauritian claims over 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 145 
Tromelin and its EEZ, as well as with Madagascar over, yet again, the possibility of considering 
Malagasy territorial interests over the Scattered I land  in e change fo  Madaga ca  
ac ie cence o e  F ance  claim o T omelin (Re ea che  In e ie : Chief Diploma ic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  The IOC is again seen as central to French policymakers 
in resolving these disputes, not least for the fact, noted earlier, that both Comoros and 
Madagascar deem the IOC to be useful as a means of accessing French/EU development funds: 
I don  kno  ho  impo an  he IOC eall  i  a  a poli ical o gani a ion.  B  f om a F ench 
perspective, I think we know there is leverage there with Comoros and Madagascar.  If the aid 
the EU provides through the IOC is what is most important for those countries, then France 
sees it as worthwhile to use its leverage in the IOC to try and resolve these remaining territorial 
claims and consolidate its influence.  This is especially important as we know China and India 
are going to become major players in this region eventually  (Researcher Interview: Senior 
Fisheries Administrator, TAAF Governance Authority). 
For the purposes of this study, these territorial disputes are not necessarily relevant in 
themselves.  What matters is what these disputes mean for the relations between the four 
independen  i land a e , pa ic la l  in ligh  of F ance  occa ional effo  o pla  he i land  
against each other within the IOC.  In this regard, there is evidence of at least some loss of 
trust, which in turn has a knock-on effect on the inten i  of he i land  m al coope a ion 
on fisheries.  Said the Chief Diplomatic Advisor for the Government of Seychelles about his 
time leading the IOC: You ask if the French have somewhat undermined the unity of the four 
[independent] islands.  Yes, I think to some degree they have.  This does not mean that all 
France does in our region is bad.  Far from it.  But it is common knowledge among the islands 
ha  he F ench a e ing p omi e  of aid, p omi e  of ecogni ing e i o ial claim all of 
hi o ge  he i land  o go again  each o he  on ome p e ing i e .  I o ldn  o e a e 
the issue, but some trust has been eroded for sure  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  This erosion of trust has been felt in regards to fisheries 
cooperation, with Comoros and Madagascar temporarily downgrading their levels of contact 
over fisheries  including between their MCS officials and their scientific researchers  over a 
two-year period from 2014 to 2016, when there was a perception by Comoros that Madagascar 
was willing to countenance the possibility of lessening its diplomatic support for Moroni over 
Mayotte (Marital 2019; Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).   
Mauritius and Seychelles experienced a similar dip in levels of cooperation, including 
a reduction in joint vessel patrols at the time France was trying to convince Seychelles to 
support its claims over Tromelin Island in exchange for enhanced security cooperation: One 
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of the few things that can poison relations between Mauritius and Seychelles is Tromelin.  Not 
because Seychelles cares about the issue, but because France thinks they can boost their 
le e age b  gi ing Se chelle  goodie  o n again  he Ma i ian po i ion.  I don  ee hi  
approach by the French as working, but they seem to insist on it and it can temporarily 
undermine cooperation  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy 
Commission, Government of Mauritius).  Indeed, there is little actual evidence that France has 
been able to successfully drive a wedge between the islands in any lasting or substantive way.  
The i land  con in e o gene all  ppo  each o he  e i o ial claim  and ha e e i ed 
recognising those of France, including through votes within the IOC.   
However, even if the political pressure applied by France has not changed inter-island 
relations in a lasting way, it has served to periodically seed doubts among island officials about 
whether their counterparts can be trusted to maintain solidarity.  This, in turn, creates periods 
of mistrust that undermine cooperation, including in fisheries.  This mistrust may be short-
lived, but even in temporarily reducing contacts between officials or halting practical joint 
initiatives like vessel patrols, it halts momentum towards the types of deeper cooperation and 
integration that are required for effective regime-building.  This pressure also undermines the 
trust that the islands are willing to place in the IOC as a prospective driver of enhanced 
cooperation.  If the institutional framework of the IOC is being used by France as a means to 
drive diplomatic wedges between the islands, it is unsurprising that the credibility of the 
organisation as a catalyst for Indianocéanie would be intrinsically limited. 
 
6. The Western Indian Ocean Islands as a Socially-Constructed Region: 
Considerations from the Perspective of Inter-Governmental Organisations 
 Just as Chapter 4 argued that the political dynamics evident between the Western Indian 
Ocean i land a e  fi he ies ministries were not conducive to moving these islands beyond 
functional  cooperation towards the enactment of Ruggie-style regimes, this chapter has made 
b oadl  he ame a g men  hen i  come  o he egion  in e -governmental organisations.  
Each of the IOC, IORA, IOTC and SWIOFC play a meaningful role in fostering fisheries-
based dialogue and cooperation between the islands  and between the islands and their 
maritime neighbours in Asia and East Africa.  None of the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that these organisations lack value.  However, the absence of clear coordination 
between the different inter-governmental bodies, accelerated by donor-driven mandate creep , 
has produced a great deal of overlap and even outright duplication in the types of fisheries 
projects and programmes these organisations seek to facilitate.  This, in turn, places a heavy 
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b den on he i land a e  limi ed h man and financial e o ce  and i  prevents each of the 
islands, but especially under-resourced Comoros and Madagascar, from fully participating in 
inter-governmental organisation initiatives in a uniform manner.  The upshot is that none of 
he e o gani a ion  fi he ie  ini ia i e  pla  he ole he  ideall  ho ld in incen i i ing 
deepening cooperation, integration and collective action among the islands.     
 In addition, the effectiveness of the four inter-governmental organisations in fostering 
a sense of regionness among the islands is undermined by the fact that each of the island states 
ascribes a different value to each o gani a ion.  Se chelle  poli ical p efe ence fo  he IOTC, 
Ma i i  p efe ence fo  IORA, a  ell a  he Como ian and Malaga  p efe ence fo  he IOC, 
a e all oo ed in he e co n ie  e pec i e fo eign polic  and diploma ic priorities, of which 
fi he ie  (e cep  in Se chelle ) a e eldom a  he fo ef on .  Wi h he i land a e  ca ce 
diplomatic resources being prioritised for different organisations, the result is that none of these 
bodies emerge as a uniformly accepted vehicle able to harness the political capital of the islands 
as a grouping.  From a fisheries standpoint, this means that no institution equivalent to the FFA 
in the Pacific, which singularly coordinates the sustained interactions between island states 
required to foster durable regimes, exists in the Western Indian Ocean.   
The infl ence of F ance in he We e n Indian Ocean, bo ne of bo h he co n  
sovereign control over Mayotte and Réunion, as well as its ambitions to project power and 
influence in a region of former French colonial rule, produces both positive and negative 
outcomes.  Among the latter are stoked internal divisions among the four independent island 
states, occasionally played off against each other by France as Paris seeks to gain acceptance 
for its territorial/EEZ claims in the region.  The IOC, symbolic as the inter-governmental body 
meant to represent the anti-colonial  interests of the independent islands (even if it has long 
stopped playing this role in practice), is seen by France as an important avenue through which 
to press its claims.  The result is that the IOC has itself come to be somewhat delegitimised as 
an organisation that fosters divisive political dynamics rather than the cooperative dynamics 
required for deepening fisheries integration. 
 As in Chapter 4, it must again be asked what the above observations say about the 
Western Indian Ocean islands as a socially-constructed region. The sheer scale of the technical 
cooperation that is fostered through each of the IOC, IORA, IOTC and SWIOFC makes clear, 
yet again, the existence of technical fisheries linkages between the islands  and between the 
islands and the wider Indian Ocean rim community.  Each of the organisations provide 
pla fo m  fo  engagemen  be een he i land  e pec i e fi he ie  official , hile p ojec  like 
SmartFish and SWIOFish ensure the availability of substantial funding to facilitate 
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functional  fi he ie  coope a ion.  N e  (1968: xii) definition of a region  as a limited 
number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual 
interdependence  h  emain  an ap  minim m anda d defini ion ha  he i land  
engagement through inter-governmental organisations would easily meet.  The above would 
al o indica e ha  he i land  ea il  mee  Po e  and Goe  (2011: 2389) simple definition 
of a region  as geography plus something , with the something  encompassing a wide array 
of cooperative endeavours, particularly in relation to fisheries MCS. 
At the same time, the fact that, with the exception of the IOC, the inter-governmental 
organisations discussed in this chapter have memberships that extend beyond the Western 
Indian Ocean island states and also encompass a much wider Indian Ocean geography, raises 
legitimate questions about whether it is even appropriate to speak of the islands as a stand-
alone fisheries region . Perhaps they should instead be considered in the context of a wider 
Western Indian Ocean that also includes the fisheries interests of East Africa and even South 
Asian states like Maldives and Sri Lanka.  More important is whether the islands represent 
an hing app o ima ing He ne and S de ba m  (2000: 461) new regionalist  definition of 
a geographical area transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of 
articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region.   As with inter-ministerial 
relations outlined in Chapter 4, there are enough functional  linkages between these islands, 
as well as dedicated inter-governmental organisations and organisational initiatives, that it is 
likely unfair to consider the islands merely as a passive object .  However, from the evidence 
presented in this chapter, it also remains unclear as to whether the islands truly possess a 
commonly understood set of transnational interests  when it comes to fisheries.   
Much of the functional  cooperation being promoted by inter-governmental 
organisations, through projects like SmartFish and SWIOFish, is donor-driven. It is doubtful 
whether these initiatives would have got off the ground (or whether the political will exists to 
ain hem) in he ab ence of hi  f nding.  The i land  di e ging fo eign polic  and 
diplomatic goals, and the fact that only Seychelles appears to see fisheries as a driving force in 
i  fo eign polic , al o gge  ha  an na ional  fi he ie  in e e , e en he e he  seem to 
exist, are not ascribed the same level of importance by each island state.  As was said about 
in e ac ion  be een he i land  fi he ie  mini ie  in Chap e  4, ha  eem  o al o e i  a  
the inter-governmental organisation level are interactions that are largely fragmented, ad hoc 
and defined more by cooperative opportunism rather than anything resembling a shared 
strategic vision for the fisheries sector. 
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Looking again at the typology of regionness introduced by Hettne (2005: 548), in which 
states can constitute a regional space , a regional translocal system , a regional social 
system , a regional international society , a regional community  or a regionalised 
institutional polity , i  i  po ible o offe  a f he  j dgmen  a  o he e he i land  
interactions through inter-governmental organisations place them on a fisheries-focused 
regionness spectrum.  The islands easily meet the standard to be seen as a regional space  ( a 
geographic area, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers ) and a translocal social 
system  ( the region is organised by human inhabitants, at first in relatively isolated 
communities, but more and more creating some kind of trans-local relationship ).  The islands 
clearly constitute a physically separate geographic grouping and have reasonably sophisticated 
political and economic relationships with one another that go well beyond the translocal, 
regardless of whether they are being considered through the lens of inter-ministerial relations 
or at the level of inter-governmental organisations.   
The more sophisticated regional social system , defined by Hettne as involving ever 
widening translocal relations, in which the constituent units are dependent on each other, as 
well as on the overall stability of the system , inspires more interesting questions.  Translocal 
relations between the island states are reasonably sophisticated, with considerable technical or 
functional  ties fostered by each of the inter-governmental organisations.  However, it is not 
at all apparent that the inter-governmental organisations themselves provide a coherent stable 
system  on which fisheries-based regionness has been (or even can be) established.  Instead, 
what seems to exist are four separate inter-governmental organisations, mostly dependent on 
funding from donors outside the region, acting independent of each other rather than harnessing 
their founding mandates to create a cooperative system defined by technical complementarities.  
The inter-governmental organisations do create a degree of regional dependence  to the extent 
that they are primarily facilitators of fisheries-related funding, but it is not apparent that these 
organisations themselves are truly building sets of foundational regimes upon which fisheries 
cooperation can be deepened.   
For the islands to be deemed a regional international society , meanwhile, they must 
be characterised by norms and rules which increase the level of predictability in the system.   
In this regard, the inter-governmental organisations present a mixed picture.  The two rules 
setting bodies, the IOTC and SWIOFC, have adapted international norms regarding fisheries 
management, particularly in regards to MCS, and have been successful in having these be 
adopted by the islands.  However, the fact that the islands have not institutionalised a 
predictable set of regimes around MCS  such as protocols on joint vessel patrols, MCS 
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training protocols, or dedicated financial commitments to the sharing of surveillance assets (to 
name just a few), suggests that at least in this particular aspect of fisheries management, the 
inter-governmental organisations have not had much success in fostering regionness.  He ne  
regional community  takes shape when an enduring organisational framework facilitates and 
promotes social communication and convergence of values and behaviour throughout the 
region.   Each of the inter-governmental organisations, in theory, should play this role.  Were 
he o gani a ion  b oadl  coo dina ed a he  han d plica ing each o he  effo , he e bodie  
very well could facilitate the types of rationalised collective action that would make the 
convergence of values and behaviour possible.  Similarly, when it comes to whether the islands 
constitute a regionalised institutional polity  that has a more fixed structure of decision-
making and stronger actor capability , it is again unclear that a real meaningful level of 
actorness (the capacity to act on commonly-defined priorities) is produced by the inter-
governmental bodies.  Or, more specifically, while it appears that actorness in the region can 
be galvanised in a short-term manner by donor funding, the inter-governmental bodies do not 
necessarily provide a fixed structure of decision-making that will allow for this actorness to be 
sustained over time. 
Reflecting again on the issue of SIDS diplomacy, the analysis presented in this chapter 
ho ld ei e a e he fac  ha  comple  poli ical d namic , and no  i landne  b  i elf, pla  
a de e mining ole in he e en  o hich SIDS ie  ganging p  i h each other as a political 
and diplomatic priority.  At least in the context of the Western Indian Ocean SIDS, island state 
foreign policies are considerably more diverse than ha  migh  be a med if he e a e  
diplomacy was merely conditioned by their vulnerability.  It is because of this diversity that 
the islands choose to allocate their political capital towards different inter-governmental 
organisations.  In this island context, diversity in national interests has not necessarily served 
o make ganging p  nimpo an , b  i  i  al o clea  ha  in e -island cooperation is seldom 
seen as a main motivator of diplomatic behaviour.   
While both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 largely focused on inter-island political 
engagement over fisheries at the government-level, Chapter 6 will now take a very different 
focus, turning attention to the role of non-state actors in facilitating cooperative dynamics and 







CHAPTER 6: Non-State Actors and the Building of Sustainable Fisheries 
Regimes in the Western Indian Ocean 
 
1. Introduction and Chapter Overview  
 Building on the previous two chapters and their focus on inter-island political dynamics 
at the state-level, this chapter takes a different turn and explores these dynamics in the context 
of non-state actors.  A key difference between the new regionalism  discussed by scholars 
like Hettne and Söderbaum (1998, 2000), Hurrell (1995) and Shaw (2000), and the more 
realist-oriented old regionalism , is the view held by the former that non-state actors  
encompassing a broad swath of transnational civil society  can be just as central to the process 
of region formation as are political elites acting within formal government structures.  Indeed, 
a con c i i  en e of egion  a  being fo med h o gh ongoing ocial in e ac ion , 
typically requires non-state actors to play a leading role in creating common norms and values 
that governments can draw upon when pursuing formal processes of regionalisation.  
Following a similar investigative approach as the previous two chapters, this chapter asks how 
engagement be een he i land g o ping  non-state actors is incentivising (or not 
incentivising) political dynamics between the islands that are conducive to deepening fisheries 
cooperation, integration and regime-building (or at least regime-influencing) in fisheries.  
In both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, it was argued that the political dynamics at play 
between the island states over fisheries, while helpful in fostering functional  cooperation at 
the technical level, were not conducive to bringing these islands together in the integrative 
manner required for them to collectively form sustainable fisheries regimes.  At the state-to-
state ministerial level, this is due to the development disparities evident between the islands, 
as well as the economic competition between them over fisheries investment from DWFNs.  
These factors create different political and policy incentives which make Pacific-style fisheries 
egime  diffic l  o e abli h fo  he e a e .  A  he le el of he We e n Indian Ocean  
fisheries-focused inter-governmental organisations, political dynamics conducive to closer 
integration are undermined by the lack of coordination between these inter-governmental 
bodies and the resulting duplication of many of their core activities.  This duplication stretches 
he i land  financial and h man e o ce  e  hinl  and p e en  he i land  (pa ic la l  
under-resourced Comoros and Madagascar) from participating fully in the initiatives of the 
IOC, IORA, IOTC and SWIOFC.  Inter-island political cooperation over fisheries is also 
weakened, at least to a degree, by the fact that the islands have very different foreign policy 
and diplomatic priorities, within which fisheries are not necessarily an overriding focus.  This 
has the effect of driving the islands towards allocating their political capital towards supporting 
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different inter-governmental organisations, meaning that none of these organisations has the 
opportunity to emerge as an FFA- le linchpin fo  nif ing he i land  fi he ie  in e e . 
Finally, the role of France  as both a regional  state and as an external power with geo-
political interests in the Western Indian Ocean  is often contentious.  Successful French efforts 
to play the islands against each other within the IOC, the organisation with arguably the most 
po en ial o channel he i land  ha ed in e e , nde mine  he i land  confidence in he IOC 
and e e  o hinde  hi  bod  po en ial o e e a  a d i e  of fi he ie  in eg a ion. 
At the non-state level, the nature of engagement between the islands once more fails to 
incentivise the types of political dynamics that are sufficient to bring about sustained fisheries 
cooperation, integration and regime-building.  There are two key reasons for this.  First, in an 
echo of the issues identified in the previous two chapters, state weakness in both Comoros and 
Madagascar is mirrored by the weakness of civil society in these two countries.  Fisheries 
focused NGOs, Boa  O ne  A ocia ion , cien ific e ea ch in i e  and independen  
associations of fisheries experts all exist in Comoros and Madagascar.  However, they lack the 
organisation, political freedom and access to financial resources required to be pro-active and 
to serve as dedicated contributors to an inter-island epistemic community.  This stands in 
contrast to Mauritius and Seychelles, where these actors are more organised, enjoy greater 
access to funding and have comparatively more political freedom.  Fisheries-oriented civil 
society groups in Mauritius and Seychelles are consequently better equipped to develop inter-
island ties.  The upshot of this is something of a bilateral fisheries epistemic community 
emerging between Mauritius and Seychelles, which is often highly effective and which tends 
o domina e he i land g o ping  cientific and research bodies.  However, this epistemic 
community largely excludes consistent representation from Comoros and Madagascar, thus 
limiting its regional  scope.        
Second, in spite of these disparities in civil society strength between the four 
independent island states, civil society in all of the islands often struggles to act in a manner 
ha  i  l  independen  f om he a e.  Pa iall  a  a p od c  of he e co n ie  common 
smallness , opportunities for funding or project engagement for non-state actors tends to come 
almost exclusively through opportunities facilitated by national governments  and particularly 
through appointments to the boards of government-led initiatives.  While not problematic in 
itself, this means that these non-state actors have relatively little room for independent 
maneuver and their opportunities to engage across borders tend to be closely tied to the 
engagement that takes place at the state-level.  As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, 
this state-level engagement is seldom adequate in incentivising deepening cooperation, 
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integration and regime-building.  Non- a e ac o  diffic l ie  in fo ging independen  
pathways of inter-island cooperation tends to make them relatively ineffective in changing this 
overall dynamic.   
With non-state actors within the Western Indian Ocean island grouping too often 
lacking strength and/or autonomy, they are unable to make a strong contribution to the 
development of political dynamics that are conducive to sustained fisheries cooperation, 
integration or regime-building.  Once again, this marks the Western Indian Ocean island 
context as being different from that of the Pacific.  In the latter island grouping, non-state actors 
face many of the same limitations.  However, non-state actors in the Pacific have developed a 
number of collaborative structures, particularly through institutions like the University of the 
South Pacific, that provide more opportunities for organisation and for the regularised 
interactions required to construct common values.  As in the previous two chapters, relevant 
points of comparison between the Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean will be highlighted in 
order to reinforce key points.       
The chapter will present its evidence for the above arguments through the examination 
of the role played by various non-state actors, particularly NGOs, marine research institutes 
and the epistemic communities of technical experts supporting them, to develop and rollout 
cooperative inter-island measures to combat IUU fishing. 
 
2. Inter-Island Disparities in the Strength of Non-State Actors: The Challenges of 
Creating a Truly Regional  Epistemic Community in the Western Indian Ocean 
 In Chapter 3, a cross-section of non-state actors was briefly introduced from each of 
the Western Indian Ocean island states.  While not an exhaustive classification, these non-state 
actors can be broadly placed into five groups.  The first of these are the associations of fishers 
that can be found in most coastal communities where fishing is a significant livelihood.  These 
a ocia ion , picall  efe ed o in each of he i land  a  Boa  O ne  A ocia ion , a e 
primarily concerned with local issues, such as the upkeep of fisheries infrastructure (e.g. 
landing sites) and the pricing for their catches in local markets.  However, they have also 
emerged in each of the islands, to varying degrees, as civil society movements concerned with 
government regulations that impact on coastal fishing.   
For instance, ongoing efforts by the Malagasy government to designate select coastal 
waters as Marine Protected Areas, with circumscribed access for both traditional and artisanal 
fishers, has galvanised the associations to band together as a loosely organised activist 
movement (UNEP, 2015).  Efforts by Mauritian policymakers to introduce marine spatial 
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planning a  pa  of ha  co n  Ocean Econom  S a eg , ha  had a imila  effec  a  local 
associations of fishers band together to try and protect customary access to long-held fishing 
grounds (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, 
Government of Mauritius).  The local focus of these associations, connected to the fact that 
they are almost exclusively concerned with matters pertaining to near-shore traditional and 
artisanal fisheries, unsurprisingly limits their interest in (and scope for) acting on a 
transnational basis. However, some connections have been forged between Mauritian and 
Se chelloi  Boa  O ne  A ocia ion .   
The second prominent group of non-state actors are NGOs, most locally-founded and 
national in scope, but enjoying some financial support from international donors and often 
serving as sub-contracted programme implementing partners for international organisations 
like WWF.  Relatively few of these organisations take fisheries as an exclusive focus, instead 
adopting mandates that tie fisheries into a wider emphasis on marine and coastal conservation, 
as well as sustainable livelihoods development. Among the most prominent of these NGOs are 
the Seychelles Island Conservation Society (SICS), Nature Seychelles, the Mauritius Marine 
Conservation Society (MMCS), Blue Ventures (an international NGO with a dedicated 
operation in Northern Madagascar), Madagascar Marine Conservation (MMC) and the Mohéli 
Na ional Pa k Con e a ion Socie  in Como o .  Like he Boa  O ne  A ocia ion , he e 
NGOs are largely concerned with traditional and artisanal fisheries and take a predominantly 
national focus.  However, some have had opportunities to engage across borders as part of 
project-focused meetings and networking events coordinated by the IOC and SWIOFC  
typically under the auspices of SmartFish and SWIOFish.   
The third key group of non-state actors consists of the scientific research, training and 
other technical fisheries bodies found in each of the island states.  In most cases, these bodies 
are administratively autonomous from their national governments, though the degree to which 
this autonomy is operationalised in practice will be considered later in this chapter.  A number 
of these bodies incorporate fisheries into broader technical mandates and with officials from 
these organisations sometimes serving concurrently as technical advisers within the 
Secretariats of inter-governmental bodies like the IOTC and SWIOFC (Ramariandrasoa, 
2017).  Examples of these organisations include the Albion Fisheries Research Centre (in 
Mauritius), the MOI, the MMTA, the Seychelles Maritime Academy and IRD (in Réunion), as 
well as IHSM and CNRO (both in Madagascar).  It also includes WIOMSA, which is 
Mauritius-based but acts as a dedicated regional  research body.  As was noted in Chapter 3, 
these technical bodies do engage on an inter-island basis, often in the form of organising 
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workshops, participating in staff exchanges and, in the case of training institutes like the 
Seychelles Maritime Academy, providing direct training to maritime officials (including 
fisheries observers) from across the different islands. 
The fourth group of non-state actors are somewhat linked to the above, but consist of 
more academically-focused research bodies tied into national universities.  The two most 
prominent of these are the Chair in Indian Ocean Studies, housed at the University of Mauritius 
and with a small research staff funded by IORA, as well as the James Michel Blue Economy 
Research Institute (BERI) based at the University of Seychelles.  These initiatives are both 
relatively recent, with both the Chair in Indian Ocean studies and BERI being established in 
2015.  They are also very small in scope, with the research complement at the University of 
Mauritius being six individuals and that of BERI consisting of eight researchers (only three of 
whom are at a senior-level) (Researcher Interview: Director of BERI; UoM, 2018).  
Comparative university-based research institutions do not seem to exist in either Comoros or 
Madagascar, likely the result of near-continuous reductions in public funding for tertiary 
education over the past ten years, (Caminade, 2018).   These university-based institutes are 
intended to serve, over the long-term, as regional hubs  for both natural science and social 
science research relating to fisheries and the wider blue economy .  At present, they play this 
role only to a limited degree, though this may change in the near future once these institutes 
are able to obtain long-term stable financing (Researcher Interview: Director of BERI).   
The fifth group of non-state actors is somewhat less defined than the other four groups, 
consisting of unaffiliated technical experts, most of whom previously served in senior 
management or technical roles within their respective national governments and/or within the 
Secretariats of bodies like the IOTC.  This group of experts, most from Mauritius and 
Seychelles, consist of around 20-30 individuals who make-up something of a floating roster of 
consultants who typically advise on government fisheries policies and who play important roles 
in the design of inter-governmental organisation projects like SmartFish and SWIOFish 
(Researcher Interview: Former Chief Fisheries Officer, Government of Mauritius; Researcher 
Interview: Secretary-General, IOTC). 
 From the above, it should be apparent that a wide-range of fisheries-focused non-state 
actors operate within the Western Indian Ocean island grouping.  The question then becomes 
to what extent these different non-state actors serve to form the type of inter-island epistemic 
community that scholars like Keck and Sikkink (1998) see as being essential when it comes to 
shaping the norms and values that underpin integrative cooperation and region-formation.  The 
answer to this question, perhaps unsurprisingly, is complex and it speaks to the national 
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disparities within the island grouping that have been a consistent discussion point throughout 
this study.   
In the context of both Mauritius and Seychelles, the above non-state actors enjoy 
reasonably high and consistent levels of funding.  For the Mauritian and Seychellois NGOs 
noted earlier, around 40% of their core funding comes from sources linked to the state, 
including through the government appointment of NGOs to serve on the boards of state-led 
fisheries projects and programmes (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean 
Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius; Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  Additional finance comes from national and 
international fundraising from individuals/charities, as well as from international donor 
agencies.  The British Department for International Development (DfID), the Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD) and the European Commission are the three main 
international donors to development projects in the Western Indian Ocean.  Each of these 
agencies typically view national NGOs as ideal implementing partners (or co-implementing 
partners to state agencies) for funded initiatives (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic 
Advisor, Government of Seychelles).   
The high visibility of both Mauritius and Seychelles as international eco-tourism 
de ina ion , combined i h he o co n ie  reputations for clean government, means that 
there is no shortage of funding for development programmes in these islands, including for 
those that adopt a focus on coastal and marine conservation or sustainable fisheries livelihoods.  
Said the Executive Director of Nature Seychelles: Se chelle and I ppo e Ma i i a e 
both sexy countries.  We are known globally as places people want to come for holiday.  This, 
and I think o  go e nmen  being een a  hone  and an pa en , mean  ha  e don  ffe  
f om lack of a en ion.  We [Na e Se chelle ] p e en  o el e  ell, b  i  a e ha  e 
have to scramble for funding  (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, Nature Seychelles). 
The same situation largely holds true for Mauritian and Seychellois academic and 
echnical e ea ch in i e .  Like he e co n ie  NGO , echnical e ea ch and aining 
bodies all receive a combination of state-funding and funding from international donors.  
Bodies like the MOI, the Seychelles Maritime Academy and WIOMSA, to provide arguably 
the three most prominent examples, also receive funding indirectly from donors through the 
IOC (MOI, 2017, 2018; WIOMSA 2019).  Universities in Mauritius and Seychelles are 
publicly-funded, but again with international donors playing an important role as financial 
contributors  IORA in the case of the University of Mauritius and the European Commission 
in the case of BERI: Our funding projections are reasonably stable.  Either our [Seychellois] 
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government, the IOC or some other donors like the EC [European Commission] have provided 
our core programme funding.  Whether this funding is reliable for the long-term is something 
e ll need o a ch clo el , but I certainly think we [BERI] are in a stable position  
(Researcher Interview: Director of BERI). 
Stable funding for non-state actors in Mauritius and Seychelles is complemented by the 
existence of reasonably well-developed platforms for civil society organisation in both states.  
In Mauritius, the national Civil Society Forum (CSF) serves as a platform for discussion 
between NGOs, universities and the leaders of national research institutes.  While CSF brings 
together non-state actors on a wide range of thematic areas, it includes a sub-platform for 
Marine Conservation and Fisheries, which draws together the full gamut of non-state actors 
no ed ea lie , incl ding ep e en a i e  f om Boa  O ne  A ocia ion .  In Se chelle , he 
Citizens Engagement Platform (CEP) serves much the same purpose as the Mauritian CSF, 
i h CEP  b-pla fo m on En i onmen al S ainabili  b inging he co n  Boa  O ne  
Associations, NGOs and technical research institutes together in regular fisheries-focused 
discussion forums (CEP, 2018).  Said the Executive Director of Nature Seychelles: We engage 
quite a lot with other organisations and with national researchers who share our interests, 
incl ding in fi he ie .  Ye , CEP i  ce ainl  pa  of hi , b  e don  need ha  formal platform 
to engage with each other.  CEP helps us build relationships, but once these have been formed, 
we get into the habit of interacting with each other  (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, 
Nature Seychelles). 
The platforms for civil society organisation present in Mauritius and Seychelles provide 
more than just a coordinating mechanism.  They also serve as mechanisms for civil society 
strengthening, with both CSF and CEP engaging in internal exchanges of experience among 
members on issues of organisational capacity-building, advocacy, as well as research and 
dissemination.  Both platforms have also brought in outside expertise, including representatives 
from the Africa-EU Civil Society Forum, to expose members to a range of capacity 
development measures related to the above issues (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, 
Nature Seychelles).  The upshot of these efforts is a small but reasonably robust civil society 
in he o co n ie , i h e en loo el  o gani ed bodie  like Boa  O ne  Associations 
demonstrating internal organisation and professionalism.  This, in turn, allows them to engage 
fairly effectively in advocacy on fisheries matters that are of concern to them: Civil society 
here [in Seychelles] is fairly robust.  This civil ocie  i  mall e e one kno  each 
o he b  i  i  effec i e.  Ve  fe  of o  fi he ie  policie  e e  ge  enac ed i ho  a igo o  
vetting by NGOs, researchers and the like.  I do think the same is true in Mauritius, at least 
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based on my discussions with colleagues there  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance 
Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).   
Potentially counterbalancing these strengths are questions around the degree to which 
Mauritian and Seychellois non-state actors are truly non-state: If you really begin 
interrogating these different organisations and [technical and research] institutes, you would 
find that their distance from the state is pretty minimal.  Lots of people involved in fisheries 
move between the government and the NGO sector, for example.  It is a bit incestuous and 
ha  o e calling non-state actors are not always that useful in acting as a civil society 
watchdog on government decisions  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean 
Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  The negative implications of limited non-
state actor autonomy from government institutions will be interrogated in the next section of 
this chapter.  For the moment, it is worth drawing attention to the benefits that these close 
linkages provide; namely, the opportunities that each of the above non-state actors from 
Mauritius and Seychelles have to engage with each other as partners on government-led 
initiatives. 
The o co n ie  JMA over the Mascarene Plateau, which represents the closest thing 
that exists to an integrative set of (bilateral) ocean governance regimes among the Western 
Indian Ocean islands, provides a case in point.  In 2017, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) launched a JMA Demonstration Project in order to equip Mauritian and 
Seychellois government officials  incl ding ho e f om he o a e  fi he ie  mini ie   
with guidance on the policy measures and good practices that would need to be introduced for 
the JMA to be successful.  Included in the project, at the behest of the government officials 
involved in the project design, were a number of the non-state actors noted earlier.  Academic 
staff from the Seychelles Maritime Academy and the Mauritius Maritime Training Academy 
were brought into the project to develop a joint training curriculum for fisheries surveillance 
personnel, ship repair personnel and naval officers tasked to undertake common naval security 
exercises geared towards the prevention of IUU fishing (Researcher Interview: Deputy 
Director, Seychelles Maritime Academy).   
The MOI and the Seychelles Centre for Marine Research and Technology (SCMRT) 
were brought into the project to co-create key performance indicators that could be used to 
inform the design of a common Monitoring and Evaluation system for assessing the 
environmental impact of economic activities like fishing and seabed mining within the JMA 
(Re ea che  In e ie : E ec i e Di ec o , MOI).  Finall , ep e en a i e  f om Boa  O ne  
Associations and NGOs were participants, alongside government officials, in the design of a 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 159 
civil society financing mechanism, initiated by the UNDP and eventually passed to the control 
of the Mauritian and Seychellois governments, that was to emerge as a side-benefit from the 
establishment of the JMA (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, Nature Seychelles).  
Interactions between these non-state actors also took place in the context of both the SmartFish 
and SWIOFish projects, with representatives from bodies like MOI, SCMRT and SMA all 
e ing a  membe  of he o p ojec  e pec i e ee ing commi ee  o  a  a minim m 
serving as part of a consultative roster  of project civil society advisors (Researcher Interview: 
Deputy Director, Seychelles Maritime Academy). 
For the Mauritian and Seychellois KIs interviewed for this study, the opportunity to 
engage on a transnational basis through the UNDP JMA Demonstration Project and through 
initiatives like SmartFish and SWIOFish, was instrumental in forging ties between non-state 
actors in the two state that may otherwise have never emerged: There were a few particular 
instances where civil society in the two countries had the chance to interact.  I would not 
overstate the frequency of these interactions, but connections were forged.  We [at MOI] 
developed a working relationship with our sister institution [SCMRT] in Seychelles.  We 
started to exchange ideas and we continue to do so now even outside the context of these 
[projects].  We have developed some common ideas on how to support our countries realise 
pa  of he bl e econom  and e  o p h ome ha moni a ion in he e idea  be een 
Mauritius and Seychelles  (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, MOI).  Notably, 
improved digital connectivity serves as a tool that appears to allow non-state actors 
participating in the JMA Demonstration Project to collaborate and coordinate their actions  
through digital sharing platforms, common scientific databases and even through social media.     
A similar perspective was shared by the Director of the Seychelles Maritime Academy, 
highlighting the experiences of his institution and other technical training institutes: 
SmartFish and the UNDP [JMA Demonstration] project provided a foundation for short-term 
interactions between people from Mauritius and Seychelles.  Not just government, but even 
our colleagues from our sister institute in Mauritius [Mauritius Maritime Training Academy].  
We worked together to develop training curricula for these projects and now we still exchange 
idea  on hi , on eache  aining and app ai al and of co e, e ome ime  e change 
students and staff for short-term exchange placements.  These interactions are all recent, but I 
think they are really good in bringing our countries closer together  (Researcher Interview: 
Deputy Director, Seychelles Maritime Academy). 
What appears to exist at present is something of a bilateral epistemic community 
emerging between Mauritius and Seychelles.  KIs were adamant that the existence of this 
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community should not be overstated: Mauritius and Seychelles interact more now because of 
the JMA [over the Mascarene Plateau].  This agreement provides a rationale and platform for 
in e ac ion, I d a  bo h fo  go e nmen  official  and fo  non-state actors.  But this is all fairly 
recent.  There were always interactions before between fisheries scientists and researchers in 
the two countries, but the regularity and depth of interaction has only really taken off in the 
last ten years, again thanks in large part to the JMA  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance 
Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles).  The Mauritian 
Consul to Seychelles, in a brief interview, noted: Part of my job is to facilitate meetings 
between Mau i ian and Se chelloi  companie , e ea che , in i ion  and o on.  If o e 
alking abo  fi he ie , I d a  he la  en ea  ha e eall  een an inc ea e in he in e e  that 
bo h co n ie  echnical people ha e in engaging i h each o he .  [The] JMA matters in this 
ega d.  I d a  he e diffe en  fi he ie  p ojec  f om he IOC [Sma Fi h and SWIOFi h] 
matter and so too does the idea of the blue economy.  It gives a common strategic rationale for 
closer integration  (Researcher Interview: Honourary Consul of Mauritius in Seychelles).   
Material evidence of this closer collaboration, in the form of technical reports, scientific 
publications, joint projects between institutions, or even minutes from meetings between civil 
society groups from the two countries, is admittedly limited.  A partial exception exists in the 
form of WIOMSA, where a cursory review of published reports from 2017 and 2018 indicates 
that Mauritian and Seychellois marine scientists have been co-authors on around a third of 
publications (WIOMSA, 2018).  However, it is difficult to derive too many conclusions from 
this since a large number of these publications also include researchers from outside the island 
grouping.  It was not possible for this study to interview a representative from WIOMSA, but 
he Ocean Go e nance Ad i o  i hin he Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e Econom , al o a 
contributor to WIOMSA publications, stated: When alking abo  cien i , I d a  he e i  a 
general consensus between Mauritius and Seychelles, interestingly not always in agreement 
with the French scientists based in Réunion, on what is important to research, around common 
research methodologies and on how to disseminate research. This makes them allies.  
(Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, 
Government of Seychelles). 
This same respondent also noted, however, that this engagement did not necessarily 
constitute a fully-fledged epistemic community: Linkages between Mauritius and Seychelles 
are growing.  The e e i ed fo  a long ime be een go e nmen  and no  he e g o ing 
between your non- a e ac o .  B  he e ill m ch loo e  ela ion hip  han ha  o  ee 
in the Pacific, for example, where the FFA and the University of the South Pacific have been 
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working for a long time on developing and really preserving scientific collaboration  
(Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department of Blue Economy, 
Government of Seychelles). 
What emerges from the above perspectives is an acknowledgment of, if not a fully-
fledged epistemic community with sophisticated linkages between Mauritius and Seychelles, 
at least a growing network of inter-island contacts and evolving avenues of cooperation 
between them.  The JMA over the Mascarene Plateau has provided the two countries with a 
formalised set of agreements within which to situate some of this cooperation.  While it may 
be too hasty to suggest that these linkages are evidence of evolved levels of regionness, they 
at least point positively towa d  a ocial con c i i  en e of con i en  in e ac ion  leading 
to the gradual development of closer ties and the emergence of common ideas/perspectives 
among non-state actors.  Looking at this issue from the perspective of the island grouping as a 
whole, however, it is readily apparent that the growing linkages between Mauritian and 
Seychellois non-state actors are not replicated when it comes to the inclusion of their Comorian 
and Malagasy counterparts.  At a fundamental level, this is due to the weakness of civil society 
in these latter two island states. 
Comorian civil society, whether pertaining to fisheries or broader issue areas, is poorly 
organised and lacks access to funding.  Equally important, however, is that the inter-island 
political cleavages that define the country also characterise its civil society.  The majority of 
non- a e ac o , hich incl de Boa  O ne  A ocia ion  and a mall co e ie of local NGO  
focused on coastal conservation and support for traditional fisheries livelihoods, are organised 
at an individual-island level rather than on a national basis (Caminade, 2018; Researcher 
Interview: Representative from the Grande Comore Union of Boat Owners).  While there are 
occasional instances of organisations forming national umbrella bodies, it is more common for 
civil society groups to be reliant on funding (and even outright patronage) from political elites 
based in the individual island capitals, many of whom are dedicated to the independence (or at 
least deep autonomy) of their respective islands (Caminade, 2018).  The result of this is that 
Comorian civil society lacks organisational scale and its activities are extremely local in scope: 
Our civil society, if you can call it that, is curtailed.  The central government does not tolerate 
pressure groups and neither do the leaders in the individual islands.  Our NGOs are small, very 
con ained in he e he  ope a e and ha  he  do.  The  don  ha e m ch poli ical a  
(Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH). 
The same situation generally holds true for Comorian fisheries research bodies.  Like 
their Mauritian and Seychellois counterparts, there are questions about how autonomous these 
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actors are from state control.  However, even a nominally national entity like CNDRS has been 
nde mined b  he fac  ha  he o gani a ion  ie  i h i  b-national components in Anjouan 
and Mohéli have become progressively weakened, mainly as autonomy-seeking political elites 
on these islands apply pressure to limit the influence of national organisations based in Moroni: 
Our fisheries research institutes have the potential to become quite effective.  But there is a 
problem in that the central government struggles to establish its authority in the rest of the 
country and we no longer have much mixing of people from the different islands among your 
non-state actors.  This makes it easier for a power-hungry leader in Anjouan say, to tell our 
fisheries institutes on that island to pay no attention to what people in Grande Comore are 
saying.  This has become a real problem here  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, 
DGRH).  Comorian civil society, poorly organised and lacking funding, is made weaker by 
inter-island divisions.  Indeed, these divisions largely prevent the co n  limi ed a a  of 
non-state actors from achieving any type of national footprint.  No civil society umbrella 
organisation akin to the Mauritian CSF or Seychelles CEP exists in the country and there 
appears to be no prospect of this type of entity emerging in the near future (Researcher 
Interview: Representative from the Grande Comore Union of Boat Owners).  With Comorian 
civil society not able to effectively organise, it is logical to suggest that it will struggle to 
develop transnational connections with civil society actors from the other islands. 
Malagasy civil society is better resourced and more effectively organised than in 
Comoros.  However, the authoritarian political climate that has emerged in the country since 
the 2009 coup has made it difficult for civil society actors to organise.  Large reductions in 
fo eign aid o e  he la  decade ha e al o made i  challenging fo  he co n  local NGO , in 
particular, to maintain strong funding levels (Hery, 2016).  A  in Como o , Madaga ca  
existing poli ical clea age  p e en  ba ie  o ome of he co n  non-state actors.  
Madaga ca  poli ical eli e , d a n f om he Me ina e hnic g o p and ba ed p ima il  in he 
highlands around Antananarivo, have long viewed ethnic groups residing in coastal areas with 
suspicion, particularly given the fact that coastal areas have emerged as centres of political 
opposition to the military-supported governments that have led the country since the coup 
(Ramariandrasoa, 2017).  Since mo  of he co n  ma ine conservation and fisheries-
foc ed o gani a ion , incl ding Boa  O ne  A ocia ion  and local NGO , a e ba ed in 
these coastal areas, they tend to come under political pressure and have even been subject to 
random closure: There were a few Boat Owne  G o p  and ma ine con e a ion NGO  in 
Mahajanga, Antsiranana and Toamasina [three main coastal cities] dealing with fisheries that 
were harassed by the government.  Mobilising for coastal interests can sometimes raise 
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suspicion of political activity.  This invites a response and it limits the space available to these 
groups to operate  (Researcher Interview: Associate Editor, Madagascar Tribune).  
The majo i  of Madaga ca  fi he ie  cien ific e ea ch in i e  a e, ome ha  
oddly, all based in inland Antananarivo and do not face harassment from the state.  However, 
these bodies have borne the cost of international aid reductions: Organisations like the Institut 
Halieutique et des Sciences Marines or the Centre National de Recherches 
Oc anographiques he e ed o be ong in i ion  p od cing ali  cien ific e ea ch.  
But now, to be honest, I think they are hollowed-out.  Over the last decade, a lot of our best 
scientists were put out of work, moved to France, moved to Réunion.  The money to support 
he e ea ch i  didn  di appea  b  i  a n  ha  i  a  befo e  (Researcher Interview: Vice-
President, National Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).  This view 
a  co obo a ed b  he Ocean Go e nance Ad i o  in he Se chelle  Depa men  of Bl e 
Economy, speaking in relation to WIOMSA: Malagasy fisheries and marine science 
institutions are less robust than they we e.  Speaking of WIOMSA, e don  nece a il  ha e 
fewer Malagasy contributors than before, but you find that many of them are now associated 
i h F ench e ea ch bodie  and no  Malaga  one .  I don  kno  if hi  i  a p oblem, b  I 
guess it does point to the difficulties that the Malagasy organisations face, which I assume are 
largely funding-related  (Researcher Interview: Ocean Governance Advisor in the Department 
of Blue Economy, Government of Seychelles). 
It should be noted that there are some positive signs of civil society strengthening in 
Madagascar, not least the founding of the Civil Society Alliance (CSA)  referred to in 
Malagasy as Hina  in 2015.52  CSA is intended to play the same civil society coordination and 
capacity-building role as Mau i i  CSF and Se chelle  CEP.  Fo  he momen , ho e e , 
CSA  membe hip emain  ela i el  mall and, hile incl i e of ci il ocie  o gani a ion  
from across the country, it lacks significant representation from the fisheries and marine 
conservation sectors: Hina has potential.  I think it will help Madagascar begin to re-build the 
strength of civil society groups.  But it will take time and we will have to see whether 
organisations from the coastal areas are properly represented  (Researcher Interview: 
Associate Editor, Madagascar Tribune).  Regardless, Malagasy non-state actors, like their 
counterparts in Comoros, are generally weak and evidently lack any of the financial and 
organisational advantages that are enjoyed by comparable non-state actors in both Mauritius 
and Seychelles.  Also, it is apparent that civil society actors in Comoros and Madagascar are 
 




not yet benefitting from improvements in digital connectivity, which could allow them to 
strengthen both their internal coordination and to engage across national borders: Over time, 
I do hink o  ill ee co n ie  like Madaga ca  and Como o  become mo e i ible ci il 
society here [in Madagascar] could Skype with civil society in Mauritius, for example.  But 
e e no  he e e .  Our connectivity is still only beginning here  (Researcher Interview: 
Associate Editor, Madagascar Tribune).    The previous two chapters have drawn attention to 
the role that development disparities and differences in political cohesiveness between the 
Western Indian Ocean island states play in preventing the emergence of truly regional  
political dynamics over fisheries.  A similar dynamic, based on the above assessment, is at play 
at the non-state level.   
Mauritian and Seychellois non-state actors enjoy an enabling environment conducive 
to effective organisation and financing.  Their close links to their respecti e co n ie  a e 
institutions provide them with opportunities for transnational engagement, at least on a bilateral 
basis, through initiatives like the Mascarene Plateau JMA and through projects like SmartFish 
and SWIOFish.  These opportunities, in turn, have enabled at least the beginnings of sustained 
in e ac ion  be een he o co n ie  Boa  O ne  A ocia ion , NGO  and cien ific 
research personnel.  While these interactions may not constitute clear evidence of the type of 
inter-island epistemic community that exists in the Pacific, they do suggest the potential for 
non-state actor regionness to emerge over time.  The clear weakness of civil society in Comoros 
and Madagascar, with non-state actors unable to effectively organise or improve their capacity 
to operate, even within their respective countries, would seem to preclude the possibility of 
them engaging on a transnational basis.  Indeed, there is no documented evidence of Comorian 
or Malagasy NGOs joining their Mauritian and Seychellois counterparts as part of the 
SmartFish or SWIOFish project steering committees.  The participation of Malagasy 
researchers in WIOMSA (or at least Malagasy researchers based in Madagascar and working 
with Malagasy institutions) is minimal, while the participation of Comorian researchers in 
WIOMSA is essentially non-existent.   
While Chapter 3 provided examples of some non-state actors from Comoros and 
Madagascar engaging with their Mauritian and Seychellois counterparts, these interactions are 
rarely sustained beyond the lifetime of project-based funding.  Comorian and Malagasy non-
state actors may not be fully absent from inter-island interactions, but they are not present 
consistently enough or at a scale required for them to be members of an (embryonic) epistemic 
community that is regional  in scope: O  [Como ian] NGO  and e ea ch in i e if 
he e i  a egional dialog e a o nd fi he ie  among ci il ocie , he  on  be a big part of it.  
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Maybe they can be involved through some donor projects, but there is no momentum towards 
our civil society having a regional voice  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH). 
 
3. Non-State Actors and Autonomy from the State: Limitations in the Forging of 
Cooperative Pathways  The Case of IUU Fishing 
 In the previo  ec ion, i  a  no ed ha  he i land  e pec i e non-state actors 
generally lack autonomy from state institutions.  This close relationship with the state does 
provide some advantages, at least for non-state actors in Mauritius and Seychelles, who are 
able to piggyback on state-level cooperation to pursue modest engagement through fisheries 
and broader ocean governance projects.  However, lack of autonomy from the state, represented 
in part by the fact that the leaders of many NGOs and research institutes previously served in 
p blic ec o  ole , i  al o een o dil e he ope a ional independence of man  of he i land  
non-state actors and limits the degree to which they are likely to serve as watchdogs on 
government actions.  Connected to this, limited autonomy from the state seems to increase the 
likelihood of he i land  non- a e ac o  oeing hei  go e nmen  e pec i e line  on a io  
aspects of fisheries governance.  This, in turn, limits (or even closes off) some of the 
cooperative pathways that could otherwise be available to a prospective regional  civil 
society.  A short case study, focused on the fight against IUU fishing, highlights this issue.   
 Under the auspices of SmartFish, civil society organisations from each of the island 
states were intended to collaborate in order to form a civil society taskforce  focused on 
generating ideas for combatting IUU fishing  within island state EEZs and on the high seas 
(IOC, 2012, 2014).  Established as part of the SmartFish implementation plan in 2010 and 
intended to be operational over the remaining four years of the project, the proposed task force 
experienced a wide range of problems that hindered its development.  The first of these, relating 
back to the previous section of this chapter, was the difficulty of soliciting participation from 
Comorian and Malagasy NGOs or research institutions: The task force was intended to 
encompass all of the islands but it was pretty clear from the beginning this would be a struggle.  
A couple of Comorian NGOs signed up to the [taskforce] MoU [Memorandum of 
Understanding], but it became clear that even with funding support from the project 
[SmartFish], they lacked the capacity to participate or contribute anything of value.  Malagasy 
organisations were in a a e of chao  af e  he co p in 2009.  The  e en  nece a il  p epa ed 
to participate and the EU was wary of any project funds going to organisations that had murky 
ie  o he ne  egime in Tana [An anana i o].  So, he e a n  m ch pa icipa ion f om 
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Madagascar either  (Researcher Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of 
Seychelles). 
 Over time, the taskforce did manage to obtain nominal participation from two Malagasy 
institutions: IHSM and CNDO.  For the most part, however, it remained a predominantly 
Mauritian and Seychellois-led initiative, with some participation also from French civil society 
bodies based in Réunion (Boucher, 2015).  The taskforce was initiated with some fanfare, being 
seen as a way to both raise awareness of IUU fishing in the Western Indian Ocean among island 
state populations, as well as to use civil society mobilisation as a means to hold governments 
accountable for engaging more forcefully with DWFNs over IUU fishing within island state 
EEZs  including, ideally, through the enactment of MT&Cs: This taskforce had some very 
good objectives.  The idea was right.  All of the islands, even Seychelles with a more 
conservation-minded focus, was sometimes too meek in the face of DWFNs when their 
[DWFN] vessels were found to be engaging in IUU fishing.  In democracies, which Mauritius 
and Seychelles certainly are, civil society mobilisation should be a way to encourage behaviour 
change in policymakers  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy 
Commission, Government of Mauritius).   
Indeed, the taskforce had some striking successes in raising the profile of IUU fishing 
in the public consciousness, with IOC and SmartFish-branded print advertisements, radio and 
television ads, as well as newspaper publications being produced (IOC, 2014; Researcher 
Interview: Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Government of Seychelles).  Said an Associate Editor of 
the Madagascar Tribute: E en in Madaga ca , he e I don  hink e eall  had a h ge le el 
of involvement with the initiative [taskforce], we were aware of the increased focus on IUU 
fishing and the threat it poses to our fish stocks, especially tuna.  People were certainly more 
aware and at least economically, if not looking at the environment, it became an issue of 
discussion in our country  (Researcher Interview: Associate Editor, Madagascar Tribune). 
 The taskforce was less successful in actually influencing behaviour change among 
policymakers.  This was not seen to be the result of a failure to mobilise civil society, but rather 
a failure of civil society in each of the islands to embrace a role as a watchdog for government 
accountability.  For the KIs interviewed for this study, there was one main reason for this: Our 
NGO  and o  e ea ch in i e o  need o nde and ha  he  a en  al a  ha  
independent from the state.  International donors fund NGOs in the region, but often the money 
is directed through state institutions, maybe the Ministry of Finance or a fisheries ministry.  
Especially in fisheries, we have a lot of state-driven development projects or environmental 
ini ia i e , i h ha  o e calling non- a e ac o  being o  of a ilia  ppo , I g e .  
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Civil society provides a nice face for international donors on these types of initiatives, but that 
doe n  mean he e p o iding an independen  oice.  The  [ci il ocie  ac o ] kno  he e 
their money comes from  (Researcher Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy 
Commission, Government of Mauritius).   
While perhaps a cynical take, this perspective was more modestly echoed by the 
Executive Director of Nature Seychelles, an organisation widely respected for having an 
independent voice: I don  ag ee i h ha  o  o he  in e ie ee aid abo  ci il ocie  
lacking a voice.  I think it does have a voice [in Seychelles], but especially for a lot of smaller 
o gani a ion , i h le  i ibili  han  [Na e Se chelle ], he e  an impe a i e o no  
an agoni e he go e nmen .  And Se chelle  i  a democ ac , o hi  ho ldn  be an i sue, but 
in a small country like ours, relationships are very personal.  Personal antagonisms have larger 
effec  han he  migh  in a la ge  co n  he e o  don  ha e e e one kno ing e e one 
else  (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, Nature Seychelles).  Non-state actors in 
Mauritius and Seychelles, at least from the above perspectives, are financially and 
reputationally tied to government.  The fact that this is the case in the two most robust 
democracies in the island grouping should give a sense as to what the situation is like in more 
authoritarian Comoros and Madagascar.  Indeed, scholars like Caminade (2018) have 
documented the close links between Comorian civil society and state benefactors, while Hery 
(2016) and Ramariandrasoa (2017) have done the same in the context of Madagascar. 
Lack of autonomy from the state does not appear to only be a matter of preserving 
funding and reputation.  It is also linked to what is termed a revolving carousel  among 
officials in each island state, between public service in state institutions and service in 
nominally non-state  organisations.  The Executive Director of Nature Seychelles, building 
on the point raised above about the importance of personalised relationships, further noted: In 
Seychelles and I think in the other islands too, there is not a clear line where you have people 
involved with the state on one side and people involved in civil society on the other.  People 
go back and forth constantly.  Maybe a fisheries expert from the SFA gets tired of working for 
the government, so they go to a research institute for a while or they go teach at the [Seychelles 
Maritime] Academy.  But then they miss the better salary working with government, so they 
come back.  This is actually really good for building relationships between government and 
non-government bodies, but it does come at the expense of these non-state actors really holding 
polic make  fee  o he fi e.  People in he non-state sector expect to be working for the state 




A similar reality appears to exist in the other islands.  In Mauritius, there is a notable 
literature that discusses the role that politicians from the countries two main political parties  
the MSM and the Labour Party  continue to play in occupying leadership positions in the 
co n  e ea ch in i e , nion  and NGO ec o  (de l E ac, 2009).  There is less 
discussion of this issue in relation to Comoros and Madagascar, though the aforementioned 
lack of political space existing for civil society in these two countries would suggest 
considerable inter-linkages between the state and non-state sectors here as well: In Comoros, 
the government is really the only stable employer.  Everyone wants to work in the public sector.  
I e en emembe  he leade  of one of he Boa  O ne  A ocia ion  he e in G ande Como e 
getting a job and working with us at DGRH.  He knew someone who had connections and who 
could get him a job.  He used to be one of our main critics!  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries 
Officer, DGRH).   
In Madagascar: If you have the right connections, you want to be working with the 
Ministry [of fisheries].  We do have legitimate civil society activists in Madagascar, though I 
o ldn  a  o m ch in fi he ie , nle  o  co n  he Boa  O ne  and hei  lobb ing again  
coastal fishing restrictions.  But the research institutes, for sure the aim is often to use 
employment in those institutes as a springboard o o king fo  go e nmen , e en if o  don  
particularly like the government of the day  (Researcher Interview: Vice-President, National 
Association for Fish Collectors and Exporters of Madagascar).  The above perspectives all 
reflect governance traits that are readily identified in much of the literature on small states: 
namely, the dominance of the public sector and a personalised rather than formalised approach 
to governance and state-society relations.  Non-state actors in the islands, where they exist, are 
seldom independent or, at the very least, tend to be led by individuals who have intimate 
connections with state actors.  This is true for multiple sectors and not just fisheries.   
Returning to the discussion of the IUU civil society taskforce established under 
SmartFish, this lack of operational independence for non-state actors proved to be extremely 
important.  As noted in previous chapters, the Freeport Seafood Hub is a central pillar of 
Ma i i  Ocean Econom  a eg  and of he co n  e port-led fisheries development.  
Two increasingly important sources of investment for the Seafood Hub have been the Chinese 
and South Korean governments and their respective state-owned enterprises and Chaebols 
(Villary, 2010).  At the same time, one of the main sources of IUU fishing in the Western 
Indian Ocean pertains to Chinese and South Korean long liners, who have been found to be 
fishing for tuna and other species like swordfish without possessing updated licenses and 
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without adhering to Mauritian EEZ entry regulations or port controls (Researcher Interview: 
Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius). 
The Ma i ian go e nmen  e pon e o hi  IUU fi hing ha  been la gel  o downplay 
it, offering mild admonishments but avoiding taking substantial legal action against DWFN 
vessel operators: I think the reasons for this are pretty clear.  The Seafood Hub is central to 
o  [Ma i i ] economic plan  and ha  A ian in e men  i  an important component.  
Downplaying the IUU fishing then makes sense for the government, but I think the most 
striking thing was that there was no pushback from Mauritian civil society on this [SmartFish 
IUU] task force.  Why? They were not willing to go against the government and make noise 
that could upset the DWFNs and maybe risk the investment in the Seafood Hub  (Researcher 
Interview: Former Chairman of the Ocean Economy Commission, Government of Mauritius).  
There is admittedly little documentary evidence to corroborate this claim, though it was echoed 
o ome deg ee b  he E ec i e Di ec o  of he MOI, ho led hi  o gani a ion  ole on he 
taskforce: I m no  e i  fai  o a  e do npla ed an hing.  O  e ea che , ome ime  
working with our colleagues in Seychelles we raised the issue [of IUU fishing by Asian long 
line ].  Wha  e didn  do i  n he i e in o ome hing he e e ied o ge  he p blic 
onboard to put pressure on the government.  We used our own channels [of communication 
with government] to raise the issue and we hoped that the close contacts we had with the 
government, including our former Chairman, who is now a consultant with the Ministry [of 
Fisheries, Shipping and Ocean Economy] would be enough to get IUU fishing more play.  We 
did this even though we knew it would be a challenge for the government and the private 
operators looking for investment in the Seafood Hub.  Could we have been more forceful in 
pushing this issue? Yes, certainly so  (Researcher Interview: Executive Director, MOI).   
The SmartFish IUU task force struggled on a number of fronts when it came to non-
state actors effectively raising the issue of IUU fishing within their own borders.  As with 
Ma i i  de i e fo  in e men  in he Seafood H b, he Como ian go e nmen  ongoing 
desire to secure funding for the Comoros National Fishing Company has had similar 
implications for non-state actors: The Boa  O ne  A ocia ion , pa ic la l  ho e dealing 
with artisanal fisheries who travel further offsho e he  e e conce ned abo  IUU fi hing 
and they tried to make an issue of it, even bringing it to the civil society taskforce under 
SmartFish.  However, our research institutes, under-resourced and undermanned as they are, 
were often asked by the federal government to be part of the effort try to secure investment 
f om he Chine e in he Na ional [Fi hing] Compan he ame co n  ho e e el  e e 
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doing the IUU fishing.  You can imagine it was difficult for our researchers to go and raise a 
fuss on the issue  (Researcher Interview: Fisheries Officer, DGRH).   
I  a  onl  in Se chelle , in hich he go e nmen  gene all  con i en  polic  
approach to combatting IUU fishing was in line with the objectives of the taskforce, where 
civil society was able to play a truly meaningful role in the SmartFish initiative.  Even here, 
ho e e , hi  cce  a  li le abo  he co n  non-state actors serving as constructive 
watchdogs for policymaker accountability: Civil society in Seychelles has strengths, but with 
the initiative you speak of [the SmartFish civil society taskforce] our researchers, scientists, 
NGO all pla ed a ole beca e he  e e aligned i h go e nmen  p io i ie  and he e 
priorities were in line with that taskforce.  Had those priorities not matched, our civil society 
would not have been any more effective than in the other islands  (Researcher Interview: 
Executive Director, Nature Seychelles). 
The example of the IUU taskforce points to the limitations that arise when non-state 
actors lack autonomy from state interests.  Whether due to financial dependence or close inter-
personal relationships, civil society in the island states does not always have the opportunity to 
identify and seize on its own interests.  The objectives of state-level policymakers often 
become, by default, the interests of non-state actors as well.  One of the main implications of 
this, as the IUU taskforce demonstrates, is that potentially cooperative avenues between non-
state actors can become closed off.  IUU fishing was broadly recognised as a concern that the 
i land  e pec i e ci il ocie  in e e  co ld ha e ni ed behind (a  lea  o a deg ee).  
However, because civil society lacked distance from the state and since state actors were less 
committed to addressing this issue, non-state actors lacked the will to take true initiative.  This 
points to non-state actors in the islands as lacking the actorness that a new regionalist  thinker 
would identify as being central to the fostering of common regional values. 
 
4. The Western Indian Ocean Islands as a Socially-Constructed Region: 
Considerations from the Perspective of Non-State Actors 
 Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 argued that at the state-level  whether between the 
i land  fi he ie  mini ie  o  h o gh in e -governmental organisations  the political 
dynamics evident between the Western Indian Ocean island states were not conducive to 
mo ing he e i land  be ond f nc ional  coope a ion o a d  e in eg a ion ba ed on he 
development of shared regimes.  Non-state actors clearly do not have the same power as 
government officials to facilitate integration between states or to enact formal regimes.  
Ho e e , he  can pla  he ole of no m en ep ene  (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) ho o k 
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to construct the values that influence regime formation.  This chapter has painted a mixed 
picture regarding the ability of non- a e ac o  in he We e n Indian Ocean o pla  hi  no m 
en ep ene  ole in a l  egional en e.   
Civil society in both Mauritius and Seychelles is reasonably robust, benefitting from 
high levels of funding and from the existence of platforms like CSF and CEP which aid in 
organisation.  The close ties that Mauritian and Seychellois NGOs and research institutes, in 
particular, enjoy with their national governments allows many of them to piggy-back on 
cooperative opportunities developed at the state-level, including through projects like 
SmartFish and SWIOFish.  While still fledgling, non-state actors in Mauritius and Seychelles 
have developed closer ties on the back of these cooperative opportunities, deepening their 
interactions and building working relationships that are slowly helping to create what may be 
termed a bilateral epistemic community between these states.  Non-state actors in Comoros 
and Madagascar are far weaker, lacking in funding and opportunities for organisation, while 
also coping with an absence of real political space in which to operate.  With NGOs, research 
institutes and universities in these two islands unable to project influence within their own 
borders, it comes as little surprise that their prospects for engaging transnationally are 
inherently limited.  The e l  i  ha  a egional  epi emic comm ni , defined by strong 
contributions from each island state, remains difficult to envision. 
At the same time, the fact that non-state actors in all of the Western Indian Ocean 
islands struggle to achieve distance from their respective governments, means that civil society 
in the islands seldom plays a meaningful role when it comes to holding state authorities 
accountable.  The civil society taskforce created through SmartFish to deal with IUU fishing 
is a case in point.  An issue that could have provided civil society form each of the islands with 
an opportunity to find common cause for advocacy amounted to little since these civil society 
actors wished to avoid antagonising state officials  whether due to fears about what this 
antagonism might mean for their funding or because so many of those involved in the non-state 
sphere have ambitions to work in the public sector.  The end result was a clear missed 
opportunity for a transnational civil society to demonstrate its potential. 
What do the above observations say about the Western Indian Ocean islands as a 
socially-constructed region? On one hand, the technical linkages between non-state actors in 
the different island states cannot be dismissed.  Some of these linkages, whether between 
oceanographic research institutes and training academies, or within the confines of research 
bodies like WIOMSA, are valued by non-state actors and appear to be growing even if they are 
somewhat biased towards involving actors mainly from Mauritius and Seychelles.  The 
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impli ic defini ion  of egion  p o ided b  N e (1968) o  Po e  and Goertz (2011), which 
emphasise geographical proximity and some type of interdependence, still seem appropriate as 
minimum thresholds ha  he i land  non-state actors can readily mee .  The i land g o ping  
non-state actors surely do not meet Hettne and S de ba m  (2000: 461) new regionalist  
definition of a geographical area transformed from a passive object to an active subject 
capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region.  Non-state actors 
from Comoros and Madagascar are barely able to engage on a transnational basis and while 
linkages between Mauritian and Seychellois civil society are becoming increasingly evident, 
these linkages tend to still emerge on the back of project-based initiatives like the UNDP JMA 
Demonstration Project rather than taking place organically and outside the cooperative 
structures defined at the state level.  
In pi e of he abo e a e men , ne  egionali m  clea l  indica e  ha  egionne  i  
a concept that periodically adjusts to higher or lower levels within a grouping of states.  As 
such, the possibility of non-state actors collectively attaining a stronger transnational focus 
ho ld no  be led o .  Ho e e , fo  hi  o happen, he i land  collec i e ci il ocie  o ld 
need to generate a much higher level of actorness, which in turn would seem to depend on 
improvements in the political climates of both Comoros and Madagascar. Indeed, it seems 
necessary that non-state actors in these islands have greater opportunity to organise and be 
active domestically before they can hope to be in a position to seize opportunities for 
transnational engagement.     
 Looking once more at the typology of regionness introduced by Hettne (2005: 548), 
inter-island political dynamics at the non-state level can be used to offer a further assessment 
as to where the islands sit on a fisheries-focused regionness spectrum.  As with interactions at 
the ministerial level and through inter-governmental organisations, the islands clearly meet the 
c i e ia of being bo h a egional pace  and an local ocial em  a  he non-state level.  
This is based on the fact that there are clearly identifiable interactions taking place between 
island state civil society, even if engagement by Comorian and Malagasy non-state actors is 
comparatively infrequent.  The more sophisticated regional social system , defined by Hettne 
as involving ever widening translocal relations, in which the constituent units are dependent 
on each other, as well as on the overall stability of the system , eem  o be an o e a emen  
in he ca e of he i land  non-state actors.  As the failure of the civil society taskforce for IUU 
fishing demonstrates, there are presently no strong structural foundations in place to organise 
transnational civil society within the island grouping and no mechanisms through which to 
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generate issue-based alignment between these actors, who instead tend to align themselves with 
the dominant policy and political positions of their respective national governments.   
 For the islands to be deemed a regional international society , they must be 
characterised by norms and rules which increase the level of predictability in the system.  
There is little evidence that non- a e ac o  in he diffe en  i land  a e ac ing a  no m 
en ep ene  in he fi he ie  ec o .  This may change over time, particularly at the bilateral 
level between Mauritius and Seychelles, since civil society in these two island states should 
continue engaging in ever-more regularised interactions.  However, these non-state actors are 
not yet playing a substantive role in driving the creation of norms or even developing among 
hem el e  a pla fo m ( em ) fo  ansnational cooperation. He ne  regional 
community  nece i a e  an enduring organisational framework that facilitates and promotes 
social communication and convergence of values and behaviour throughout the region.  There 
is no evidence at all to suggest that non-state actors are playing this type of role, though as 
emerging efforts continue (e.g. the mutual design of fisheries training curricula by national 
maritime training academies), this convergence may become more evident.   
Unsurprisingly, when it comes to whether the islands constitute a regionalised 
institutional polity  that has a more fixed structure of decision-making and stronger actor 
capability , there is no evidence to suggest that such a level of regionness is even close to being 
attained at the non-state level in the Western Indian Ocean.   Actorness (the capacity to act on 
commonly-defined priorities) appears to be a key ingredient that is missing at the non-state 
level among the islands.  A set of distinct and transnationally-focused civil society goals  and 
mechanisms on which to achieve them  are not yet evident.  This contrasts with the Pacific 
context, where fisheries-based civil society in the various island states has established 
dedicated platforms for cooperation through the University of the South Pacific and through 
the FFA, which provide predictable platforms for civil society participation and organisation 
on fisheries issues (Fry and Tarte, 2015).    
 The result of the above is that it is impossible to look at engagement among non-state 
actors in the Western Indian Ocean and see evidence of socially-constructed region-building.  
In e ac ion  be een he i land  e pec i e ci il ocie  ac o  a e e iden , b  a e no  
institutionalised and do not appear to have a life of their own outside of the (often superficial) 
cooperative structures created by the different islands at the state-level.  As such, it is not really 
possible to see these actors as doing much to facilitate inter-island integration or regime-
building in the fisheries sector.   Wi h he d  co e anal ical e plo a ion comple e, Chap e  
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7 will now bring together the varying strands of he d  a g men  in o an o e all mma , 
































CHAPTER 7: Conclusion: Inter-Island Political Dynamics, Collective 
Diplomacy & Constructed Region-Building in the Western Indian Ocean 
 
In Chapter 1, this study posed one primary and two secondary research questions.  The 
primary question asked how existing political dynamics between the Western Indian Ocean 
island states incentivise (or fail to incentivise) deepening cooperation, integration and 
collec i e diplomac  among he e a e  in he fi he ie  ec o ? The d  econda  e ea ch 
questions asked: 1) to what extent do these existing political dynamics allow for the Western 
Indian Ocean island grouping to be thought of as a distinct and socially-constructed region  
particularly one characterised by commonly-held and actionable fisheries regimes?; and 2) to 
the extent that signs of inter-island cooperation and collective diplomacy can be found within 
this island grouping, is there evidence to suggest that ganging up  has allowed these island 
states to boost their collective bargaining power and achieve impactful diplomatic outcomes 
on fisheries issues? 
 This concluding chapter provides a response to each of these questions, summarising 
the key arguments made throughout the study and further tying these arguments back to the 
o e a ching heo e ical pe pec i e, ba ed on ne  egionali m  and he ocial con c ion of 
egion , ha  ha  nde pinned he d  foc .  Beca e hi  dy has concentrated on a 
particular thematic sector in a particular island geography, the degree to which analytical 
generalisations  can be generated should not be overstated.  In spite of their common 
mallne , he poli ic  of he We e n Indian Ocean island states are multifaceted and the 
factors that shape cooperation, integrative regime-building, collective diplomacy and region-
building are surely too complex for a single instrumental case study to capture in full.  
However, looking in-depth at a particular thematic issue area in fisheries and drawing on the 
insights of a wide array of KIs, as well as information gleaned from relevant secondary 
documentation, it is possible to draw some conclusions that can serve as a foundation for future 
e ea ch.  Af e  ha ing i  final pe pec i e  on each of he d  e ea ch e ion , hi  
chapter will conclude with modest ideas on what form this future research should take. 
 
1. Inter-Island Political Dynamics and the Incentivising of Fisheries Cooperation, 
Integration and Regime-Building among the Western Indian Ocean Island States  
 This study has argued that regardless of the lens through which the Western Indian 
Ocean island states are examined  whether in relation to engagement at the state-to-state 
ministerial level, within the context of inter-governmental organisations or in relation to non-
state actors  the political dynamics that exist between these islands are not conducive to 
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moving these states beyond echnical o  f nc ional  coope a ion in he fi he ie  ec o  and 
towards the deep cooperation, integration and regime-building that is clearly evident in the 
comparable island grouping of the Pacific.  Technical cooperation between the Western Indian 
Ocean island states in fisheries is clearly evident.  In most cases, this cooperation is highly 
valued by the island states, whether it occurs in the form of trainings, experience exchanges 
among fisheries personnel, the sharing of surveillance assets or in the implementation of 
practical exercises such as joint vessel patrols (to name just a few examples).  This technical 
cooperation is a core component of the work carried-out by each of the four main inter-
governmental organisations focused on promoting fisheries cooperation among the islands  
IOC, IORA, IOTC and SWIOFC  and is at the heart of the two main fisheries-related projects 
implemented within the island grouping: SmartFish and SWIOFish.  This study has not sought 
to downplay the importance of this technical cooperation and the clearly impactful role it is 
playing in imp o ing a  lea  ome a pec  of egional  fi he ie  go e nance. 
 However, aking ne  egionali m  and i  ocial con c i i  e ho  a  a pa h a  
towards exploring political engagement between these islands, this type of technical 
cooperation is not, by itself, sufficient to indicate a real sense of unity and shared purpose 
among the islands  the very notion of Indianocéanie, which some of the islands  political 
elites identify as a unifying force, but which this study found little evidence of in practice.  The 
oft-mentioned definition of regionness, provided by Hettne and Söderbaum (2000: 461) a  a 
geographical area [being] transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of 
articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region  aspires that technical 
cooperation evolve into something more, ideally a catalyst towards the development of regimes 
that institutionalise this cooperation and allow it to be deepened over time through regualarised 
social interactions, whether at the state or non-state levels. 
 It has been argued throughout this study that the political dynamics that exist between 
the Western Indian Ocean island states do not, at present, allow for the emergence of 
converging transnational interests or expectations over fisheries.  A number of reasons have 
been put forward to explain this situation.  The disparities in levels of socio-economic 
development and political cohesion between the Western Indian Ocean islands, mainly 
between Mauritius and Seychelles on one side and less-developed Comoros and Madagascar 
on he o he , gi e he i land  go e ning eli e  idel  a ing polic  and poli ical priorities.  
At the state-to- a e le el, looking a  engagemen  be een he i land  e pec i e fi he ie  
ministries, the failure of the islands to enact common MT&Cs to govern the conditions of 
DWFN vessel access are largely a product of these different priorities.  For Mauritius and 
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Seychelles, with well-developed fisheries industries and a stable footing on different 
components of the fisheries value chain (particularly for the tuna fishery), strategic initiatives 
like MT&C enactment and the longer-term sustainability measures such enactment would 
require, have considerable value.  For Comoros and Madagascar, which have both experienced 
the loss of structural aid for their fisheries sectors (from the cancelled SFPAs with the EU), 
widespread poverty and a resulting need to prioritise sectoral growth make the enactment of 
regimes like MT&Cs less politically compelling.  When this is combined with the fact that the 
fisheries ministries in Comoros and Madagascar lack the professionalism and resourcing to be 
actively engaged in fisheries diplomacy in the way that their Mauritian and Seychellois 
counterparts are, it becomes difficult for the islands to ever arrive at a unified starting point in 
order to undertake coordinated action. 
 Disparities in development and political cohesion among the islands also affect political 
dynamics in the context of inter-governmental organisations and in relation to non-state actors.  
With the former, the islands were identified as all having different political preferences as to 
which inter-governmental bodies they would prioritise when allocating their political capital.  
Se chelle  p e  a diploma ic a eg  mo  akin o a pical  mall i land a e, i h bl e 
econom  and ocean go e nance objec i e  a  majo  p io i ie .  The co n  killed 
technocratic fisheries personnel find something of a home in the highly technocratic IOTC.  
Ma i i  m ch la ge  ambi ion  o e e a  an Indian Ocean e ice  h b and link be een 
Asia and Africa, reflect the sophistication of the co n  econom  and e plain Po  Lo i  
political preference for IORA.  For impoverished Comoros and Madagascar, on the other hand, 
the IOC is the inter-governmental body assigned the most weight.  However, this preference 
has nothing to do with the organi a ion  fo nding manda e o p omo e in e -island solidarity, 
but rather with the fact that the IOC is a useful mechanism through which to obtain EU 
development funds, which neither country can so easily access on a bilateral basis.  For both 
Comoros and Madagascar, fisheries are not a diplomatic priority in itself, but rather a means 
to realise other policy objectives.  This makes it difficult for these states to engage as national 
actors truly interested in deepening fisheries cooperation or developing robust fisheries 
regimes. 
 At the non-state level, stark differences in political cohesion between the islands mean 
that while civil society in Mauritius and Seychelles is generally quite vigorous (if small), with 
good access to funding and platforms for organisation, the same cannot be said for civil society 
in Comoros or Madagascar.  In these countries, non-state actors lack both access to financing 
and the political space to organise amidst authoritarian political climates defined by different 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 178 
types of cleavages.  The result is that while Mauritian and Seychellois non-state actors have 
been able to piggyback on state-led cooperative efforts to form something of an embryonic 
bilateral epistemic community, their Comorian and Malagasy counterparts have almost no 
opportunity to do the same and this emerging epistemic community fails to be representative 
of the island grouping as a whole.     
 Besides inter-island disparities in development and political cohesion, the political 
dynamics between the Western Indian Ocean islands were also seen to be affected by the 
institutional architecture for fisheries that exists within the island grouping.  This is particularly 
evident at the inter-governmental organisation level, where manda e c eep  and the lack of 
coordination between the four organisations create a considerable degree of overlap and even 
outright duplication in the types of fisheries projects and programmes being facilitated.  For 
each of the islands, but especially for resource-poor Comoros and Madagascar, ensuring 
uniform and quality participation in a large number of administratively separate but otherwise 
identical fisheries initiatives requires an outlay of financial and human resources that the 
islands cannot always consistently manage.  The result is an uneven level of participation by 
the islands in most inter-governmental organisation initiatives, including SmartFish and 
SWIOFish.  An emphasis on implementing an abundance of fisheries initiatives rather than a 
well-coordinated and more rationalised set of initiatives, means that none of the Western Indian 
Ocean  in e -governmental bodies provides a platform for regularised and coordinated 
engagemen  be een all of he i land  fi he ie  official .  This, in turn, makes it difficult for 
any of these bodies to emerge as the type of linchpin for constructed interactions over fisheries 
that take place in the Pacific through the FFA.  
 The third factor that this study has shown to affect inter-island political dynamics 
relates to the role of outside actors, particularly DWFNs, in undermining prospective solidarity 
between the islands.  At the state-to-state ministerial level, it was shown how competition over 
fisheries related investment from DWFNs, often stoked by these nations through promises of 
in e men  in he i land  e pec i e al e-added fisheries infrastructure, undermined the 
i land  collec i e ill o e abli h ha ed DWFN e el acce  and licen ing fee .  The d  
also demonstrated how the role of France in the Western Indian Ocean, valuable from a 
technocratic fisheries standpoint, has also served to undermine inter-i land .  Pa i  e of 
the IOC, in particular, as a mechanism through which to play the islands against each other in 
efforts to secure their recognition of French territorial claims in the region, were shown to have 
a knock-on effect in stoking tensions between the islands that undermined direct fisheries 
cooperation and integration.  Taken together, the above factors all make it extremely difficult 
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for the island  o mo e be ond f nc ional  coope a ion and gene a e coope a i e pillo e  
ha  co ld b ild momen m o a d  he c ea ion of R ggie  (1975: 570) mutual expectations, 
rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial commitments, which have 
been accepted by a group of states.  
 
2. The Western Indian Ocean Island States as a Socially-Constructed Region  
In each of he d  co e chap e , effo  e e made o i a e he We e n Indian 
Ocean i land a e  on He ne  (2005) typology of regionness.  This typology refers to a group 
of a e  a  con i ing a egional pace , a egional an local em , a egional ocial 
em , a egional in e na ional ocie , a egional comm ni  o  a egionali ed 
institutional poli .  I  a  a g ed ha  ega dle  of he len  h o gh hich he i land  a e 
e amined, he  clea l  mee  he anda d of being a egional pace  and a egional an local 
em , bo h defined b  geog aphic p o imi  and e idence of a  lea  ba ic f nc ional  
linkage .  Ho e e , he e en  o hich he i land  can be con ide ed a  a egional ocial 
em  defined b  a deg ee of a e in e -dependence and reliance on a stable system of 
exchange, is more debatable.  Inter-dependence does exist, to an extent, at the economic level, 
with the islands locked into a linked fisheries value chain (especially for tuna).   There also 
exists an institutional architecture that sees the Western Indian Ocean SIDS exchange 
surveillance assets, engage in shared scientific research and engage through dedicated technical 
committees and working groups in fisheries governance institutions like the IOTC and 
SWIOFC.  While participation in this institutional architecture is not equal among the islands, 
the mere fact that this architecture exists and is commonly accepted by each country, gives 
c edence o he idea of con ide ing he e i land  a egional ocial em .  
He ne  egional international ocie , hich i  cha ac e i ed b  no m  and le  
which inc ea e he le el of p edic abili  in he em , is where the islands begin falling short 
as a group of states with identifiable regionness.  Norms and rules governing the fisheries sector 
are by no means absent among the islands, but nor are they standardised, codified and 
interpreted in exactly the same way by each of the islands.  The failure of the island grouping 
to enact common MT&Cs is the most obvious example of this.  Unlike the Pacific islands, 
where national expectations and interests over fisheries converged over the Nauru Agreement 
and the PNA, no similar converge has happened among the Western Indian Ocean island states.  
Norms and rules do appear to be emerging on a bilateral basis between Mauritius and 
Seychelles, largely thanks to their mutual JMA over the Mascarene Plateau.  However, neither 
Comoros nor Madagascar have the same political incentive to make strategic and long-term 
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norm creation in the fisheries sector a national priority.  This suggests that attaining the level 
of regionne  akin o a egional in e na ional ocie  ill con in e o ake ome ime.    
He ne  egional comm ni  ake  hape hen an end ing o gani a ional 
framework facilitates and promotes social communication and convergence of values and 
behaviour thro gho  he egion.  Interestingly, while an organisational framework clearly 
exists to facilitate this level of regionness among the islands, in the form of the four inter-
governmental organisations, there is little to suggest that this framework is promoting a 
convergence of values and behaviours.  This is due to both the inefficiencies within this 
o gani a ional f ame o k ( manda e c eep  and he d plica ion of fi he ie  ini ia i e  b  each 
o gani a ion) and beca e he i land  b oade  fo eign polic  interests prevent them from 
pooling their collective political capital behind the same components of this institutional 
framework.   The regionalised institutional polity  has a more fixed structure of decision-
making and stronger actor capability.  This appears to be the level of regionness that the Pacific 
SIDS have achieved through the PNA.  In the Western Indian Ocean, however, the fisheries 
sector is clearly not governed by anything resembling a fixed decision-making structure.  There 
is also little to suggest that these states possess a high level of actorness  the capacity of states 
to act on commonly-defined priorities.  Merely defining shared transnational interests on 
fisheries seems to be a considerable struggle for the Western Indian Ocean islands.  Acting on 
them would require a much greater sense of shared identity around this sector, likely defined 
by the existence of clear and mutually-accepted regimes. 
As has been noted at various points in this study, regionness is a mutable concept.  
Levels of regionness can change (and should be expected to change) over time.  As such, there 
is nothing to suggest that the Western Indian Ocean island states cannot achieve a higher level 
of regionness in future, particularly if a common set of MT&Cs is enacted, if some 
rationalisation in the work of the four key inter-governmental organisations is pursued and if 
non-state actors in all of the islands find the opportunity to organise and interact on a more 
frequent basis.  For any of these to happen, however, it seems logical to suggest that there must 
begin to be a greater convergence in the levels of socio-economic development and political 
cohesiveness between the different islands.  This requires positive political change in both 
Comoros and Madagascar that is difficult to envision at present. 
Ul ima el , ne  egionali m  and he ocial con c i i m on hich i  i  ba ed 
e i e  a egion  o be defined ba ed on he he  i  eflec  he p ofe ed idea  and al e  
that political and social actors (at the state or non-state levels) profess to hold.  The Western 
Indian Ocean SIDS con in e o be di c ed a  i land , clo e and ni ed  (IOC, 2013) and he 
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concept of Indianocéanie continues to exist as an idealised sense of shared identity among 
these islands.  At least in fisheries, however, there is no clear evidence that this professed sense 
of closeness truly exists in reality. 
 
3. The Merits of Ganging Up  as a Diplomatic Approach for SIDS 
 Returning to the initial issues that motivated this study, whether the vulnerability, 
peripheral nature and low levels of bargaining power among SIDS could be ameliorated by a 
g ea e  foc  on collec i e ac ion o  ganging p , he e idence f om hi  d  points in 
somewhat contradictory directions.  The Pacific island states mark a clear example of this 
gang p  app oach achie ing ema kable cce .  The e i land , ackno ledging hei  
individual weaknesses and the risk of continuing to be played off against each other by DWFNs 
o e  e el acce  condi ion  and fee , made a con cio  poli ical deci ion o follo  Schiff  
(2010) ad ice o gang p  and c ea e a fo mal nego ia ing bloc o ep e en  hei  in e e .  
Interactions between members of this bloc produced the Nauru Agreement and the regimes 
associated with it, all of which have been deepened and made more sophisticated over time.  
The end result for these states has been overwhelmingly positive, with these islands taking 
greater control over their fisheries resources, managing their sustainability and achieving 
higher economic returns.   
 In the Western Indian Ocean, by contrast, a similar political calculus has not been 
evident.  This is not because the underlying conditions facing the two island groups are that 
different.  The same types of factors that motivated MT&C enactment in the Pacific also exist 
in the Western Indian Ocean.  For various reasons, however, the Western Indian Ocean island 
a e  ha e no  een he ame poli ical incen i e o gang p  a  hei  Pacific co n e pa , i h 
the most prominent reason for this being the differences in strategic outlook  short-term 
sectoral growth vs. long-term fisheries sustainability  that represents an important cleavage 
between the islands.  Similarly, while the Pacific island states have chosen to pool their 
collective interests towards reinforcing the strength of a single inter-governmental body to 
provide fisheries coordination (the FFA), the Western Indian Ocean island states hold far more 
diverse interests, of which fisheries are not always at the forefront.  This makes it more difficult 
for these islands to channel their political capital in a common direction. 
 Ke  le on  ha  can be aken f om hi  d  a e: a) ha  a gang p  app oach to 
cooperation and collective diplomacy can be extremely effective for SIDS when it comes to 
boo ing hei  collec i e ba gaining po e ; b  b) he deci ion on he he  o gang p  ha  
ela i el  li le o do i h mallne  o  i landne  per se, and more to do with the political 
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considerations of each island state.  The Western Indian Ocean example suggests that while 
SIDS ma  indeed ha e mo e mo i a ion o gang p  han o he  a e , i  i  no  ine i able ha  
they will choose to do so.  Complex and messy political dynamics are also at play in informing 
the degree to which SIDS will see collective action with each other as being a desirable 
diplomatic strategy.  The takeaway from this is that SIDS may not be that different from other 
pe  of a e .  Smallne  and i landne  a e no  de in  and he e a e  a e comple  
political actors seeking to balance a multitude of competing priorities.    
 
4. Final Thoughts and Ideas for Future Research 
 It was noted in the description of the research methodology in Chapter 1 that this study 
initially began as an effort to compare inter-island political dynamics and cooperation across 
multiple sectors.  For practical reasons, this was not possible in the context of this study.  
However, a series of further instrumental case studies looking at cooperation among the 
Western Indian Ocean SIDS in thematic areas like renewable energy, transportation, 
agriculture and tourism (to provide just a few example) would shed further light on both the 
politics and international relations of this island grouping.  This type of comparison, 
pa ic la l  if adop ing a imila  ne  egionali m  pe pec i e, o ld allo  fo  an 
examination of whether regionness and evidence of constructed identity is more evident in 
these other sectors than in fisheries.  Also, while this study did compare and contrast the 
Western Indian Ocean and Pacific SIDS contexts, it did provide a fully-fledged comparative 
analysis.  This type of analysis, whether focused on fisheries or other issue areas, could be 
extremely useful in drawing out a more complete set of lessons learned. 
 There may also be value in carrying-out more in-depth research on particular issues 
highlighted in this study.  The JMA between Mauritius and Seychelles over the Mascarene 
Plateau has the potential to serve as a foundation for a wide range of technocratic and political 
engagement between these states.  This study only touched on particular aspects of the JMA, 
but it may be worth considering whether this type of agreement and its associated regimes 
could serve as a blueprint for similar types of initiatives that may be more inclusive of the 
island grouping as a whole.   
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